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PREFACE 
 
 
 
In 2004-5 the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) is holding a series of 
policy workshops as part of a programme with the self-explanatory title Needs and 
Options for Security-Sector Transparency and Reform in Ukraine and Moldova 
(NOSTRUM, for short).  This is an exercise funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of The Netherlands.  It is being conducted in collaboration with the Ukrainian Centre 
for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov (UCEPS, or the 
Razumkov Centre) and Moldova’s Institute for Public Policy (IPP). 
 
The workshops represent the second phase of the NOSTRUM venture.  The first 
phase occupied the period July-November 2003 and involved initial planning, 
preparatory meetings and some exploratory research on ‘needs and options’. The 
preparatory meetings were held in Chisinau and Kiev.  The exploratory research was 
conducted for, and reviewed at, a Roundtable convened in Odessa (at the end of 
November). 
 
This Harmonie Paper comprises the material specially commissioned for the Odessa 
gathering (Parts B and C) plus chapters on policy priorities derived from that material 
(Part D).  (Part A is a brief Introduction which incorporates a summary of the 
contributed papers.) 
 
The ‘priorities’ chapters have been written by CESS’s Director and Research Director, 
Peter Volten and David Greenwood – who acted as Moderators at the November 
Roundtable – and they represent possible points of departure for the policy workshops 
of NOSTRUM’s second phase.   
 
The heart of this text, though, is the preceding contributed work.  This consists of 
original essays offering different perspectives on security-sector transparency-
building and reform relevant to the circumstances of Ukraine and Moldova.  To be 
specific, analyses for Odessa were solicited from 
• knowledgeable individuals in three ‘neighbourhood’ states –  Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovakia – that have not only recent reform experience to share 
but also a record of accomplishment in this regard sufficient to earn them 
accession to NATO (papers in Part B here); 
and 
• acknowledged experts from the two ‘target’ countries themselves plus 
respected international commentators on Moldovan and Ukrainian security-
sector affairs (papers in Part C). 
There is a wealth of information and insight in these pieces.  Each is valuable in its 
own right and not just as an input to NOSTRUM agenda-setting.  Hence this 
publication. 
 
 
 
  iv 
To all contributing authors the Centre for European Security Studies owes a 
substantial debt of gratitude for their effort on our behalf.  Thanks are due also to 
colleagues Jos Boonstra and Merijn Hartog, who are co-managing the NOSTRUM 
exercise as a whole; and to Joke Venema, who prepared this text for the printer. 
 
 
 
Margriet Drent 
Executive Director, CESS 
Groningen 
29 February 2004                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The contributed material in Parts B and C is prepared here as submitted, apart from 
some layout – and language – editing. This explains the variations to be found in use 
of hyphens, italics, capital letters and inverted commas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Preface and Chapters I and XV have been translated into local languages for our 
Moldovan readers. 
 
This Preface and Chapters I and XVI have been translated into Ukrainian. 
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I. NEEDS AND OPTIONS FOR UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA 
 
David Greenwood 
 
 
At the beginning of 2004 three small states of the former Soviet Union stand at the 
threshold of NATO accession and membership of the European Union (EU). By the 
middle of the year the Baltic nations – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – will have 
fulfilled their European vocation (as will Poland, a NATO member since 1999, and 
Slovakia). A pair of other erstwhile Eastern bloc countries – Bulgaria and Romania – 
will also join NATO in mid-2004 and have high hopes of admission to the EU later in 
the decade. 
Where does this leave the three westernmost states of the post-Soviet 
Commonwealth of Independent States, and in particular the odd couple – Ukraine and 
Moldova – that have also in their different ways declared a clear European ‘vocation’ 
(which the other member of the trio, Belarus, has not)? 
The short, and candid, answer is that nobody knows. However, much thought 
is being given to this matter, especially where security is concerned.1 Moreover, one 
thing we do know is that neither the mighty Ukraine nor little Moldova is likely to be 
able to develop satisfactory Western connections while their military forces and other 
‘armed structures of the state’ remain largely unreformed and while their conduct of 
security affairs continues to be characterised by a conspicuous lack of transparency. 
On top of that, of course, such shortcomings are obviously obstacles to the two 
countries’ overall progress, quite apart from national aspirations to join the European 
mainstream. 
What in this respect do Ukraine and Moldova need to do? And what concrete 
policy options for security-sector reform and transparency-building commend 
themselves? These are the questions addressed in the present study, with a view to 
formulating a practical policy agenda for each country. 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
To help answer the questions we sought views on ‘needs’ and ‘options’ from three 
sources: first, national experts of high standing, able to bring to their analyses detailed 
knowledge and understanding of local conditions and circumstances; secondly, a 
select number of well-informed and well-regarded ‘outside’ observers of Ukrainian 
and Moldovan security affairs; and, thirdly, analysts from three neighbouring or 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Judy Batt and others, Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe, 
Chaillot Papers No. 64, (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, September 2003), especially Chapter 
2 – by Dov Lynch, one of the contributors to this book– plus the annexed texts of such key documents 
as the European Commission’s Communication on Wider Europe (11 March 2003) and the European 
Council’s Conclusions Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood (18 June 2003). There is also some 
material on this theme in Alyson Bailes, Oleksiy Melnyk and Ian Anthony, Relics of Cold War: 
Europe’s Challenge, Ukraine’s Experience, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 6, (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, November 2003). Oleksiy Melnyk is another contributor to the present volume.  
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neighbourhood states – Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria – who were asked to reflect 
on their own countries’ recent experience of security-sector reform (general and 
specific), highlighting any lessons learned (and mistakes made) that policy-makers in 
Kiev and Chisinau might be wise to take into account. 
The result is a wealth of fascinating material. The contributions of the 
‘neighbourhood’ authors are, perhaps, of particular interest. To be sure, some of these 
pieces are long on description and short on critical evaluation. In others there is a 
suspicion that, with an international readership in mind, a felt need to present national 
accomplishment in the best possible light may have affected the writing. Here and 
there instructive messages for Ukraine and Moldova emerge only if one is prepared to 
read between the lines. For all that, each essay has an authentic flavour, something 
often lacking in Western prescriptions based on ‘ideal type’ models of security-sector 
practice (or, worse, outright theoretical abstractions). 
There are self-evident gains from juxtaposing the views on needs and options 
(and imperatives) for Ukraine and Moldova of domestic experts on the one hand, 
international commentators on the other. The local perception of problems and policy 
possibilities is where the construction of any agenda for action begins: ‘you start from 
where you are’ (actually from where you think you are). What the outsider brings to 
the debate is, first and foremost, clarity of vision uncluttered by mystique – the classic 
‘naked emperor’ role – and, hopefully, disinterested judgement. In the present context 
this last is needed most clearly in the case of Moldova, because of the Transdniestria 
dispute.2  
 
 
The Experience of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia 
 
The six ‘neighbourhood’ perspectives – three pairs of chapters – make up Part B 
below (Chapters II-VII). The first essay in each country-couple offers a general 
survey of the relevant state’s reform experience. The second deals with a specific 
feature to which attention is drawn as an example of good regional practice (or 
effective improvisation) that might be of particular interest to decision-makers in 
either Ukraine or Moldova (possibly both). 
 
 
Bulgaria 
 
The contributions of our Bulgarian authors are exemplary in conforming to this 
pattern. In a thorough and vigorous account of recent history the ‘general survey’ 
writer, Valery Ratchev, highlights the problems and prejudices – and the political 
pusillanimity – that prevailed in his country throughout the first half of the 1990s; and 
                                                 
2
 The word ‘Transdniestria’ is used here for Moldova’s breakaway ‘para-state’ because it is generally 
accepted in diplomatic and academic circles, though the Republic’s own nomenclature is different. See 
the International Crisis Group’s publication Moldova: No Quick Fix, ICG Europe Report No. 147, 
Chisinau and Brussels, 12 August 2003, p.3. In the contributed papers in Parts B and C the form 
favoured by the respective authors has been retained. 
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then goes on to record the progress made, at least in the military domain, once 
determined leaders took the levers of power in Sofia. (However there is a great deal of 
unfinished business, he says, where non-military security-sector organisations are 
concerned.) As for the ‘special feature’ piece, one of the principal architects of 
Bulgaria’s post-1997 force reduction, rationalisation and restructuring effort, Todor 
Tagarev, provides an admirably lucid explanation of the origins and development of 
an Integrated Defence Resources Management System (IDRMS) that is now a key 
tool – arguably the key tool – for resource allocation and budget execution as the 
country proceeds through further military transformation on its way to NATO 
membership. It is the institutionalisation of the IDRMS that is a signal 
accomplishment, Tagarev says: a product of reform that will facilitate – is already 
facilitating – continuing reform and, also, represents a most important contribution to 
transparency-building in defence. 
Ratchev highlights a number of ‘lessons learned’ from Bulgarian experience. 
He gives particular prominence to the following (author’s order retained). 
• Security-sector reform needs strong and continuous political management, 
based on a common understanding among politicians, professionals and 
society on the major issues of the national security vision, strategy and policy. 
• Sustaining the momentum of reform depends on the commitment and 
effectiveness of ministers and top executives, who must be prepared to fight 
not only organisational inertia but also entrenched opposition. 
• Redefinition of what constitutes professionalism in the contemporary 
environment is necessary to ensure that security-sector staffs at all levels are 
equipped to deal with new security and political realities.3 
• Substantial management capacity and competence are needed for effective and 
timely reforms.  
• Change is turbulent; and maintaining the motivation of personnel – uniformed 
and civilian, throughout the defence organisation – is a formidable challenge 
and requires considerable effort. 
• The legal foundation of the security-sector reform process requires constant 
attention and development. 
• The core of reform is definition of security-sector organisations’ new 
paradigm(s): the forces’ rationale, roles and missions. 
• Effort must, however, also be put into effective arrangements for public 
information, as the process unfolds and when the ‘new model’ is up and 
running. 
• The same applies to provision for security-sector organisations’ all-round 
accountability to elected representatives and other civil society institutions, an 
obligation that top decision-makers, senior officials, commanders and 
managers especially should respect. 
These are the considered observations of a thoughtful and articulate observer of his  
 
                                                 
3
 The author does not say as much, but in these first three items on the checklist he pinpoints the factors 
that did not obtain in Bulgaria before 1997-99.  
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country’s recent security-sector reform and transparency-building effort: Kiev and 
Chisinau take note.4 
Inspection of Ratchev’s enumeration of ‘lessons learned’ – especially the early 
entries in the listing – prompts one obvious observation. If there is a single ‘golden 
rule’ for progress in security-sector reform (certainly military reform) it is that 
without the right people the process goes nowhere, may not even get underway. What 
Todor Tagarev has to say in the following chapter supports this, but puts an important 
gloss on the judgement: it helps if the reformers can devise and develop tools for the 
job; and the consolidation of change is greatly assisted if their approach to decision-
making can be successfully embedded in the procedures of the administration. 
The management tool that Tagarev describes – the IDRMS (see above) – has 
served Bulgaria well in this regard, and something like it might be the answer for 
others still facing big transformation challenges (for example, Ukraine). Would-be 
followers of Sofia’s example should, though, register the prerequisites for an effective 
system.  
• It must be comprehensive, covering all defence activities, expenditures and 
sources of finance (state budget funds, own revenues, foreign military 
assistance, and so on.). 
• It should allow for the efficient and straightforward translation of costed 
defence programmes into conventional budget submissions.  
• All planning documents ought to incorporate easily understood and assessable 
performance measurement indicators. 
• For a NATO-membership aspirant the set-up should be compatible with 
NATO’s defence procedures so far as possible.  
• The system must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate contingencies and 
unforeseen changes in economic, financial and social circumstances (even 
allowing in-year programme reviews and updates). 
• It should provide for broad organisational participation, but with clear loci of 
decision-making authority making well-documented decisions available to all 
resource managers in a timely manner. 
Further to this last point, Tagarev adds that it is important even in the system’s 
development phase to involve representatives of all future players from all branches 
of the defence administration and the senior military authorities, in particular 
budgeting professionals. The finance ministry, the legislature and the national audit 
office, and the office of the Head of State (the Supreme Commander in Chief) should 
be engaged as well. What must be paramount, though, is that the designed 
management system adequately implements all the main principles listed. Finally, 
echoing Ratchev’s sentiment, Todor Tagarev says that ‘the personal involvement of a 
                                                 
4
 Writing at end-2003, with his country engaged in a further Strategic Defence Review, Ratchev also 
has a great deal to say about what this latest exercise needs to accomplish and how in general the 
Bulgarian defence effort should evolve through the early years of its NATO membership (from mid-
2004). Most of these observations are uncontroversial – counsels of perfection, some might say – but 
they are too numerous to summarise here. We recognise, though, that a wise commentator’s views on 
‘what must now be done’ or ‘what we must now be careful not to do’ may be every bit as instructive as 
‘lessons learned’ firmly based on the evidence of experience. 
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senior resource manager – the Minister of Defence or a designated deputy minister – 
is indispensable’ for the setting-up of a system and its successful operation. People 
matter. 
In addition to the points summarised above, both our Bulgarian authors 
acknowledge that the country had useful external assistance as it grappled with 
‘change management’: bilateral help, especially from the Americans; and, most 
important, from 1999/2000 to 2003/2004 the feedback received as part of NATO’s 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. 
 
 
Romania 
 
There are many similarities between the post-Cold War reform experience of Bulgaria 
and that of neighbouring Romania. Both countries reduced their defence efforts in the 
first half of the 1990s, but retained ‘legacy’ force structures, obsolescent weapons, 
redundant facilities and superfluous top brass. Neither embarked on earnest reform 
until a welcome conjuncture: strong personalities appeared on the scene – the Kostov 
administration’s defence team in Sofia, the Iliescu-Nastase-Pascu partnership in 
Bucharest; and the prospect of joining NATO finally became real – which had the 
effect of not only concentrating minds but also bringing with it externally monitored 
and assisted preparation for accession under the MAP scheme. (In addition, of course, 
both countries steadily earned favour with NATO – and with the United States 
especially – in 1999 and after, initially by being supportive throughout the Kosovo 
crisis and conflict, later by demonstrating the value of their real estate as staging 
ground for force deployments to Afghanistan, Central Asia generally and the Middle 
East.) 
Needless to say, there is more to the Romanian story than this. As Adrian 
Pop’s account tells us, in the early post-Cold War years lack of vision, confusion and 
wishful thinking were commonplace. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
security-sector reform was a tough learning process and it is only with hindsight that 
it is easy to see what had to be done. ‘The countries belonging to the former Soviet 
space could and should benefit from the lessons learnt along the way – the hard way – 
by the CEE countries,’ he says. Moreover in Romania necessary foundations were 
laid in this period: important steps towards establishing civilian control of armed 
forces and restructuring them; and, after 1994, engagement in interoperability-
oriented programmes under the aegis of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). 
Still, as Pop acknowledges, reshaping military formations and transforming a 
defence organisation are two quite different things. The latter did not get underway 
until a raft of old assumptions were set aside; and it proved easier to do that once 
Romania was engaged in the MAP process. The inaugural 1999/2000 cycle exposed, 
our writer notes, ‘serious dysfunctional features: unrealistic planning; discrepancy 
between objectives and resources; lack of co-ordination between the departments and 
services of the defence organisation; lack of funds; and a reversed personnel pyramid’. 
The good news is that the last is now largely corrected; the other shortcomings have 
Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building 
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been addressed; and the Ministry of National Defence (MND) believes that it can 
deliver against its 2003-2007 prospectus (focused on an Objective Force 2007 with an 
active strength of 75,000 military men and 15,000 civilians). 
There is also more to security-sector reform than reorganising defence. Now 
overdue in Romania, Adrian Pop thinks, are (1) a wide-ranging review of the division 
of labour between law-enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as between the 
domestic and foreign branches of the latter; and (2) effort to promote – under strict 
political guidance – greater inter-agency co-operation among the defence 
establishment, the law-enforcement and intelligence agencies (domestic and foreign) 
plus various military and civilian institutions. 
The second Romanian piece in Part B of this volume complements the first. 
Tudor Munteanu describes the country’s arrangements for democratic control of the 
armed forces and, as a senior military man, has his own perspective on restructuring 
and reform. His chapter also offers helpful detail on current defence priorities. 
However, Munteanu’s contribution holds special interest so far as the present 
exercise is concerned because of the material it contains on how Romania has made 
special institutional provision for (a) the management of executive-legislature 
relations, with particular reference to defence, and (b) the dissemination of public 
information about military affairs. It is authoritative material too: at the MND in 
Bucharest General Munteanu’s job title is Deputy Under-Secretary of Defence for 
Relations with the Parliament, Legal Harmonisation and Public Relations; and he 
works for a State Secretary (Deputy Minister) for Parliamentary Liaison. 
There are very few defence ministries that have made the business of two-way 
communication with elected representatives – largely, but by no means exclusively, to 
smooth the passage of legislation – the responsibility of a top office-holder with high-
ranking staff. It pays dividends, however, according to the Romanian experience, 
judging by the way in which the legal aspects of preparation for NATO accession 
have been handled and the nature of the relationship between the MND and the 
Standing Committees for Defence, Public Order and National Security (the oversight 
bodies). For that reason it is a ‘special feature’ of Romania’s institutional 
arrangements for handling security-sector reform and transparency building about 
which Ukraine and Moldova – and perhaps also ‘other countries belonging to the 
former Soviet space’ – might want to learn more. As General Munteanu himself puts 
it: ‘military transparency is the key which unlocks the door to successful 
implementation of military reform’. 
Interestingly, in the Munteanu essay there is also passing reference to the set-
up at the Romanian MND for tackling resource allocation and resources management, 
the matters dealt with in Bulgaria using the IDRMS described by Todor Tagarev. 
There is a similar system. In Bucharest they call it their Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Evaluation System (PPBES). 
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Slovakia 
 
Against the background of the material from Bulgaria and Romania, that on Slovakia 
promotes a distinct sense of ‘déjà vu all over again’. Ivo Samson’s general piece 
quotes the following characterisation of attention to security-sector reform in the 
country’s first decade. 
  1993 – 1995: time of identifying the problems 
  1996 – 1998: continuity of reform attempts  
  1999 – 2002/3: transition from declamations to real reform 
Gabriel Kopecky’s contribution – on the urgent ‘defence review’ initiated at the 
beginning of 2001 – makes clear that even the eventual ‘transition’ to action was slow 
to gather momentum. The critical conjuncture did not occur until that time, when 
Jozef Stank was appointed Minister of Defence and the powers-that-be in Bratislava 
realised that the state of the armed forces was such that joining the post-Cold War 
‘second wave’ of NATO enlargement was far from assured. 
In the event, of course, Slovakia was a ‘second wave’ invitee at NATO’s 
November 2002 Summit in Prague, heralding accession in mid-2004. Presentation of 
the Force 2010 blueprint for the country’s future defences – the outcome of Stank’s 
urgent review – presumably satisfied the sceptics in member-states. Not everyone is 
entirely happy, however, with the strategy documents upon which this prospectus is 
based (also refreshed in the 2001 review). Samson thinks they still contain some 
dubious threat assessments, not to mention too many ‘generalisations and clichés’ and 
‘overlapping goals’ and ‘tautological definitions’: in other words, they need further 
refreshment. Moreover, the Force 2010 text is a portfolio of promissory notes – this is 
how good it’s going to be – and Slovakia has earned something of a reputation for 
failing to do what it has said it will do. 
Thus, if we are interested in ‘lessons learned’ from the Slovak experience (as 
we are), the clearest to emerge is that this is probably not the way to tackle a security-
sector reform challenge. Ivo Samson does not say this explicitly; but it is the 
sentiment implicit in his observations. Gabriel Kopecky might concur, perhaps, taking 
a decade-long view. On the other hand, the central message of his contribution is clear: 
if circumstances require that you do an urgent defence review, after years of 
procrastination, there is a lot to be said for doing it the way we did it. 
Kopecky describes ‘the way we did it’ at the beginning and end of his chapter. 
(In-between he presents material on what the outcomes were.) 
• Minister Stank established a Steering Committee (SC) and put his State 
Secretary in the chair, with the Chief of the General Staff as deputy-chair. The 
SC supervised five Working Groups (WGs), under the Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff’s direction. Membership of the WGs included advisers from the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. 
• This apparatus was tasked to (a) refresh the Military Strategy of the Slovak 
Republic; (b) develop a concept for the armed forces plus force structure and 
other prescriptions for dissemination in a document entitled The Armed Forces 
of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010 (antecedent of the eventual Force 2010 
Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building 
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blueprint); and (c) draw up a concrete Long-term Plan for the Structure and 
Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. It was also given 
the job of producing a new organisational structure of the defence ministry. 
• A methodology was developed ‘to provide discipline and focus to the work’. 
Essentially this involved the systematic examination of trade-offs among 
capabilities, cost, and risk. On the basis of ‘the current threat assessment’ it 
was possible to concentrate attention on ‘planning efforts to counter the more 
likely threat of Regional Armed Conflict’ (the yardstick Ivo Samson considers 
dubious). 
• All study products went for discussion and final approval to the SC which 
during the review met monthly or as needed. Between SC meetings work was 
evaluated and coordinated by an Integration Team, comprising all team 
leaders plus top officials and top brass. The Minister of Defence himself 
visited Integration Team meetings frequently. All proposals had to be 
presented in such a way that members of the National Assembly might 
understand them clearly. It was agreed that all documents, except a few very 
sensitive ones, should be unclassified 
• When work at SC level was finished, an approved document was sent to the 
Minister. Submission of the final document Armed Forces of the Slovak 
Republic – Model 2010 marked the last stage of work at the defence ministry. 
There followed approval by the State Defense Council, a special body of 
ministers chaired by the prime minister.  
This major text subsequently received Parliamentary approval. Around 70 per cent of 
elected representatives voted ‘for’ it, testimony to the care taken to explain official 
thinking to the legislature throughout the review exercise. 
This process, it is worth remembering, yielded a blueprint and promissory 
notes. Business might not have been done so expeditiously if ‘immediate action’ 
decisions had been involved. Gabriel Kopecky’s insider’s view is none the less 
illuminating, in several ways. Noteworthy for present purposes are that it confirms the 
value of ministerial drive and input, of the systematic examination of 
capability/cost/risk trade-offs when considering alternative force configurations (cf. 
Tagarev on the genesis of Bulgaria’s Plan 2004), and of maintaining transparency of 
the process vis à vis the legislators who have ‘the power of the purse’ and to whom 
decision-makers are in the last analysis accountable (cf. Munteanu on executive-
legislature relations in Romania). 
The glaring omission from our material on Slovakia is information and insight 
on what, if anything, has been done there to reform police forces, security services, 
domestic and foreign intelligence agencies (or non-military security-sector 
organisations). There is ‘unfinished business’ in Bulgaria, a contributor says. It is the 
same in Romania. Is it the case in the Slovak Republic also? Our authors’ silence on 
the subject suggests that perhaps it is.  
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Perceptions in and of Moldova and Ukraine 
 
Following these neighbourhood perspectives in our volume (Part B) are the 
contributions to the work by local authors and by our chosen ‘outside’ commentators 
(Part C). There are seven chapters altogether in this Part: two by Moldovans (Chapters 
VIII and IX), two by Ukrainians (Chapters XIII and XIV), and alongside these – 
actually in-between them – the three other pieces (Chapters X-XII). 
 
 
Moldovan views 
 
In the Republic of Moldova there is interest in security-sector transparency building 
and reform for all the usual reasons associated with shedding a post-Soviet legacy, 
furthering democratisation and completing what Nicolae Chirtoaca calls the 
‘unfinished construction of the nation and the state’. Moreover, some positive 
developments have taken place in the ‘proper’ Moldova, as a Polish commentator 
calls it.5 (In breakaway Transdniestria there is evidence of none.) 
Reform in the Republic has been slow and superficial, however, partly 
because of an imperfect understanding of what is required. Chirtoaca cites apparent 
satisfaction with nominal civilian control of the military. He also finds not only a lack 
of consensus among stakeholders about ‘next steps’ but also little domestic impetus 
for further headway. True, a new Concept of Military Reform appeared in 2002 but, 
while its prescriptions for rationalising the armed forces are satisfactory, other 
features are not. In particular a veil of ambiguity lies over the matter of where 
responsibility for implementation rests. (Also, there have been no counterpart 
documents on police and judicial reform.) 
Looking ahead, regarding the domestic agenda, the things that Nicolae 
Chirtoaca would like to see are  
• a strengthening of the civilian oversight and management of the armed forces 
and security services, to which end he advocates enhancing civilian expertise 
within all the relevant ministries, raising the profile of the relevant 
parliamentary oversight committees, and establishing independent research 
institutes specializing in defence and security issues ‘to work in direct contact 
with the decision-making structures’; 
• much greater transparency in security-sector affairs, because ‘a lack of 
transparency creates the dangerous trend towards politicisation and abuse of 
the military and security services by the authorities and political groupings’; 
• the more active involvement in monitoring the security sector of institutions 
and organisations of civil society (including the media), especially in using 
increased transparency of budgeting and improved auditing mechanisms to 
                                                 
5
 Jacek Wróbel, whose ‘Transnistria’ (sic) in Armed Conflicts in the post-Soviet region, CES Studies 
No. 9, (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2003), is an excellent concise overview of the 
dispute. 
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help reduce ‘the level of corruption and waste of resources in security-sector 
programmes’; 
and 
• greater regional and sub-regional (international) co-operation, not least 
because this should ‘yield knowledge transfer and contribute to the change of 
mentality of participating Moldovan civilians and military’.  
In addition, of course, Chirtoaca has views on the Transdniestrian dispute which 
impinges on the domestic reform agenda: its persistence creates uncertainties over the 
content of reform and it absorbs politicians’ energy and attention. (Basically he 
expresses foreboding about a possible termination of the ‘frozen conflict’ that 
effectively legitimises the secessionist regime and, in this and other ways, gives 
Moscow ‘a permanent lever of influence’ in the running of his country.) 
The piece here by our second Moldovan contributor, Vlad Lupan, covers 
much the same ground as Nicolae Chirtoaca’s but with different emphases. Lupan 
also has things to say about his country’s early security-sector reform efforts, but 
usefully records the transformation of some ‘old Soviet structures’ (the KGB and 
Militia) and the setting-up of a new Ministry of Interior with its own interior troops 
(Carabinieri). He too has looked at the 2002 Concept of Military Reform, but judges it 
more positively. He has picked up, for example, a reference to ‘democratic command 
and control’ as a subject on which Moldova plans dialogue with others’ armed forces; 
and he notes that there is a commitment to ‘creation of a civilian and military 
command structure of the Armed Forces with a detailed delimitation of the 
attributions in the sphere of political, administrative and military command’. (Not 
until 2005-2008, though.) 
As for the future, Vlad Lupan, thinks security-sector reform (SSR) needs 
external stimulus and will benefit from international support. 
‘Thus, the enlargement of NATO and the European Union up to the borders of 
Moldova, the recently-declared EU policy on [its] wider neighbourhood and the 
expressed strategic goal of Moldova to integrate in EU might be those factors that 
could provide new solutions and give a new momentum to SSR.’  
He adds that ‘a future Transnistrian conflict resolution, as well as some 
positive signals from the EU on its greater and more direct involvement in Moldovan 
affairs … would give some additional impetus’. (On the prospects for that ‘conflict 
resolution’ Lupan is studiously non-committal.)  
 
 
Independent commentaries 
 
More direct EU involvement in Moldovan affairs generally and in the resolution of 
the Trandniestrian conflict particularly are the dominant themes in the first of the 
‘outside’ contributions to this text.6 Its author, Dov Lynch, is close to EU thinking on 
pursuit of the ‘Wider Europe’ agenda and has thought a great deal about the 
Transdniestria issue. His piece demonstrates this clearly. 
                                                 
6
 ‘Outside' meaning here outside Moldova, Ukraine and the immediate neighbourhood. 
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Lynch’s essential message here is that nobody should be surprised that the 
latest efforts to end the deadlock over Moldova’s breakaway ‘republic’ have ground 
to a halt (end-2003). ‘The negotiations have gone on ice’, he writes, so we still have a 
“frozen” conflict. Still, he thinks there is a way forward, based on, among other 
things, the following. 
• The resumption of discussions on a new constitution in parallel with the 
exploration of options for provision of security guarantees through a “peace 
consolidation force”. This last notion is important, Lynch argues, because any 
new security arrangement ‘must work against the artificial militarisation that 
has emerged since 1992’. The force should have a civilian and police focus, he 
says. Most important, he thinks that the EU can and should take the lead in 
both ‘designing and directing new security arrangements’ and providing 
whatever forces might be necessary to police them. 
• Further measures to press the powers-that-be in Tiraspol towards settlement. 
(‘Sticks must be combined with carrots’, Lynch says.) Options here include 
freezing of assets and ‘the institution of an EU-wide “refusal-to-deal” with 
companies active on the left bank [i.e. in Transdniestria]’. 
The ‘other things’ in the Lynch prescription include insistence that the Russians 
honour their troop withdrawal commitment; and perseverance with efforts to obtain 
from Ukraine a firm commitment to co-operate in border management. 
Russia’s interests and motives in the latest negotiations and démarches 
concerning Transdniestria, Ukraine’s position on the border management question and 
in general, the opportunities presented by the EU’s newly expressed commitment to 
engage more actively with its eastern neighbours (because it wants stable and well-
governed countries on its eastern frontiers) – these themes are all prominent in the 
second of our ‘outside’ contributions. 
Alex Rahr’s essay is brimful of ideas by about the meaning for Moldova and 
Ukraine of the fact that Russia’s former “near abroad” will become part of the EU’s 
“near abroad” from mid-2004. Both countries would like to ‘emancipate themselves 
from the dominant Russian neighbour by means of closer ties with the West’, he notes; 
and he sees several opportunities for them to enhance their strategic cooperation with 
the EU particularly but also with NATO. For example, Ukraine could take a stronger 
mediator role in the Transdniestria conflict and do both itself and Moldova a favour 
by improving border control on their 400km of common frontier. (The very existence 
of the breakaway republic is largely dependent on its trade with Ukraine and transit of 
goods through Ukraine.) Collaboration here might lead to development of other forms 
of cross-border co-operation. This is ‘one of the areas in which effective 
transformation is possible’, Rahr says, ‘and will be favourably perceived and 
supported by the EU [because it] stimulates economic growth and higher standards of 
living on both sides of the border and assists to improve conditions for the investment 
climate’. ‘Ukraine and Moldova could then be promoted into the European 
communication and transportation networks’, he thinks. 
For its part, Rahr believes, the EU should develop a security partnership with 
Ukraine and Moldova within the framework of its European Security and Defence 
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Policy (ESDP). This notion appeals because he sees the OSCE as having become 
weaker in its role as the main instrument of peace and stability in the post-Soviet 
space. The development of a more modern and robust ESDP-mechanism might, he 
argues, better suit the conflict situations in Moldova and other states of the former 
USSR. 
However, Ukraine continues ‘to face most serious obstacles and challenges on 
its way to full-fledged integration’, Rahr writes, and ‘many of them are home-made’. 
Among these he cites security-sector reform, or rather the lack of it. ‘The 
restructuring of Ukraine’s military forces has not shown positive results’, he says, and 
‘the bureaucracy is still locked in former Soviet thinking’. Nor has the country yet 
placed civil-military relations on a satisfactory footing. ‘Only a radical rethinking of 
the leadership, like in Romania and Bulgaria in the second half of the 1990s, can 
bring a breakthrough’, Rahr concludes. 
The third and last of the independent commentaries in Part C addresses 
directly the question of security-sector reform in Ukraine, except that James Sherr 
says ‘transformation, not reform, is what is needed’.  This is because of the tenacity 
of the Soviet legacy across the sector – though less in the armed forces than in other 
‘security and power structures’ – and an overarching need generally to change the 
relationship between state and society in the country.7 
As this is written (end-2003), the powers-that-be in Kiev are looking, again, at 
the future shape and size of the armed forces in a far-reaching review initiated by 
recently-appointed Defence Minister Marchuk (and due for completion in mid-2004).  
The central task is to get planned provision and likely resource availability on a stable 
footing.  It will not be easy, according to James Sherr; partly because it never is; 
partly because a couple of special considerations complicate contemporary 
calculations.  First, although aspiring to NATO membership, Ukraine cannot yet 
presume that it will be admitted.  Secondly, the country cannot assume that the days 
of Russian mischief-making are over (witness the 2003 Tuzla crisis). 
What the present leadership has shown little interest in, however, is overdue 
reform – or transformation – of the state’s many non-military security-sector 
organisations.  ‘Today’, Sherr reminds us, ‘these structures include Internal Troops 
and a vast array of specialist forces within the domain of the MVS (Ministry of 
Interior) and militsia (police), the civilian and military components of the SBU 
(Security Service of Ukraine), troops of the State Committee on Defence of State 
Borders, Ministry of Emergency Situations, State Customs Service, Tax Police, and 
                                                 
7
 At the same time, Sherr draws attention to some important accomplishments.  ‘The fact that troops of 
the Soviet Armed Forces, MVD and KGB numbering 1.4 million men were substantially reduced and 
thoroughly resubordinated – all of this without conflict and upheaval – was a contribution to European 
order second only to the country’s unilateral nuclear disarmament’, he writes, referring to the early 
1990s.  He notes also that ‘a critical mass of state officials, security professionals and independent 
experts understand the dangers inherent in the Soviet legacy as well as the present post-Soviet status 
quo’ and have been able to exert some influence on defence decision-making since the later 1990s.  It 
is important also, Sherr argues, to recognise the significance of the NATO-Ukraine relationship that has 
developed over the years, which represents ‘an astonishing record for a military establishment which 
viewed (and to a fair extent still views) transparency as a threat to departmental interests and national 
security.’         
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the Main Directorate for Struggle against Organised Crime and Corruption’.  
Moreover, the core structures – the MVS and SBU – function much as their 
antecedents did in Soviet times: as instruments of control over society (now at the 
service of who knows whom).  Thus, Sherr writes, they are ‘on the cutting edge of the 
relationship between state and society and subject to all its strains and distortions’; 
and it is crucial, therefore, that they be made accountable and that their financing be 
made transparent.  ‘If the state cannot fund militsia, border guards, customs officers 
and tax police’, he says, ‘somebody else will’. 
Sherr goes on to comment on the dysfunctional nature of Ukraine’s (inherited) 
administrative culture and attitude to public information.  He concludes, however, on 
his central themes.  The imperative of transformation is recognised in the military 
field, but there are tough choices ahead.  It is imperative that transformation is 
extended to the wider security sector, not least because this challenge ‘is directly 
connected to the most important challenge of all: diminishing the gap between state 
and society in Ukraine’. 
 
 
Ukrainian voices 
 
Following Sherr’s analysis, and concluding Part C, are two views from Kiev: a 
chapter by Grigoriy Perepelitsya; and a chapter that is the joint work of Oleksiy 
Melnyk and Leonid Polyakov. Interestingly, these Ukrainian authors concur in Sherr’s 
overall assessment that, so far as their country’s security sector is concerned, in 
2004/2005 we should be talking not so much about ‘needs’ and ‘options’ for reform, 
more about imperatives. 
In Perepelitsya’s opinion action is called for in both the armed forces 
themselves and the institutions of democratic control. For him it is imperative because 
he wants Ukraine to commit itself to joining NATO – the sooner the better – and 
thinks that the country will not be considered a serious candidate unless it is already 
clearly committed to root-and-branch reform. Once a candidate, it will have the 
benefit of stimulus and assistance from the MAP process. In the meantime it has the 
Ukraine-NATO Action Plan arrangement as an aid to self-discipline; and it has not 
responded to that as it should have done, he says. 
He notes, for example, the many shortfalls in meeting Action Plan targets that 
were reported in mid-2003; and he foresees continuing difficulties for Ukraine in 
meeting key military objectives. These are (1) showing that the country can make an 
appropriate contribution to collective defence and for contingency operations; (2) 
indicating a willingness and ability progressively to improve its capabilities; and (3) 
meeting standardisation and interoperability objectives. On the third of these points, 
the present leadership’s continuing insistence on equipment deals with Russia and/or 
domestic procurement could be problematical. 
Given this reasoning it comes as something of a surprise to find that, pending 
completion of the major review that Defence Minister Marchuk is conducting, 
Perepelitsya’s priorities for 2004/5 would include a campaign to muster both domestic 
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and international support for Ukraine’s NATO candidacy, devising a border regime 
acceptable to the EU, ‘reinforcing control’ over the Russians’ military presence(s) in 
the country and ‘creating preconditions’ for their withdrawal from Sevastopol, 
achieving NATO connectivity in a couple of areas (airspace management and 
communications), and establishing a well-balanced system of military-industrial co-
operation (see previous paragraph) – but nothing specific in the domain of security-
sector reform. On this, all he offers is ‘optimisation of the structure and function of 
the military organization of the state’ (which could mean anything or nothing). 
On transparency-building and the ‘democratic control’ issue generally, 
however, Grigoriy Perepelitsya is less elusive. He explains that the legal base for a 
satisfactory regime exists, thanks to several statutes including a 2003 Law, but he 
would like to see 
• Additional ‘normative documents’ to regulate decisions on definite issues and 
strengthen the position of civilian officials and experts in their dealings with 
the uniformed military;  
• More civilian appointments throughout the defence organization with the 
position of ‘civil bodies in the Armed Forces of Ukraine’ properly elaborated; 
and;  
• Exact definition of the powers of the (civilian) minister and his deputies. 
Perepelitsya’s advocacy here is related to concern about the powers of the Presidency 
and the Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine (CNSD). He cites the 
danger of ‘substitution of democratic principles with authoritarian methods … when 
civilian ministers and civil personnel of force structures can be appointed just 
according to the principle of personal devotion to the President or loyalty to the party 
[whose leaders make up the President’s entourage]’. This anxiety also underlies our 
author’s wish to see 
• Improvement in the control exercised over the intelligence service(s) and 
special forces. 
Significantly none of these points expressly calls for legislative oversight (so that it is 
to how civil direction and control are exercised that they are addressed rather than 
democratic control in the fullest sense of the phrase). The reason is that the Ukrainian 
Rada and its ‘parties’ bear little resemblance to the elected representatives of any state 
west of Kiev. 
Melnyk and Polyakov would echo their fellow-countryman’s desire – and 
Sherr’s – to see Ukraine’s non-military security-sector structures brought under 
democratic control. These ‘remain basically unreformed from the time of their 
creation in the early 1990s’, they write. If efforts were made to carry reform into this 
area, however, it is likely that the initiative would receive ‘considerable’ public 
support, they believe. Is there any direction from which stimulus might come?  
Because of the organisations’ engagement in the continuous struggle for 
political power in Ukraine and the parallel process of redistribution of property, the 
likeliest source is external – the EU, maybe NATO. Certainly it appears that the 
country’s own leadership is not yet serious about, for example, democratising and 
improving the professionalism of the police in order to provide real security to its 
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citizens against the criminal world. This might alter, however, if that latent popular 
support were to grow in parallel with a recognition among the Kiev elite that 
continued inaction might prejudice EU and NATO membership aspirations. 
It is that kind of ‘squeeze’ – internal plus external pressure – that is most 
likely to break the logjam that has held up military reform in Ukraine for so long. 
Melnyk and Polyakov trace the record of negligence here. During the early years of 
Ukraine’s independence, the political elite concentrated its efforts on the 
subordination of military formations – removing them as a political factor in domestic 
struggles – rather than reforms that would have addressed the real needs of the Armed 
Forces and defence policy. This neglect was assisted by the non-existent role of civil 
society in the early 1990s, which prevented the Armed Forces’ popularity in society 
from significantly influencing the political agenda. In structural terms, it took years 
for the leadership to realise that the Soviet military heritage of some 800,000 military 
personnel and huge amounts of equipment was more of a liability than an asset. 
Thus, say Melnyk and Polyakov, throughout the 1990s ‘the Ukrainian military 
was basically left to reform itself as it saw fit, within the framework of shrinking 
budgets.’ ‘The failure to make sufficient reductions in force structure in the face of 
declining resources led’, they add, ‘to a situation where over 80 per cent of the MoD 
budget was (and still is) spent on the maintenance of personnel, leaving little left for 
either investment or maintaining the readiness of current forces’. Also the military 
remained imbued with the Soviet mindset and hamstrung by Soviet standards. The 
first serious engagements with NATO in the second half of the decade made a little 
difference, but not a lot. For instance, officers were able to take courses in Euro-
Atlantic Integration, but there was no thorough-going review of curricula and training 
at military education institutions. ‘The side-by-side existence of two standards – 
NATO and Soviet – causes systemic tensions that waste resources and reduce overall 
effectiveness’, our authors write. 
This was also a period of false starts in defence reform, which became habit-
forming. On top of that, it was not a learning process. Even after a series of reform 
efforts – as shown by the evolution of programmes such as the ‘State Programme of 
Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through 2005’ 
(adopted in 2000) to the ‘Concept for the Structure of the Armed Forces-2010’ 
(adopted in 2001) to the ‘State Programme of Transition of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine to Manning with Contracted Servicemen’ (adopted in 2002) – Ukraine has 
yet to address the need for systemic transformation, preferring to focus instead on 
quantitative factors (and step-by-step reductions to ever-shrinking targets). ‘As a 
result’, Melnyk and Polyakov say, ‘current plans are still unrealistic’. 
What, then, do these analysts think should happen now? What do they have to 
say about ‘needs’ and about ‘options’ for Ukraine in the short-to-medium term? 
Fundamental to their thinking is the proposition that ‘reform can only succeed 
if it can get in front of the current cycle of step-by-step reductions and ever-thinner 
distribution of scanty resources’. ‘The Ukrainian authorities have recently made 
promising declarations’, they say, ‘but the associated actions are still inconsistent or 
non-existent.’ 
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‘What is needed is a concentration of resources and consistency of reform 
measures, founded on strong political will and clear definition of priorities. But in the 
absence of a direct and visible large military threat, the country’s leadership, which is 
concerned primarily about short-term political issues, is unlikely to become sincerely 
concerned about addressing long-term issues related to military reform.’ 
‘Two factors that could overcome this lack of interest’, they continue, ‘are 
pressure either from the Ukrainian public and civil society and/or from Ukraine’s 
democratic partners in the West.’ 
The question is: pressure of what sort? Our contributors’ answer embodies the 
notion of creating a virtuous circle. There should be a stronger insistence by NATO 
on the fulfilment of some of the Organisation’s key expectations and requirements if 
Ukraine is in earnest about its membership aspirations; and by the EU on evidence 
that Kiev takes seriously the ‘good governance’ elements of the Union’s candidacy 
conditions. ‘Both the Western partners and civil society in Ukraine should consider 
that progress in defence reform will help highlight the urgency of democratising the 
entire system of state governance, including reforms in the political and economic 
spheres’ say Melnyk and Polyakov. As these occur, the way for further defence 
reform will become easier. There may be fewer false starts. 
Responsibility for sustaining the process should not be placed wholly on 
NATO and the EU, of course. It ought to be stressed constantly in Ukraine that 
realising the country’s declared intention to join those organisations depends on far-
reaching SSR. Three key issues will need to be addressed by a comprehensive and 
systemic approach: 
(1) establishing democratic norms in the security sector; 
(2) ensuring a security system that meets modern needs at affordable cost; 
and last, but not least, 
(3) attending to political factors.  
In the area of democratic standards – for NATO and EU membership – Ukraine will 
need to establish that it is a law-governed democracy in which human rights and 
political freedoms are fully respected and meet the more specific requirements for the 
security sector, including civilian direction and democratic civil control, ensuring 
effective border regimes (that simultaneously form a barrier to criminal activity and 
allow the free movement of legitimate people and goods across the border), and 
standards of law enforcement behaviour. 
Melnyk and Polyakov admit that to date the influence of NATO procedures on 
internal processes in Ukraine is mostly limited to the Armed Forces. To effectively 
promote change, Ukraine’s co-operation with an enlarging NATO and EU will need 
to better match, they recognize, wider SSR priorities embracing the non-military area 
(a high priority for both Perepelitsya and Sherr, remember).  
However, Melnyk and Polyakov conclude with a reminder that this process 
can only be effective if Ukraine gives priority to SSR and acts in systematic way. 
They say 
‘Action cannot be limited to agreeing an Action Plan with NATO and the EU 
(and perhaps eventually participation in MAP); it must be supported by national 
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procedures that are aimed at supporting a process of systemic transformation. These 
national procedures must: clearly identify national security interests and link them to 
tools (structures) and resources (budget and personnel); bring together planning (via 
the President), budgeting (via the Government and parliament) and execution 
(responsibility); and develop political and societal consensus on security needs and 
the price to be paid.’ 
Further, they think that linking democratisation and internal political reform 
(which the public supports) to NATO/EU accession (about which the public is 
ambivalent, or even hostile) will be crucial to changing attitudes and thus to the 
effectiveness of SSR in Ukraine. 
 
 
Agenda-setting 
 
From the wealth of material in Parts B and C of this volume – neighbourhood 
perspectives and some perceptions ‘in and of’ Moldova and Ukraine – we have tried 
to distil essentials.  These are presented in Part D as statements of priority actions for 
the two countries in the short-to-medium term: an Agenda for Moldova (Chapter XV) 
and an Agenda for Ukraine (Chapter XVI). 
 
Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building 
 
 20 
Harmonie Papers No.17 
 
 21 
 
 
 
 
 
Part B  Perspectives: Neighbourhood Experience 
Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building 
 
 22 
 
Harmonie Papers No.17 
 
 23 
II. BULGARIA: LESSONS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
 
Valeri Ratchev8 
 
 
Although the issues of security sector and defence reform became very popular during 
the last decade, still there is consensus neither on the spectrum of institutions and 
issues that should be covered by the process nor on what “reform” is and what it 
should encompass. Broadly, in the case of Bulgaria we identified through the method 
of “probe-fault” two different approaches towards reforms. One stresses that the 
reform is mainly an aspect of the overall democratisation process of the country and 
so it is an issue of political responsibility and control. The other approach argues that 
reform is an issue of mainly professional performance and, in terms of this, should be 
left primarily to the hands (and heads) of the security sector staff. Obviously the ideal 
formula should consist of an optimal mixture of both approaches. The core of security 
sector reform in Bulgaria is in redefinition of the political role, judicial basis, 
operational missions and organisation of the Special Services, the Armed Forces, and 
the other institutions from the sector9. Important is also the aspect that security and 
defence reform should be considered as well as a specific episode in the emerging 
democratic civil-military relations. This is mainly because the relations between 
citizens and the state are changing in such a way that all three parties involved in 
civil-military relations – political elite, security sector professionals and civil society – 
must adjust themselves and adopt new cultural models of conduct and mutual 
relations.  
Similar to other East European countries, Bulgaria lacks practical and 
theoretical models for such large-scale transformations. However, the experience of 
the last decade is enormous indeed, and analysing it would be a great contribution to 
the art of political and strategic management in future. Whether this experience might 
prove useful for other countries with different political realities and historical 
background is an issue of methodology. The historic traditions, political, and strategic 
culture are the most influential common denominators in explaining and analysing the 
persistence of different political, social and professional processes in the context of 
radical security sector reforms. Anyway, despite of the differences in order to become 
                                                 
8
 This article expresses personal evaluations and opinions of the author that do not necessarily reflect 
any Bulgarian official position. They have been developed and updated during the last two-three years. 
Early versions of particular ideas and theses have been presented at conferences and published by the 
NATO Defense College and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). See 
also Security Sector Reform Coalition Report #6 titled NATO Membership and the Challenges Facing 
the Bulgarian Parliament (Sofia: November, 2003). 
9
 Here the “security sector” is in accordance with DCAF’s approach and consists of the Bulgarian 
Army (traditional name for the Armed Forces, incl. Military Police and Counterintelligence, and 
Military Information Service), National Intelligence Service (foreign intelligence), National Security 
Service (counterintelligence), National Police Service, National Service of Gendarmerie (paramilitary 
force with police functions), National Border Police Service (control of the ground and maritime 
borders), National Guard Service (for guarding VIP and important civilian objects), National Service 
for Combating Organised Crime and National Service of Fire and Emergency Safety.  
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a generator of stability, the armed forces and security services must be integrated in 
the democratic political systems. They must be kept under effective democratic 
control and should be transformed into real instruments not only for national but also 
international democratic security policy. 
 
 
Transformation Imperatives 
 
Within the new political and security environment of the countries in transition the 
ideology of transforming former “powerful organisations” has three principal 
imperatives. From the point of intra-societal democratic development security sector 
reform is a substantial element of the political transition of the country. Depolitisation 
of professional service, introduction of civilian political leadership at the ministerial 
level of governing, expansion of the use of civilian expertise, and gradual 
enhancement of transparency and accountability are more or less common for the 
Eastern European countries during the last decade. They were supplemented by 
efforts to stimulate the rise and maturity of a new political culture, social mentality 
and organisational behaviour10. It becomes increasingly obvious that the borrowing of 
law, or adapting institutions, and applying external rules for civil-military connections 
from countries with developed democratic cultures, does not lead to an automatic 
restructuring in values, psychological attitudes, and political behaviour in post-
totalitarian societies. The reason why this happens so often lies in the specific features 
of the prevailing political culture and its functional environment. 
The other imperative is that at the same time national security organisations’ 
reform has a purely functional (operational) aspect, related to the adequacy of their 
capacities to meet society's requirements for security in the new sensitive environment. 
Forces of any type should have essential capacity to deal with situations with 
probability rates as of 95 per cent as well as with those whose probability of 
occurrence is 5 per cent or even lower. The political definition of the reforms includes 
building and maintaining capacities to meet the four main functions: sustaining the 
population and the state authorities, responding to international and local crises, 
protecting the territorial sovereignty of the country, taking part in collective and co-
operative security efforts.  
Last but not least in terms of significance is the fact that for the countries, 
which are striving for membership in NATO and EU security sector reform relations 
has turned into issue of foreign policy. The enlargement of these organisations is more 
closely related to democratic evolution of society, economic and political divergences, 
                                                 
10
 The political culture characterises the qualitative level at which political relations function. It 
includes political knowledge and values, plus the sustainable patterns of political, social and 
organisational behaviour. One of the "objective laws" to which its action is subject is that of inertial 
cultural effect. This law suggests that each political generation inherits from the preceding one a certain 
volume of knowledge, values, and behaviour patterns. A period of transition will tend to see the 
endurance of values and behaviour patterns in civil-military relations that are typical of totalitarian 
society; the mono-logical nature of communication, the persistence of ideological fears, the tendency to 
place group (social, corporate, or political) interests above the national ones, and so on.  
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and transatlantic relations than to the “pure” defence in its classic Clausewitzian 
formula. There is no doubt that the aim of NATO enlargement is neither to become 
better prepared for total defence nor to prevent some new continental war. The real 
point in this context is that the institution of liberal democratic civil-military relations 
and the transformation of the military establishments of the applicant countries have 
turned from internal issues into issues of foreign policy11.  
Within these imperatives and on the basis of the real Eastern European 
countries’ experience a list of basic requirements to the security sector reform could 
be drawn in order to facilitate the extraction of useful lessons.12 The main criterion for 
reform of national security organisations is that while they should be effective and 
efficient in carrying out their duties, they should do so on the basis of well-considered 
national security and defence strategies, be under democratic control, and act on the 
basis of realistic, credible and affordable plans. In more detail, this implies: 
• Up-to-date security and defence strategies, which have been publicly debated 
and approved by the national parliament. These should clearly define the risks 
and challenges facing the country, and set out the role of the defence and other 
forces, the types of mission which it is envisaged they should perform, and the 
way in which they are to be managed; 
• Modern organisational structures, both within defence and more widely 
within government, to allow the necessary coordination of national security 
decision-making, including for crisis management; 
• Adequate national funding arrangements, commensurate with what the 
country can afford, providing as far as possible predictable provision from 
year to year, and allowing scope for efficient management; 
• Credible resource-based plans, arrived at following analysis and prioritisation 
of tasks and missions. Plans must be realistically costed, formulated in 
sufficient detail, and rigorously implemented in order to control what is done 
and how resources are used; 
• Appropriate military structures, sized, trained and equipped to meet national 
and international obligations and objectives; 
• Appropriate legislative underpinning to support national plans and 
international objectives, for example to enable forces to deploy abroad; 
• Effective management of human resources, both military and civilian, 
including to train personnel for new tasks and to deal with redundancies where 
necessary; 
• Accountability to national parliaments and publics, both in the narrow, 
financial sense and more generally for security and defence policies and 
operations; 
• Adequate security arrangements and access to intelligence, to facilitate 
exchange of classified information within government and internationally, and 
to support security and defence operations; 
                                                 
11
 For this reason "the big bang expansion" was accepted with more enthusiasm from politicians, 
diplomats and societies in the West than from their military. 
12
 The following list with requirements is extracted from a large number of articles, documents, and 
speeches, presented since 1995 but mainly between 2000 and 2003.  
Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building 
 
 26 
• Effective arrangements for public information, both to ensure transparency in 
respect of national policies and security forces activities and to respond to 
points of public and media concern. Links to defence- and security-related 
academic and non-governmental organisations should also be in place, in 
order to develop better public understanding of defence. 
This is a formidable checklist of requirements for any country. 
 
 
Political System and Policy of Reforms 
 
Among observers there is probably a unanimously shared opinion that the security 
sector reform in Bulgaria has been painful, relatively slow but successful. “Lost 
years” were followed by radical and deep reforms. The irreversible development in 
the security sector and especially in defence has been recognised by the western 
countries and institutions. Between 2004 and 2007 the country will join each 
organisation that has been aimed. In spite of this one could point to shortcomings in 
many areas. Rather than giving an overview about problems the following 
observations are addressed to those wishing to learn from the mistakes and good 
practices of others. 
 
 
Political system 
 
The constitutional system and judicial definition of relationship among the various 
centres of authority have a decisive impact on both policy formulation and democratic 
control over the sector. In Bulgaria political power is distributed in accordance with 
the Constitution of 1991 among four relatively independent institutions: Parliament, 
Government, President, and judiciary. This formula is quite common in Europe. 
However in Bulgaria it came as a result of the "round table", which carried out the 
"velvet revolution" overthrowing communism. As a result a balance was sought 
among these centres. In regard to security, defence and armed forces, this balance is 
one of parity rather than optimal distribution of functions. 
Particularly important are the relations within the triangle Parliament 
(Bulgaria is “parliamentarian republic”), the President (directly elected head of the 
state, and supreme commander in peace and war time), and the Government 
(responsible for the executive policy). The fact that the members of the Parliament 
and the President have equal electoral status means that the Parliament does not exert 
control over the President, but the President has not a right on legislative initiative. 
The President as a head of the state, signs treaties, appoints generals and admirals 
from the Armed Forces and Security Services endorses strategic defence plans and so 
on, but he is doing this only after governmental proposals. All these functions are 
elements of the strategic management of the state, which officially are excluded from 
the political process due to the specific status of the President. And being excluded 
from this process, they cannot be kept under Parliamentarian control.  
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These facts shortly illustrate the impact of the ideology of “balanced centres of 
political power” applied during the new constitutional building process of 1990/91. 
Even further, to guarantee the balance indeed the security sector organisations are also 
in some degree distributed among these centres of political power. Thus the National 
Security Service (counterintelligence) and the National Guard Service (which 
provides protection to VIP personalities and strategic infrastructure such as nuclear 
power plants, ministries, and so on) are under direct control of the President. And 
since the President himself is not under the control of the Parliament, his subordinates 
are also beyond this control. In view of the mentioned presidential lack of legislative 
initiative, these organisations still have no legal framework of their own.  
 
 
Policy of Reforms 
 
Defence 
The reform Plan 2004 was designed in 1998-1999 and approved in 2000 in order to 
make the national defence system adequate to the new political and international 
realities by achieving the best possible results with the scarce resources allocated for 
defence; to transform the Ministry of Defence into a modern defence administration, 
adequate to the requirements of democratic society and market economy; to make the 
Armed Forces adequate to the strategic environment and capable of meeting the 
challenges of new types of conflicts, and to reach an initial level of interoperability 
with NATO and a capacity for effective contribution in crises response operations and 
collective defence. This should also turn the Armed Forces into an effective 
instrument of the national strategy to join NATO and EU. 
Plan 2004 is reaching its completion: it achieved the initial reorganisation of 
the army, releasing it from its extrinsic functions, responsibilities and activities; it also 
introduced new missions and tasks. The political and organisational role of this 
process was related to preparing the army for a radically changed internal and 
international environment and, above all, for NATO membership. The Strategic 
Review of Defence, initiated by the Government in 2003, should conceptualise 
programming and push it into creating the long-term image of the Bulgarian army in 
the 21st century. 
The Strategic Review Political Framework adopted by the Government 
contains some important initial guidelines as to the planning of forces. The analysis of 
the current state of, and opportunities for, defence indicates a lack of risk of a large 
scale aggression against Bulgaria, a low probability of the necessity for full 
mobilisation in the context of defence of the country and a lasting trend towards 
expanding the scale and intensity of international peacekeeping and conflict 
prevention operations. It is on these grounds and in accordance with NATO trends 
that the future forces are seen as ‘capable of deployment’ and ‘capable of defence of 
the national territory’. Interoperability has been defined as a priority for the 
international operation forces. On the other hand, the resources for the overall 
modernisation of the army (equipment, infrastructure, communications, training, 
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living standards, health and education) have been fixed without any sound 
argumentation and are not bound with an assessment of what part of the planning can 
be achieved. In the context of the strategic perspective, this situation hides the risk of 
having the army split permanently into two parts: a small part (called package of 
deployment forces) characterised by a high degree of professionalisation and 
modernisation, and a large part of forces for ‘territorial defence’ with a relatively low 
combat capacity.  
Creating the concept of a ‘unified army’ (including its reserve or mobilisation 
components) presents a better alternative. Such an army will have a high impact on 
military morale. Limitations in resources will be reflected by introducing categories of 
formations according to their capabilities for deployment. These categories will be 
crucial to the prioritisation process in the programmes for modernisation and 
professionalisation. There will also be additional inner stimuli for those willing to 
serve in formations with a high degree of readiness for military involvement and in 
this way the lost willingness for career mobility towards more prestigious, promising 
and better paid positions will be restored. 
 
Police Institutions 
In contrast to defence and armed forces the institutions for internal security in 
Bulgaria were not transformed through comprehensive and co-ordinated plans. The 
reason obviously is a complex rooted in the more (than the army) invisible structures 
of the interior services, their deep engagement in all social, industrial and diplomatic 
affairs, and, not on the last place, the more or less recognised intention of every new 
political power to benefit from the co-operation or the control over the secret services 
in favour of partisan or business interests. Due to the fact that the security concerns of 
the population were associated with activities other than defence, especially after the 
end of intensive combat in Serbia, the citizens’ expectations were to increase internal 
security, have a more reliable and less corrupt police, capable effectively to fight 
burgeoning organised crime and corruption. As in other East European countries in 
Bulgaria also the entire security agenda has moved from the main external security 
provider, the armed forces to internal security providers13. In sum, the decline of 
external threat went in parallel with the very limited increase of the prestige of the 
armed forces. However, with the strengthening of democracy and civil society, step-
by-step measures were undertaken by different governments in order to put the police 
sector under democratic control, to adapt the interior services to the new security 
environment (characterised by significant shift from external defence towards internal 
anti-criminal and corruption activities), to strength the role of judiciary, and to 
increase the role of emerging civil society for the public and individual security.  
Reform of the interior sector from the very beginning was marked by two-
tracks parallel pressures that reflect the specific case of Bulgaria. One is the truism 
that the secret services, in one or another degree took part (many believe that it has 
been significant, and even dominative) in the so called “velvet transition of power”. 
                                                 
13
 Dunay P., ‘Did Not, Does Not, Will Not’ Or Why Defence Reform Continues To Be the Weakest 
Element of Hungary’s Transformation (Geneva Centre for Security Policy: Geneva, 2003). 
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Other factor is the monstrous eruption of criminality during the first years of “the wild 
capitalism” which became international under the dark shadow of the wars in and the 
embargo against Yugoslavia, the dissolution of the Soviet Union-market and the 
flagrant activation of the trans-Balkan road of drug, human and other trafficking. The 
result was that the expected and natural pressure for democratisation of the police 
sector receded giving priority to institutional effectiveness. This dualism had and still 
has a place most of all in the public perceptions. The reality shows that the provoked 
delay in democratisation and modernisation only deepened the problems in the sector. 
At the threshold of NATO and EU membership, despite that a lot of serious 
improvements have been implemented, Bulgarian interior sector still needs deep 
reforms: from amendments in the Constitution, through passing specialised bills for 
the “secret services”, up to European type of reorganisation of police sector from 
quasi-military type into real “civil service”.  
Currently, the main task in preventing terrorism is to limit the possibilities for 
financing or any other support activities of international terrorist organisations. The 
Government decision on the Ratification of the Convention on Suppression of 
Financing Terrorism led to amendments to the Penal Code and other existing and 
expected domestic legislation into compliance with the provisions of Articles 4, 5, 8, 
and 18 of the Convention. Also, a Plan for Detecting and Preventing Terrorist 
Activities on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria is in implementation. Its focus is 
mainly on establishing a strict regime and control over generally hazardous 
substances by extending the requirements to persons who apply for and hold firearms 
or handle explosives and other generally hazardous substances and enhancing the 
control over them, actively countering crimes related to the use of explosives through 
operative measures and control at sites where explosives, strong poisons, and 
radioactive and other generally hazardous substances are kept. 
Bulgaria is also a party to the key international conventions in the fields of 
transnational organised crime, illicit narcotic drugs trafficking, money laundering, 
illicit traffic of arms, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other 
potentially lethal materials. The Government is obliged to refuse permissions for 
foreign trade transactions in arms and dual-use goods and technologies with countries 
against which sanctions have been imposed by international organisations in relation 
to exports to certain states and regions. Especially the arms export control policy was 
totally redefined after the ambitions to join NATO and the European Union became a 
security policy driving factor. Sharing the common approach towards the arms control, 
policy of non-proliferation and risk reduction, Bulgaria participates in regimes such as 
the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
Goods and Technologies, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee on 
controlling nuclear materials and technology, and the Australia Group on controlling 
chemical and biological weapons material and technology. Bulgaria has applied for 
membership to the Missile Technology Control Regime but already applies its 
guidelines. Despite these preparations and largely expressed political readiness strictly 
to follow them the so called ‘TEREM’ affair (concerns the illegal export to Syria of 
dual use spare parts from the branch office of state owned defence industrial company 
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‘TEREM’) exposed how far is the state system of control from expected effectiveness. 
Coming as it did, just days before the NATO Summit in Prague, it was a piece of 
exquisite timing that Machiavelli would have been proud of. Some observers in Sofia 
even ask: ‘was this affair a hopeless act of Bulgarian mis-management or was it a 
sublime performance of political machination designed to discredit certain members 
of the Government’? And if the former, then how could such arrogant behaviour be 
allowed to continue?14 
Overall, the evaluation of police services reform is positive but sounds 
different from the standing point of the politicians and citizen. From political point of 
view issues like departisation, parliamentarian oversight, political civil leadership and 
transparency are in dominant degree resolved. Much more difficult is with the 
legislative background. The 2003 Parliamentarian autumn session started with debates 
on amendments even in the Constitution that are designed to open space for a 
completely new “European” type of both division of labour between services and 
branches of judiciary and the prosecution and related legislation. However, as in the 
other countries from the region, systematic comprehensive redesign remains to be 
done. People reflect this fact two ways. From one side they systematically express 
total dissatisfaction from the work of police. Despite this they support every 
successful investigation of corruption and organised crime and are ready to give 
confidence vote to every police chief capable to deal with an “iron hand”.  
 
National security services 
The issues of the intelligence and security agencies’ activities are definitely the most 
specific and complex in the realm of security issues. The multifaceted nature of the 
phenomenon is inevitably reflected on the definition of the balance and the borderline 
of the intelligence activity and the scope and mechanism of the democratic oversight 
and control of the respective agencies. This particular complexity underscores the 
persisting need of broader education of the public on the basics of the issue to provide 
it with adequate instruments of understanding the problems and implementing the 
oversight. 
During the communist regime, exactly before the change in 1989 the national 
security services were concentrated within the Ministry of Interior – all of them 
except the Intelligence department of the General Staff of Bulgarian Army. With the 
dismissal from power of the last communist leader Mr. Todor Zhivkov on 10 
November 1989 among the first priority issues was the restructuring of the national 
security services. On 5 February 1990 “First Department” was removed from the 
Ministry of Interior and the National Intelligence Service was established. 
Approximately the same period the other security services were integrated into a new 
one called National Service for Defence of the Constitution within the Ministry of 
Interior. In 1991 the Great National Assembly, called to approve a new constitution, 
passed the Ministry of Interior Act that determined only one of the security services – 
                                                 
14
 The Principal of the company is the MoD and it is to perform not only overhauls of armament and 
machinery, but also produce spare parts that are necessary for these repairs (as a result the Prime 
Minister sacked two of the Deputy Defence Ministers and the board of directors of TEREM). See 
http://www.csees.net 
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National Security Service – to be prerogative of the executive power. The Military 
counter-intelligence was subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed 
Forces together with the Military Intelligence. Both services after several 
reorganisations were transferred under civilian minister’s control.  
Generally concluding, the national security services are still to be regulated 
from legislative and democratic control point of view. NATO and EU membership 
requirements provide sufficiently clear frame but probably it could not been enough. 
There are four factors that cause special concern in NATO’s respective circles in 
connection with Bulgaria’s (and other new members’) intelligence services reform. 
The first factor depends on the degree of achieving civic democratic control 
over the intelligence services and their operations. In this connection, it is important 
to motivate the civil society to educate themselves on the issues of intelligence in 
order to be able to control it better. This makes it necessary to demystify intelligence 
while preserving and increasing its efficiency in the service of the country’s defence 
and the exerted civic democratic control. It is also necessary to assist the formation of 
a political culture that supports the legitimate role of intelligence under conditions of 
democracy and does not permit the leakage of intelligence information for private or 
political goals. At the same time, this culture should not allow intelligence to roam 
free by drawing social and political dividends from its concentrated informational 
might. Finally, there is the issue of selection, training and overall preparation of 
professional agents – those who specialise as professional servants of the state. 
Everyone should understand clearly that this profession – unlike many others under 
conditions of democracy – is to be subjected to professional regulated control and, 
only very rarely, to external regulations. However, given the possible danger of these 
professionals’ impunity in conditions of transition to a fully-fledged democracy, there 
is a need for a more concrete form of accountability and control by external units and 
governmental and civil structures familiar with the task specificity and complexity. 
Yet even in conditions of a more settled democratic society, there will be a need to 
cope in an intelligent manner with the dilemma of democratic control over 
intelligence: such control is to be exerted but this should not happen at the expense of 
the efficient functioning of the intelligence services in their efforts to defend the 
nation and the state. 
The second factor depends on the degree to which the intelligence services 
reform has been harmonised and synchronised with the standard procedures of 
western intelligence services. A question of key importance in this context is that of 
the early retirement of high-ranking officers remaining from the times of totalitarian 
communism, as well as the recruitment of officers that have a pro-western orientation 
and have not been discredited. One may say that this is a matter of simple party 
political analysis that should not provoke dramatic responses from any direction. 
The third factor is dependent on the degree to which the link between national 
and Russian intelligence and counter-intelligence services has been severed. The 
problem is that the US and NATO possess evidence of conducted disinformation 
campaigns and of Russian intelligence gathering information from the new countries, 
members and aspiring members of the Alliance. These facts tie in logically with the 
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continuing declarations of top-level Russian officials that NATO enlargement is a 
mistake and Russia perceives it as a hostile act. It is naïve to expect that our future 
NATO allies will become ‘less alert’ in this area, even if they act as friends or even 
allies with Russia on a number of issues or because we do not go far enough in our 
analyses and activities in this area. Our sovereign conduct following 1989 means, 
above all, an independent, many-sided and in-depth strategic analysis and assessment 
of the security situation and an adequate response to it. It turns out that one important 
component of this situation includes the opinions, perceptions and assessments of our 
allies that we should also study carefully. In addition, we need to formulate 
independently our positions according to the demands of the new situation without 
necessarily expecting the corrective power of allied opinion. The positive content of 
our links with Russia will apparently have to be promoted by other ways and 
channels: e.g. in the context of multilateral shared efforts against terrorism instead of 
free use of our national sovereignty by skilful intelligence quarters. 
The fourth factor depends on the degree to which intelligence and counter-
intelligence have been ensured sufficient budgets and other resources in order to 
function efficiently. In the case of Bulgaria, there was some additional concern 
recently that the trafficking in arms towards the Middle East and dictatorial or 
terrorist-bound states may have something to do with an insufficiency of the reform 
and adequate control of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services. 
 
 
Lessons Learned from the Policy of Reforms in Bulgaria 
 
The policy for preparation of the country for NATO and European Union membership 
has been and is the environment wherein the deepest changes in Bulgarian society and 
in the security sector organisations are being formed and realized. This “environment” 
to a great extent sets the parameters and determines the pace of reforms, formulates 
advisable criteria and makes regular review and assessment. So the entire success and 
problems of the integration policy should be viewed in the light of the strategic 
perspective for full integration of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people into the European 
and Atlantic political, social, economical and security systems. In a social, political 
and organisational aspect the integration policy in its essence is contribution to 
strengthening democracy and development of civil society; participation in the 
international efforts in the fight against common security threats; and reform of the 
security sector organisations themselves.  
 The success in these three aspects in particular is one of the most important and 
even crucial arguments to receive an invitation for membership in the European 
Union and NATO. The security sector organisations should be reorganized and placed 
under democratic control in order to ensure both their efficiency and empathy to the 
common process of democratisation and democratic development. An important 
condition for the success of such a strategy is the learning of correct lessons from the 
experience gained in the past dozen years and their interpretation in the context of 
NATO membership. 
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Security sector reform needs strong and continues political management, 
based on unanimous understanding between politicians, society and professionals on 
the major issues of the national security vision, strategy and policy. The principal 
political-professional consensus on the need and macro parameters of security and 
defence organisations’ reform is crucial for its success. This is one of the greatest 
difficulties in reform planning and implementation. It needed more than seven years 
for such a consensus to be achieved in Bulgaria. The issue became symbolic for the 
incompatibility between the hangover from the Warsaw Pact political and strategic 
culture and the approach to national security based on “European common values”. 
Periodically in 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001, and again now in 200315 the public debate 
was revitalised around the parameters of the reforms in different security 
organisations, especially the division of labour between them, the level of the 
democratic control, and even their constitutional subordination to different “centres of 
political power”. Consensus was reached when both sides – politicians and 
professionals - matured to understand that the successful creation of the new national 
security sector should be based on realistic evaluation of their essential role in the 
emerging international and internal realities, shedding both memories from the past 
and illusions about the future, and strictly accounting for every security and defence 
related expenditure. 
In practice, security sector transformation was initiated and performed 
separately for each individual organisation since results are achieved fast due to the 
existing regulatory framework and, most of all, to the mechanisms of resource 
provision. It is essential, however, that reforms be carried out by following a single 
concept and consensus-based political, regulatory, organisational and social 
principles. What this means on an operating level is that we need an overall 
transformation of the security sector by following a single concept and possible 
amendments to the Constitution, a series of laws, structural and staff alterations, a 
new system of staff recruitment, training and development, introduction of integrated 
information systems, intensified civil control and reintegration of the national security 
system into the overall structure of the state. In this way, a level of ‘strategic 
community’ can be reached that will bring us closer to NATO members’ practices. 
The new concept of reform and development of the security sector should 
contain two defining components. The first one is democratic and civil control in all 
decisions and processes of the sector reform. The second one is the principle of 
efficiency and effectiveness as a criterion for the functioning of individual 
organisations and the sector as a whole. Even if organically intertwined, these two 
pillars of the new security sector reform concept have their specific characteristics, 
problems and requirements. Conceptualising the sector and finding solutions to 
individual problems in the different reform areas should also be included in the 
responsibilities and priorities of Parliament not only before becoming a member but 
also (and to a greater extent even) after receiving membership. 
                                                 
15
 A comprehensive Strategic Defence Review should be performed until April 2004 in order to draw 
the parameters of the security sector and especially the armed forces as those of a NATO member 
country. For more information on the issue visit the web-site of the Ministry of Defence 
(www.md.government.bg).  
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The key for security sector reform are the figures of ministers and other 
political executives. In the case of Bulgaria the role of the minister is to rein in 
disparate interests in the defence and police establishment and shape a reform plan to 
suit the overall goals of himself and his administration. Given their limited time and 
resources, the task is enormous, in some ways impossible, but the performance of the 
ministers is vitally important for design and implementation of reform plans. The 
existing organisational system of the security sector departments is not meeting the 
requirements of modern management. The accumulation of political, administrative, 
command and staff functions within one and the same structures is not meeting the 
contemporary ideas for efficient management. The issue pertaining to the political 
appointments, including in the services, reporting to the President is not yet fully clear. 
From the Council of Ministers point of view the planning and implementation of 
reforms at the same time in several or in most of the organisations also seems hard to 
manage. The analysis of the reorganisations in the Ministry of Interior and in the 
Armed Forces shows that the lack of an initial integrated concept for the security 
sector has made the processes rather moving apart than focused. Instead of 
optimisation of objectives, functional reallocation and development of complementary 
capabilities the result was duplication, accumulation of similar capabilities, loss of 
people and many other negative results.  
Redefinition of the new professionalism should make the security sector’s 
staff adequate to the new security and political realities. The basic obstacle in their 
behaviour is that they should not only think of national security with high 
responsibility, but also understand that the essential threats to national security are 
more complex than ever before. The most difficult results that have been reached in 
this context in Bulgaria are based on the culture to think that Bulgarian national 
security depends on the security of the others and most of all of the neighbours. As a 
result the definition of the term “defence” was changed in order to involve issues like 
“international military co-operation”, “confidence and security building measures”, 
“multinational formations”, “conflict prevention”, and “crisis management”. 
Interoperability for the Armed Forces became an issue related not only with NATO 
membership but with the “international responsibility” of the country as well. A new 
division of labour between the national security sector organisations is still needed to 
achieve inter-agency co-operation effect, and higher efficiency besides avoiding 
overlapping.  
Serious management capacity is needed for effective and timely reforms. 
From governmental point of view security sector reform is extremely large set of 
issues that attracts political attention and resources, and needs time to be prepared, 
motivated, promoted, defended and implemented. In Bulgaria it was identified that the 
national political, civilian and professional capacity to manage successfully the 
multitude of reorganisation processes, which have begun simultaneously, is limited. 
Issues like drawing packages of laws, design of cross-agency arrangements, change of 
organisational models, transition from conscript to voluntary service, massive 
downsizing of the personnel, garrisons and combat equipment in the army, and many 
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others need not only of well prepared personalities but of teams of experts on every 
level – political, institutional and performance.  
The core of effective policing reforms is in an optimum use of civilian and 
uniformed expertise. It should be measured by the extent to which the uniformed and 
civilian personnel work together on operational planning, resource allocation and 
management. This is not (only) an issue of “administrative civilian control”. The 
practice in Bulgaria shows that the sharing of expertise among the uniformed and 
civilians in the resource planning and management process is the best way to avoid 
one-sided decisions on issues not only related to the budget, but also to those on 
deployment of security forces, closing army bases, procurement and acquisition, 
specialised professional education, and professionalisation of soldiers’ service in the 
army16. An extremely important driving factor is the fact of chronic lack of well-
prepared civilians that can do the job professionally enough. The reason for it is 
mainly the systematic decrease of the attractiveness of army and police employment 
for young people, mostly due to the permanent reductions, structural changes, and the 
visible risk that make the profession unstable. Because of this an important and 
inseparable part of the reform process is an accelerated focused training of experts. In 
this context Bulgaria at early stage recognised the value of foreign consultants on a 
permanent basis. They have serious contribution to the design and implementation of 
reform plans of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Customs, and others.  
The legal foundation of the security sector reform requires constant attention 
and development. The painful experience in Bulgaria shows that the defence reform 
needs a strategy-based judicial basis within a democratic frame, and permanent 
improvement to keep the package of regulations adequate to the arising new army and 
its officer corps. This issue is invariably present in governmental programmes and 
parliamentary agendas since there is an apparent lack of harmony between important 
components of the current legislation and the needs arising from internal democratic 
and functionally-operative processes, and from Bulgaria’s international ambitions. 
The new package of laws should provide a legal solution to issues such as allied 
responsibilities of the country and ways to execute them, armed forces new roles and 
missions and mechanisms for their realisation, military professionalism characteristics 
(including its moral dimension), turning the security sector organisations into modern 
managerial institutions, regulating transparency and other items of democratic 
oversight. This task requires exceptional political commitment, a European vision and 
taking into account the realities and prospects for using the armed forces in various 
conditions and situations. There is a risk in the delay of political work on the 
promised new package of laws to transfer the initiative into the hands of experts, 
which, based on experience so far, means imposing departmental approaches and 
making pointless the political process of law making.  
                                                 
16
 Professionalisation of the soldiers’ service in the Bulgarian Armed Forces gives priority to the units, 
designated for NATO-led Pease support operations and especially to deployable forces. In accordance 
with the Annual Report on the National Defence and Armed Forces 2002 the Land Forces have hired 
approximately 3700 soldiers, in the Air Force the level of professionalisation is 26 per cent, and in the 
Navy 81 per cent as the warships staff is fully on contract. 
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The core of reform is the definition of security sector organisations’ new 
paradigm. The first stage of security reforms in the country followed the 
Constitutional paradigm as of 1990-1991. Then the vision of the country’s future was 
based on “neutrality” (or on “non-alignment” at least) and the cliché was “all-azimuth 
defence”. The difference between 1991 and 2003 is that back in 1991 the armed 
forces all around the world served the exclusive goal of guaranteeing the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity. Hence they were alike! In 2003, every open, 
liberal and sovereign state faces the common threat of being subjected to, or used for, 
the purposes of terrorism. State sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity for 
the purposes of which the armed forces were de facto created can be defended mostly 
through integration, participation in international cooperation and contribution to 
multilateral efforts. This is to be expected given that our new enemy has no political 
sovereignty. Terrorism threatens the political systems and ways of life of societies. It 
is not a case of threatening state sovereignty any more – neither is it territorial 
integrity and certainly not independence.  
Transformation means more effectiveness. The definition of a new paradigm 
followed by reorganisation and downsizing are not enough for successful reforms. 
Without making the army, police and intelligence more effective with less personnel 
the value and support of the reform will be immediately lost. Downsizing is only 
precondition for better allocation of resources. Downsizing itself does not produce a 
“modern army”. Modernisation and re-equipment, new training environment 
including modelling and simulations and multinational exercises, performance 
evaluation, lessons learned system and other attributes of modern effectiveness are the 
pillars of reforms 17 . Debate on these issues is different than on downsizing of 
personnel and discharge of old arms. Political, social and business attention is also 
quite different. It requires more strategy and long-term planning than any other aspect 
of the reform. Most of the countries in transition, Bulgaria included, can suggest a 
very few good examples even only in designing strategic modernisation. There are 
real threats of over-politicisation or unacceptable professional influence, of losing 
strategic perspective while doing successful small steps, and also of going out of the 
time frame for reforms.  
Keeping the personnel motivation turns out to be the most laborious effort. 
Effective management of human resources, both uniformed and civilian, is critical for 
defence reform from any point of view. The large-scale downsizing of military 
personnel that is envisaged by the defence reform is unquestionably the issue with the 
highest social importance. Military downsizing exacerbates the already severe 
unemployment problem in the country. Any political party or government that 
assumes the responsibility to further proceed with reorganisation of national defence 
will face public backlash in the process of closing down garrisons, barracks, and 
military installations and cutting thousands of jobs. More than 28,000 uniformed 
people and 4,000 civilian employees left the Bulgarian defence system in the period 
                                                 
17
 Much information in these issues could be obtained form Minchev, O, Ratchev V. Lessenski M. 
(eds.) Bulgaria for NATO 2002, (Sofia: IRIS,2002). The electronic version of the book is on www.iris-
bg.org  
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of 2000-2003 and keeping personnel morale and motivation high turns out to be the 
most laborious task. A formula must be found to improve the standard of living and 
the quality of service in the military. An approach to attract and retain trained civil 
staff is also necessary.  
Several programmes with national and international financial support were 
launched to help military personnel adapt to civilian life. The MoD Resettlement 
Programme 2000-2004 was developed with the support international donations, 
NATO expertise and NGO active engagement. The Programme was introduced at the 
Working Table 3 of the Stability Pact for South East Europe. It was designed to 
provide resettlement support to the servicemen during the last 180 days of their 
service and to continue this support for the former military personnel as long as it is 
needed. More than 99 per cent of the discharged servicemen are eligible to the 
Programme. Despite these figures several independent opinions evaluate the 
effectiveness of the applied approach at up to 10 per cent! 
Effective arrangements for public information should be provided 
simultaneously with an enlarged and strengthened accountability to national 
parliament and public, both in the narrow financial sense, and more generally for 
security and defence policies and operations. A possible solution of this problem is to 
establish an environment and practices to build, use and maintain a network of non-
government organisations, research centres in the academic community, which have 
(or could create) the required analytical competence. Different activities could be 
included within these efforts: introduction in the specifics of parliamentary work, 
provision of the necessary information, assignment of permanent tasks, organisation 
of cooperation with foreign and local organisation on topical legislative practice 
problems, publication of the results of research, analytical work and the projects for 
changes in the legislative regulation. The preliminary systematisation and 
specification of the foreign relations, security and defence policy priority areas is an 
important condition for good organisation of the expert activity. The provision of 
competent expertise in service of the Commission could considerably improve the 
efficiency of its legislative work and the quality of its decisions.  
The role of business for efficient civil control should be substantiated and 
realized. The business in its capacity of employer and public procurement contractor 
in good of security has direct or indirect serious interests in and influence on the 
security policy development and implementation. The degree of transparency in the 
realisation of these roles, which is comparable to that of the academic and the non-
government sector, is an important indicator of civil control efficiency. The absence 
of an association of Bulgaria’s defence industry as an exponent of the interests and 
ideas of the business leaders in this specific field of great significance to the national 
security impedes the realisation of the important role of the defence industry in the 
processes of civil control over the sector. 
The mass media, inquiry journalism in particular, are an exceptionally 
important instrument of support of the members of parliament in exercising their right 
and obligation for control over the security sector. In view of that, the improved 
awareness about the work of the commissions, the organisation of public hearings of 
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representatives of the executive and outside experts with the participation of the mass 
media are all prerequisites for intensified contribution of journalists. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Bulgarian society has reached a national consensus on democratisation of the 
security institutions. Even though the sectoral reform is not finished yet (even it is far 
from finishing in terms of bettering the division of labour, adjusting the legislation, 
rearmament, interoperability, professionalisation, and so on), it has extremely and 
significantly contributed to the process of overall democratisation of the society.  
From this point of view the standing point for analysing Bulgarian security 
sector reform and policy on accelerated preparation for full-fledged membership in 
NATO could be maximalist or minimalist one. Those who would like to see 
integration efforts to be unreservedly first priority will focus on issues like the speed 
of reforms, definition of “ centre of gravity” of transformations, promotion of “the 
right people on right positions now”, a priority of membership related legislative and 
military measures, and so on. The others, that believe that the domestic agenda is 
more important will lay on the positive evaluations that came from NATO and 
member countries’ officials and will accept lower speed of organisational reforms in 
order more resources for structural reforms in economy and direct social policy to be 
provided. From this point of observation the establishment of firm civil control is 
presented as more important than fast creating of security sector capabilities adequate 
to “the new war” requirements. 
However, the conclusion of the presented observations is that the security 
sector is an essential component between instruments of national and international 
security policy and strategy. Significantly changed security environment and the 
responsible contribution to the war against globalised terrorism require deep 
modernisation of all military and "soft" instruments, in national and international 
context. Security sector organisations became multifunctional international factors, 
providing the politicians with more capacity for effectiveness. It does not matter how 
different are the positions between the countries from the Euro-Atlantic space on 
issues like terrorism, preemption and dissuasion we should not permit the politicised 
terror to draw the global security agenda. In this responsibility there are not small and 
big countries and everyone has capacity and responsibility to contribute. No doubt 
this mission is the core in the entrance of the new millennium. Effective security 
organisations, adequate to the character of threats, legal arrangements and large public 
confidence and support, are crucial for success. Security sector reform in Bulgaria is 
about this. 
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III. BULGARIA: INTEGRATED DEFENCE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
 
Todor Tagarev 
 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s most post-communist countries found themselves 
needing to adapt their heavily oversized defence establishments to the post-Cold war 
realities without having adequate national procedures, tools and expertise. The notion 
of the democratic civilian control over the armed forces was slowly introduced, but 
General Staffs remained the primary organisations, if not the only ones, thinking how 
to adapt military establishments to the 1990s security environment. Defence budgets 
were declining not so much as a result of rigorous planning and risk assessment, but 
under the pressure of diminishing GDPs in the first years of transition to market 
economies. As a result of delayed reforms and shrinking budgets, the militaries were 
quickly losing their traditional capabilities without increasing the capabilities to 
participate in peace operations.  
For Bulgaria, as one of the post-communist countries in transition to 
democracy, these problems became most acute with the economic crisis in 1996 and 
early 1997, followed by the February 1997 decision of the interim government of the 
Union of Democratic Forces to prepare the country for NATO membership. Only then 
the national defence leadership turned directly to the challenge of transforming the 
armed forces so that they became both affordable and appropriate to the new strategic 
environment18. 
This paper provides analysis of the Bulgarian experience in establishing and 
institutionalising an advanced defence resource management system to help in this.19 
Prior to that, we take a brief look at the importance of establishing the affordability 
requirement in the practice of political defence decision-making. Both parts of the 
paper relate closely to the concept and the practice of democratic control of defence: 
this relation is examined directly in the concluding section of the paper. 
 
 
‘Defence Planning’ in 1990-1998 
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, Bulgaria introduced the main legislative requirements 
for implementation of the democratic principle of civilian control over the armed 
forces. However, the first civilian defence ministers did not have considerable 
                                                 
18
 Much to the dismay of defence reformers, acceptability to society – or the ‘third A’ condition in 
David Greenwood’s formula – was not rigorously considered. For definition refer to Margriet Drent, 
David Greenwood, Sander Huisman and Peter Volten, Organising National Defences for NATO 
Membership: The Unexamined Dimension of Aspirants’ Readiness for Entry, Harmonie Paper # 15 
(Groningen, The Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, November 2001). 
19
 The focus of this report is on the first steps of introducing advanced defence resource management. 
In-depth analysis of the current challenges are presented in the article Bisserka Boudinova, 
“Transparency in Defence Resource Management - Problems and Solutions,” Information & Security: 
An International Journal 11 (2003): 73-91,  http://www.isn.ethz.ch/onlinepubli/publihouse/ 
infosecurity/ volume_11/A4/A4_index.htm> (28 Oct. 2003). 
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expertise in defence matters and were in office for relatively short terms. Therefore, 
for a number of years the General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces was the 
primary organisation expected to adapt the military establishment to the post-Cold 
war realities. It can be assumed that thinking on defence reform started approximately 
in 1991. In 1992 the Bulgarian Armed Forces made a token transition from ‘army-
divisional’ to a ‘corps-brigade’ force structure. The then defence minister presented 
this transition as ‘NATO-style defence reform.’ In the following three years the 
national security debate was focused on the dilemma ‘West vs. East’ 20  and the 
accession to the Partnership for Peace Programme. In 1995 the Cabinet approved a 
draft Concept for National Security, followed by a Concept for Reforming the 
Bulgarian Army till the Year 2010. But if until 1995 the attention of the Bulgarian 
politicians to defence was marginal, in 1996—the year of the economic crisis—
defence was not even on the societal agenda. Thus, for six years since the dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact, the defence leadership did not come up with a plan how to adapt 
the national defence to the new strategic environment.  
In February 1997, the Provisional Government appointed by President 
Stoyanov declared the intention of Bulgaria to join NATO. In March the same year 
the declaration was followed by a Programme for NATO Accession. Approximately 
one year later the Cabinet approved a top-secret plan for reforming the military 
establishment, known as Plan 2010. There is no evidence to suggest that civilians, 
including the defence minister and his deputies, played any substantial role in the 
preparation of Plan 2010. It is safe to assume that no planning guidance was issued, 
other than ‘to prepare the armed forces for NATO integration,’ and no resource 
constraints were set in advance. The plan was limited in scope, examining the 
Bulgarian Army per se and leaving untouched Cold War militarised relics. Plan 2010 
called for downsizing the peacetime personnel of the Bulgarian Army to 75 000 
people. However, the sole most influential factor for downsizing was the demographic 
trend that limited the number of young male Bulgarian citizens potentially available 
for mandatory conscript service, while the length of the conscript service had been 
already shortened from 24 to 18 months. Civil authorities did not assess Plan 2010 in 
essence. It was not constrained by expected resources. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, there were no attempts to cost the plan. Further, it did not envision 
changes in missions and tasks of the armed forces, preserved the 1992 organisational 
structure, and called for keeping all major weapon systems in the limits set by the 
CFE Treaty. For all practical purposes, the planned force structure for 2010 was a 
somewhat smaller version of the force structure of the Bulgarian Army of the 1980s. 
Also around 1994-1996 the Ministry of Defence developed another –
accompanying – document. Referred to as the “Programme for Rearmament and 
Modernisation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces till 2015,” this called for more than 20 
billion US dollars for rearmament – several times more than any reasonable forecast 
accounting for fiscal realities. The governmental approval of Plan 2010 only 
confirmed the NATO concerns, expressed the previous year by a senior NATO 
advisor, that “there is no Central and Eastern European country that has the effective 
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army it needs and no government that can evaluate what kind of defence it requires, 
nor what size, nor evaluate the proposals of its generals.”21 
Given the explicit governmental programme for NATO accession, the 
approval of Plan 2010 further proved that the NATO message did not reach the 
intended audience in Bulgaria. Initial claims that Plan 2010 is adequate to NATO 
integration requirements were quickly countered by the impartial professional 
estimate of a seasoned observer of defence policies of Central and Eastern European 
countries.22 Dr. Jeffrey Simon from the US Institute for National Strategic Studies 
concluded that Bulgarian governmental and military officials lack ‘an understanding 
of how far behind they are, as well as what they need to do, to seek [NATO] 
integration.’ A follow-up study sponsored by the UK Ministry of Defence found that 
there is a lack of realism and coherence between budgets and defence plans. 
Furthermore, the credibility of the relation between plans and budgets is repeatedly 
undermined since ‘plans, once endorsed, are regularly found to be unaffordable within 
allocated budgets and … MoD has to adopt a significantly different force posture 
from that agreed by Parliament in order to meet affordability constraints.’23  The 
decision making process by itself was found ‘highly inconsistent and unpredictable’ 
and there was no mention of a structured and clear defence planning process. In sum, 
although defence policy was subject to civilian control in principle, civilians in 
Parliament and Government lacked sufficient expertise to establish a defence planning 
process or to assess principal defence planning decisions. Not surprisingly, in lacking 
civilian control the military acted in a very cautious conservative manner. Also, 
civilians were not able to undertake their share of responsibility for difficult decisions. 
There was no relation between the Plan 2010 and the Concept for National Security, 
approved by the Bulgarian Parliament only one month earlier. The resulting Plan 
2010, although a step in the right direction, did not provide reform objectives 
adequate to national defence and NATO integration requirements. 
 
 
Affordability Considerations in Major Defence Reform Decisions  
 
It did not take long for the political leadership to realise that, since affordability was 
not an issue in the preparation of Plan 2010, the prospectus was doomed. At the end 
of 1998 a comprehensive defence reform study was launched.24 One of the study 
teams was tasked with the overall analysis and preparation of the final 
                                                 
21
 Chris Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the 
Problem,” NATO Review 45, 1 (1997), 15-19, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/ 1997/9701-4.htm> 
(24 Oct. 2003). 
22
 Jeffrey Simon, “Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years,” Strategic Forum 142 (Washington, DC: INSS, 
National Defense University, May 1998).  
23
 Parliamentary Oversight and Democratic Control of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and MoD, Final 
Report, Study No. 3/98 (London: Directorate of Consultancy and Management Services, UK MoD, 5 
October 1998), p. 23. Emphasis added.  
24
 Conducted jointly with a US Government team. 
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recommendations from the study25. This team rigorously implemented qualitative and 
quantitative methods for defence and force planning while searching for a model for 
the Bulgarian armed forces that best addressed the requirements of national security 
and defence.26 The planning process was not threat based, but capability based, and 
searched for a model with the highest possible combat potential within the forecasted 
resource constraints. 
At the first stage, the team designed hypothetical but realistic models of the 
armed forces with personnel strength from thirty to ninety thousand people, and with 
100 percent manning (no mobilisation potential) under valid training requirements. 
The cost and the combat potential of each model were then estimated. 27 At this stage 
it was established that, given the forecasted resources, the optimal model of the 
Bulgarian armed forces, including the formations directly subordinated to the 
Ministry of Defence, would have a peacetime personnel strength of between 45,000 
and 55,000 people. In the second stage, the team designed twelve models with varying 
ratios of active duty and reserve personnel, various proportions among the services as 
well as among the branches within a service, and varying proportions between 
resources for sustaining and modernisation of the armed forces. It was established that 
the optimum model for performing expected missions was a force with 50,000 
military and civilian peacetime personnel in the Ministry of Defence; 45,000 of them 
in the armed forces. 
Results were presented first to Government and the President and then (in 
April 1999), voting on the Military Doctrine, the Parliament decided to limit by 2004 
the personnel strength of the armed forces to 45,000. That was the first realistic and 
thus realisable framework decision on post-Cold war force posture of Bulgaria.  
The transition to that force model also had to be realistic. The same team in 
the Ministry of Defence, in coordination with other ministries, designed several 
transition models with varying rates of downsizing and, respectively, defence budget 
projections. The chosen model served as a basis for the ministerial guidance to 
prepare the “Plan for Organisational Development of the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Bulgaria till the Year 2004.”  
 
                                                 
25
 A joint team of civilians and military officers, based in the Ministry of Defence. For details refer to 
Todor Tagarev, Control, Cooperation, Expertise: Civilians and the Military in Bulgarian Defence 
Planning Experience, ISIS Research Reports # 14 (Sofia: Institute for Security and International 
Studies, 2003), <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Publications/research_reports/research_report_14.htm> 
(28 Oct. 2003). 
26
 For details refer to Dobromir Totev and Pavlin Roussanov, “Implementing the Defense Resource 
Management Model (DRMM) in the Development of the New Bulgarian Military Doctrine and The 
Plan for Organizational Structure and Development of the MoD by the Year 2004,” CD-ROM 
Proceedings, Applications of Operations Analysis Techniques to Defense Issues (Garmish, Germany: 
George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, 14-17 March 2000). 
27
 Indicator of combat capability accounting for manning, equipment and training levels, as well as for 
characteristics of major weapon systems. It was estimated using the Defence Resource Management 
Model (DRMM) – US model adapted to Bulgarian needs in 1995-1996. 
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Lessons learned in designing the Bulgarian defence resource management system  
 
The reform plan tasked the Ministry of Defence to introduce an integrated system for 
planning, programme development and budgeting within the Ministry and the armed 
forces. The expectation was that such a comprehensive approach would allow for 
objective, effective and transparent allocation of defence resources, subject to civilian 
control. The integrated system spans a 6-year planning period. It balances national 
security objectives and long-term requirements with short-term priorities. The 
programming phase – the nucleus of the integrated planning system – relates available 
and forecasted resources to defence capabilities, as well as long-term plans to budget. 
Furthermore, it attributes decision-making authority to the responsible and 
accountable persons and permits higher transparency of the planning process, making 
it open to civilian control. Finally, allowing implementation of capabilities-based 
planning in a manner compatible with the NATO planning system, it should be 
sufficiently flexible to incorporate high levels of uncertainty (economic, financial and 
budget forecasts, labour and other costs, organisational, and so on.) in a transitioning 
country. 
The first version of the new Bulgarian defence resource management system 
was introduced in May 2000. Figure 1 depicts the major planning documents, 
information flows and organisational roles involved, structured in three main resource 
planning phases of ‘planning,’ ‘programming,’ and ‘budgeting.’28  
The Bulgarian experience points to the following most important prerequisites 
for an effective defence resource management system: 
• It shall be comprehensive, covering all defence activities (including military 
participation in operations abroad), expenditures (incl. separation allowances, 
etc.), and financial sources (subsidy form the state budget, own revenues, 
foreign military assistance, etc.); 
• It shall allow for efficient and straightforward translation of defence 
programmes into budgets;  
• All planning documents shall incorporate easily understood and assessable 
performance measurement indicators; 
• It shall be sufficiently compatible with the NATO defence planning 
procedures, i.e., following the six-year planning horizon, programme and 
budget structure of the PfP “Interoperability Survey,” keeping the information 
on past years plans and implementation results, timeframe, and so on; 
• It shall be sufficiently flexible to account for contingencies and unforeseen 
changes of economic, financial and social factors. We assess as correct the 
early 2000 decision to introduce a one-year planning cycle (unlike the NATO 
two-year cycle), to allow in-year programme reviews and updates that may be 
regular (quarterly or every six months) or ‘event triggered’; 
                                                 
28
 The timeline of all major activities is presented in Dobromir Totev, “Bulgarian Defence Resource 
Management System - Vehicle for Transparency in Defence Planning and Budgeting,” in Transparency 
in Defence Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement, ed., Todor Tagarev (Sofia: Geneva Centre for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Association George C. Marshall - Bulgaria, 2002), 
pp. 71-84. 
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Figure 1: Planning, programming and budgeting in the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Defence 
 
• It shall provide for broad organisational participation but clear decision 
making authority and well documented decisions, available to all ‘resource 
managers’ in a timely manner.  
Further, it is important to involve in the development phase representatives of all 
envisioned future players not only from all branches of the defence administration and 
the senior military authorities, in particular budgeters, but also from the finance 
ministry, the legislature, and the national audit office, the office of the President (the 
Supreme Commander in Chief) and elsewhere. However, it is even more important to 
guarantee, that the designed resource management system adequately implements all 
main principles (listed above).  
The personal involvement of a senior ‘resource manager’ – the Minister of 
Defence or a designated deputy minister – is indispensable for the design of an 
adequate resource management system and its successful implementation. Certainly, 
the leadership shall benefit from adequate in-house expert support and, possibly, 
consultations with experienced western partners.29  
The developers of the Bulgarian defence resource management system called 
the first version PPBS – ‘Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.’ 
Subsequent experience proved that this was not a good choice. The name invited 
                                                 
29
 The official interaction with the NATO planning structures is essential. Of high value in the 
Bulgarian case was also the support by the US Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia 
<http://www.ida.org/>, organised in a small number of specially tailored programmes.  
Harmonie Papers No.17 
 
 45 
allusions to the complexities and intricacies of American practice that were used, with 
some degree of success, by opponents to the introduction of transparent, 
democratically controlled defence resource management. This is the main reason why 
the updated version was called an Integrated Defence Resource Management System 
(IDRMS).  
 
 
Lessons learned during IDRMS implementation  
 
The experience from the first two years of IDRMS implementation allows us to draw 
the following main lessons 30:  
• The first prerequisite for successful implementation is to persuade both the 
leadership and other players in resource management of the need to transition 
to a different planning philosophy and procedures. Useful in that respect might 
be to assure support of the relevant legislative committees and of the office of 
the President (who, in the case of Bulgaria, is designated in the Constitution as 
‘Supreme Commander in Chief’ of the armed forces). 
• All participants in IDRMS implementation, in particular programmers, should 
be trained in advance. A two-day practical course prior to each programming 
cycle was found very useful. 31  Since initially academic support was not 
available, the designers of the IDRMS led the first courses.  
• Organisational resistance is to be expected. The introduction of a new type of 
resource management inevitably leads to redistribution of ‘power’ (decision 
making authority). It is not possible to devise a single formula for overcoming 
this resistance, but support from the senior leadership is imperative.  
• In addition, there have been attempts to blame IDRMS for the lack of funding 
for a particular activity or organisation. In this respect, it is important to 
explain in advance that IDRMS does not bring additional money. It just 
distributes available (expected) defence resources among highest priority 
requirements in a transparent manner.  
• Wonders cannot be expected during the first implementation cycle. Given 
uncertainty and insufficient information, resistance and learning requirements, 
around 90 percent coverage and accuracy in the first implementation cycle 
may be considered a success. Be sure to have an opportunity for in-year 
programme review in order to account for changing constraints and unforeseen 
events.  
• Prioritisation, incorporated in IDRMS in a formal way, might be very useful to 
support decisions on resource distribution among competing requirements. 
                                                 
30
 Details are provided in Todor Tagarev with Dobromir Totev and Tilcho Ivanov, “Managing 
Resources for Defence and Security,” Chapter V in Programme for Integration of the Republic of 
Bulgaria into NATO, ed., Konstantin Dimitrov and Velizar Shalamanov (Sofia: Institute for 
Euroatlantic Security, February 2003), <http://www.ieas-bg.org/project_01/eng/egl5.html> (29 Oct. 
2003).  
31
 The education and training in defence resource management is a topic that deserves special 
treatment.  
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• To this end it is important that programme teams devise qualitatively different 
programme alternatives, e.g. alternative ways to achieve an objective in the 
programming guidance. 
• The necessary effort must be made to cost the programmes and programme 
alternatives correctly and to check the costing during the first phases of the 
programme review (before submitting programmes for review by senior 
decision making bodies).  
• Adequate information support to all phases of defence resource management, 
but in particular to programming, is key. The success of IDRMS 
implementation may hang on the efficient handling of the planning process 
and related information. 
The implementation may be greatly supported if the performance of the defence 
establishment, including the armed forces, is assessed according to programmes 
(results achieved and not just the money spent). For example, the legislature requests 
that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers annually presents to Parliament a 
Report on the Status of Defence and the Armed Forces. A further requirement to 
present that report in a programmatic form may be a major driving force for adequate 
IDRMS implementation. Likewise, IDRMS implementation may be facilitated given 
a legislative request that the government submits draft budgets and budget execution 
reports accompanied by major defence programme documents.  
Planners in any country should do so, of course, taking account of their own 
national circumstances and prepared to ‘learn by doing’. For example, after the first 
IDRMS implementation cycle, the Bulgarian MoD made an important change in the 
programme structure. A capability-oriented structure of 21 main programmes, that 
was theoretically sound, was replaced by an organisationally bound structure of 13 
main programmes that was estimated as better manageable 32 . During adaptation 
outside (foreign) support may be quite useful, especially when advice is implemented 
carefully respecting local culture and experience. 
The final lesson, and the most important one, is that implementation cannot be 
successful unless the senior resource manager – the Minister of Defence or a 
designated deputy minister – acts in concordance with IDRMS requirements. 
 
 
Conclusion: General observations from the Bulgarian experience 
 
An IDRMS is a very efficient tool to manage defence transformation, providing for 
transparency of decision making, democratic control and accountability of elected 
officials. Indeed, it is probably the only available tool to implement effectively 
capabilities-based planning and to assess implementation of plans, programmes, and 
budgets.  
                                                 
32
 See for example Todor Tagarev, Transparent Defence Planning for Effective Democratic Control, 
PfP Planning Symposium 2001, IS/DPAO.959.1 (Oberammergau, Germany, 18–19 January 2001). 
<http://pforum.isn.ethz.ch/events/index.cfm?action=doc_detail&eventID=175&docID=275> (30 Oct. 
2003). 
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In particular, the introduction of the programming phase is seen as crucial to 
relate defence policy to money allocations, assuring ‘value for money’ budgeting and, 
potentially, effective democratic oversight of armed forces. The IDRMS 
implementation can be strongly facilitated if the Parliament requests submission of 
the draft defence budget accompanied by adequate programme description, as well as 
programme-based performance reports by the executive power. 
However, the essential condition for successful defence transformation is the 
political will for reform, manifest in the Bulgarian case by the commitment to 
preparation for NATO integration, sufficient to overcome resistance to change. The 
existence of a most advanced IDRMS and experts of highest qualification cannot 
substitute for political will and supportive civil-military relations. There is no need to 
wait for IDRMS institutionalisation in order to make rough (first-order) decisions on 
force level and force structure that is affordable, appropriate, acceptable. While 
supported by quantitative analysis, the major Bulgarian defence reform decisions in 
the beginning of 1999 were not based on results of an existing IDRMS system.  
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IV. ROMANIA: REFORMING THE SECURITY SECTOR  
 
Adrian Pop  
 
 
As an offspring of both defence and security experts, the concept of security sector 
reform (SSR) originates in a more comprehensive, constructivist approach towards 
security, which underlines the fact that the latter is basically an inter-subjective or 
socially constructed reality. 33  Whereas the term sector points to the relationship 
between defence and other governmental and non-governmental security 
organisations, the term reform entails a whole new design of the military forces 
according to the new post-Cold War missions, ranging from preventive diplomacy, 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement to humanitarian intervention and post-conflict 
rehabilitation.34 
To this wider, internationally oriented understanding of the security regime in 
Europe and elsewhere has heavily contributed the changed post-Cold War and post-
9/11 security environment, which has objectively required a gradual shifting of 
traditional national allegiances and responsibilities towards more international tasks 
and duties. 
Nothing about that kind of development was self-evident by the time the 
painful and sometimes erratic transition of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) towards 
the rule of law and market economy began. The lack of vision, confusion and wishful 
thinking was pervasive both East and West. Retrospectively, it is easy to say what had 
to be done. However, the SSR in CEE was more the product of a learning process 
than one of a clear-cut design. From the latter perspective, the countries belonging to 
the former Soviet space could and should benefit from the lessons learnt along the 
way – the hard way – by the CEE countries. 
There is plenty of evidence that a series of factors have hindered the speedy 
implementation of the SSR in CEE. Among them, one could enumerate: bureaucratic 
resistance against change, especially on the part of the General Staff; lack of 
experience among the military in planning, programming and budgeting; shortage of 
expertise among civilians within the defence establishment and security agencies; 
little interest on security and defence matters on the part of the people at large; the 
difficulty of setting up workable civil-military relations (CMR); the inaction and 
muddling through of the defence organisation and the military; the lack of an 
appropriate legislative framework for carrying out reform; the lack of coherence and 
the absence of co-ordination between the different levels of the security and defence 
establishment as a whole; and the prevailing model of “democracy without choice” in 
CEE. 
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Legacy of the Past 
 
In Romania as elsewhere in CEE, the legacy of the communist past at the end of the 
Cold War was enormous and omnipresent. There were more than 300,000 men in 
uniform, out of which 171,000 were in the armed forces. Romania deployed 3,200 
main battle tanks and about 300 combat aircraft. For this oversized military and army 
equipment Romania spent $7 billion, i.e. one-eighth of its $56 billion GNP.  
Initially, the first impulses towards implementing a democratic system of 
control of the military were given by the so-called Committee of Action to 
Democratise the Army (CADA), which pressed for the removing from office of those 
officers compromised by their links with the Ceausescu regime, for promotion on the 
basis of merit, downsizing and professionalisation of the Romanian armed forces. 
Another significant factor that contributed to the launching of the army’s restructuring 
was the signing, in 1990, of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, which initiated 
a decrease in the number of military personnel and various types of armaments. For 
the new spirit of transparency which gradually started to penetrate the army, the 
confidence-building Hungarian-Romanian Open Skies agreement signed on 11 May 
1991 is also worth mentioning.35 
However, there was still the problem of the legacy of the infamous and much-
hated Securitate (Department of State Security). That is why one of the first actions 
taken by the new political power after December 1989 was to put the intelligence 
structures under the MoD’s jurisdiction. According to the official data of the General 
Staff, by the time of revolution the overall number of people working for the 
Department of State Security was 15,312, of which 10,114 were officers.36  
Soon after that, two new intelligence services were set up with domestic and 
foreign areas of responsibilities respectively. Unfortunately, though, the agencies 
suffered by a twofold lack of legitimacy due to the fact that the new Constitution was 
not adopted yet and among their staff the “old guard” prevailed.37 
This initial phase of the defence and security structures’ reshaping in Romania 
ended up, in 1991, with the adoption of the new Constitution, which laid the basis of a 
democratic institutional set up. 
Throughout the second period, between 1992 and 1996, several important 
steps were made towards establishing civilian control of armed forces. In 1992, the 
National Defence College was established – under the chairmanship of the defence 
minister – for training high-ranking army and police officers, as well as civil servants, 
representatives of the Parliament and political parties on national, regional and 
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international security issues. In 1993, a civilian deputy defence minister was 
appointed, and in 1994 the first civilian minister of defence was nominated.  
In addition, in 1992 a National Agency for the Control of Strategic Exports 
(ANCEX) was set up, administratively subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA), for non-proliferation and export control enforcement purposes.38 
In the area of the restructuring of the Romanian armed forces, the first step 
was the elimination of regiment-division echelons and their reorganisation into a 
battalion-brigade-army corps structure. The downsizing of the armed forces in 1994 
permitted the elimination of the army echelon as well. In addition, having been the 
first East European country to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in January 1994, 
Romania started to implement its interoperability-oriented programmes. 
 
 
Defence Organisation Reform 
 
However, as restructuring of the armed forces does not mean the reform of the 
defence organisation, one could say that the latter really started in Romania with the 
creation of mission-specific differentiated structures, such as surveillance and early 
warning units and rapid reaction forces. Thus, the setting up of the Rapid Reaction 
Force (RRF) on 1 March 1997 heralded future force structures for crisis management 
operations in a multinational environment. 
 Throughout the third transformation stage, between 1997 and 2000, most of the 
army’s reform efforts were made according to the annual orders of the country’s 
Supreme Defence Council. For instance, decision-making was both simplified and 
made more efficient by the reorganisation of the MoD in accordance with the 
Governmental Decree no. 110/1997. As a result, the central directorates with general 
attributions for the armed forces were subordinated to the minister and his staff. New 
structures were added to the previously reorganised Department for Defence Policy to 
enhance its capacities in the domains of Euro-Atlantic integration preparedness, 
defence policy planning, and the management of civil-military relations. The elements 
of the General Staff and the service branches were restructured on a modular basis in 
accordance with similar structures of NATO states.  
  In 1999, the Government drafted a new National Security Strategy and a White 
Book of the Government – Romanian Army 2010. But due to the constant squabbling 
among coalition partners, the two political documents were approved by the 
Parliament only in 2000. In that year, the National Office for Security was established 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), as a specialised governmental structure 
in charge of issuing security clearance for Romanian officials that will be allowed 
access to classified NATO information. Last but not least, in 2001, a law on the 
demilitarisation of the police was passed by the Parliament, consecrating the new 
status of policemen as civil servants. 
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The first MAP cycle (1999-2000) exposed a series of serious dysfunctional 
features: unrealistic planning; discrepancy between objectives and resources; lack of 
co-ordination between the departments and services of the defence organisation; lack 
of funds; and a reversed personnel pyramid. As far as the latter is concerned, in 2000, 
when the fourth reform stage started, there was a surplus of about 450 generals, 1,700 
colonels, 3,800 lieutenant colonels and 5,000 majors. Through an extensive 
programme of training and governmental financial support to facilitate employment in 
the civilian sector, the inverse pyramid was readjusted to a large extent by 2003 when 
the fourth stage ended. This was accomplished in accordance with the Programme 
Force 2003 planning, which envisaged a pyramidal structure of personnel with an 
officer/NCO ratio of 1:2.4; and facilitated by a Military Career Guide, implemented 
since June 2001, as well as the provision of social protection, assistance and training 
for officers who leave the army, in order to help them enter the civilian job market. 
At the time of writing (end-2003), the authorised strength of the active and 
civilian personnel of the Romanian Armed Forces is 140,000, out of which 112,000 
are military men and 28,000 civilians39. Programme Force 2003 complies with the 
military missions identified in the National Security Strategy and the priorities 
established by the Government, i.e. to develop a force able to defend the national 
territory and to solve a possible crisis in favour of the national interest of Romania, to 
develop efficient command and control structures able to turn rapidly from peace to 
war, to develop a balanced force package (active, territorial and reserve) to react 
quickly against the possible threats, to establish a mobilisation system able to generate 
forces in case of national crises, and to develop joint operational forces for land, air 
and maritime operations. The active forces have a readiness of 7 to 30 days, the 
minimum manning level being 80 per cent. The territorial forces have a lower 
readiness of 90 days, and their manned level is between 30 and 70 per cent. In order 
to achieve this force structure, 186 units and large units have been disbanded, 162 
have been transformed and 270 have been reorganised. 
Some 80 per cent of Romanian air forces, 70 per cent of naval forces and a 
considerable number of land forces units designated for NATO-led operations have 
already NATO compatible communication systems. 
The future force structure, Objective Force 2007, which is to be implemented 
throughout a fifth transformation stage, between 2003 and 2007, is the force Romania 
can afford. Smaller, leaner and better equipped than Programme Force 2003, it will 
comprise 75,000 military men and 15,000 civilians. The active forces are scheduled to 
have a readiness of 24 to 72 hours within Romanian territory and 30 days outside the 
country, whereas the territorial forces are going to have a readiness of 30-90 days. It 
will allow for a rapid reaction capability in a possible future conflict, which will 
secure the time needed for augmenting the territorial forces and allied intervention. 
Emphasis will be placed on operational mountain troops, paratroopers, aviation, 
artillery, navy, and infantry. 
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The issue of human resources management has been integrated within the 
framework of the general reform of the Romanian army. In order to have the right 
men in the right jobs at the right time, all projects in this field have been designed on 
medium or long term. The rethinking of the human resource management system has 
been based on adopting the personnel pyramid model; continuing the process of the 
military’s gradual turning into a fully professional body by 2007; boosting attractively 
the military career by adapting it to practices existent in modern armies; and setting 
up a system of professional retraining and integration into the civilian job market of 
those which leave the army (as noted earlier). 
Additionally, identifying personnel with the appropriate language skills, 
experience and qualifications – in order to have an effective national representation at 
NATO and to fill a number of posts in Alliance structures – has been a major 
undertaking. As a result, a commission has been set up within the Romanian MoD to 
co-ordinate this process and select a pool of civil servants, military officers and non-
commissioned officers with the necessary backgrounds. 
Regarding capabilities, Romania has focused on increasing the interoperability, 
deployability and sustainability of its forces earmarked for peace-support operations 
and article V missions. All forces earmarked for collective-defence or PfP operations 
are also available, as required, for operations in or outside Romanian territory, on a 
case-by-case basis. Moreover, Romania is willing and able to participate in all 
NATO’s new force structures, including the NATO Response Force (NRF), NATO’s 
elite rapid-reaction force, officially launched in mid-October 2003 in the Dutch city of 
Brunssum, which combines integrated land, sea, air and special forces. From the force 
package made available for peace-support operations, Romania already has the 
capacity to deploy and sustain 1,500 troops in operations abroad.  
Further, the country has put a special emphasis on identifying Host Nation 
Support capabilities. The Romanian catalogue in the area includes four airports for air 
operation support, two ports with excellent harbour facilities, naval support facilities 
and other facilities that may be available to NATO forces. 
Romania is also committed to substantially contribute to efforts aimed at  
reducing dangers arising from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, 
sensitive related materials and their means of delivery. The October 2003 NATO 
exercise in Pitesti, focused on handling a possible radioactive contamination scenario, 
is just one recent example that Romania is determined to honour its commitments in 
that field.  
Concerning defence planning, Romania already has a NATO-compatible 
system and is now taking steps to prepare for the rigours of NATO force planning. 
This involves improving decision-making explicitly to link Romania's responsibilities 
with the country's limited resources. In this way, the country's defence budget is now 
pegged to GDP forecasts and based on the government’s commitment to ensure a 
proper level of defence spending, i.e. 2.38 per cent.  
The MFA-chaired National Commission for Romania’s Integration into 
NATO secures the overall co-ordination and supervision of the planning, analysis and 
review process.  
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Civil-Military Relations 
 
Civilian control over the military and the setting up of democratic mechanisms for 
overseeing the military are important indicators of the quality of a democratisation 
process. The new civil-military relations (CMR) agenda encompasses a move from a 
state-centred traditional security-oriented approach to a democratic consolidation 
process with a broader understanding of security, which includes greater effectiveness 
and efficiency in CMR arrangements.  
In Romania, the Law 45/1994 regarding national defence stipulates that the 
leadership of the national defence system is ensured by the Parliament, the President 
of Romania, the country's Supreme Defence Council, the Government, the MoD and 
“public authorities that have responsibilities in national defence domain” (article 7). 
Among these there is a clear-cut division of labour. From 1994 onwards, the defence 
ministers have been civilians. 
The Parliament is the only authority competent to adopt the defence legislation, 
as well as any resolution of major importance in the defence field: declaring partial or 
general mobilisation; declaring the state of war; suspending or ceasing the military 
hostilities; regulating the state of siege and of emergency. The main bodies of the 
Parliament exercising control over the military are the two Committees for Defence, 
Public Order and National Security, one in Senate and the other in the Chamber of 
Deputies. There are three occasions in which the two committees work together: 
hearings for the nominations of the Cabinet members designated to run the military; 
the approval of the budget; and the approval of military exercises on national territory. 
Hearings are the principal instrument for exercising parliamentary control over the 
different branches of the military. Periodically or whenever the need arises, 
committee members invite representatives of the governmental institutions within 
their area of responsibility to come and testify with regard to specific problems related 
to the activity of their sectors. A crucial instrument of parliamentary control is the 
budget, but its efficiency is considerably reduced by in-built as well as economic 
limitations.40 Another instrument is the ad hoc inquiry. If the Parliament decides that a 
certain situation requires special parliamentary investigation, in parallel to one 
undertaken by specific branches of the Government, the members can either mandate 
the permanent Committees or create an entirely new special commission, with the aim 
of complementing the work performed by the executive in this respect. 
The President of Romania is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
and also the Head of the Country's Supreme Defence Council. This position gives him 
a major influence on national security affairs. The President promulgates the laws 
regarding the military institution, voted by the Parliament. Subject to parliamentary 
approval, he can also declare the general or partial mobilisation and the state of siege 
or emergency. It is the President who confers decorations and honour titles, as well as 
the ranks of marshal, general and admiral. 
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The Country's Supreme Defence Council (CSDC) organises and co-ordinates 
the activities related to national defence and security in a unitary manner, reporting to 
the Parliament once a year. The Council plays a central role in the preparation of the 
main security documents and actually approves them as binding decisions, thus being 
de facto the most important participant in the decision-making process. The secret 
services are also part of the CSDC structure, their Directors being appointed by the 
President. A presidential Counsellor runs the CSDC on a day-to-day basis as its 
Secretary. The main duty of this body is to analyse the major problems in the security 
and national defence fields and to present proposals for their settlement to the 
Parliament and the President.  
The Government co-ordinates the activity of the MoD for maintaining the 
capabilities of the country's defence, ensures the necessary defence resources, 
elaborates budgetary norms, regulates the armed forces' activity through resolutions 
and rulings, and initiates authoritative documents and draft laws regarding the military 
field.   
In order to co-ordinate all defence-related legislative activities with other 
public bodies as well as NGOs, and harmonise the national defence legislation with 
the relevant NATO and EU member states legislation, a Department for Parliamentary 
Relations, Legislative Harmonisation and Public Relations was set up within the MoD 
in 2001 (about which there is more in Chapter V below).  
Apart from the control exercised by the above mentioned institutions, there is 
a control of the military exercised by the Constitutional Court, which checks up the 
legal and constitutional aspects of the laws and regulations applied to the national 
defence and public order field; and the Audit Court, which checks up the budget 
execution.  
Academic expertise in security, defence, and international relations includes 
university research centres such as the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies of the 
University of Bucharest, think-tanks such as the MoD-run Institute for Political 
Studies of Defence and Military History and the Centre for Strategic Security Studies, 
or the MFA-run Romanian Institute for International Studies “Nicolae Titulescu”. 
There are several NGOs dealing with security issues, too, including the EURISC 
Foundation, the “Manfred Wörner” Euro-Atlantic Association, the George C. 
Marshall Association Romania and the NATO House, which together form the 
Romanian chapter of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA).41 One problem with the 
security-oriented Romanian NGOs is that more often than not their expertise is not 
seriously taken into consideration by decision-makers. Only a few NGOs have some 
influence over the Government and this is because of their special relationships with 
the power structures. It is the case of the “Manfred Wörner” Euro-Atlantic 
Association, led by a MoD State Secretary, and of the NATO House, run by a 
counsellor of the Prime Minister. The above-mentioned situation poses the problem of 
de facto non-NGO status of such organisations and raises serious doubts about their 
political neutrality.  
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A positive but unfortunately rare example of a public-private co-operation in 
the area of security is the Information Centre for the Security Culture set up by the 
Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) in partnership with the EURISC Foundation in 
September 2003.  
However, all in all, the security community outside the government is rather 
meagre. There is little to no rotation of security experts from academia to the 
government and back to academia as in the West. Debates on security and defence 
issues are insufficient, and the level of expertise in the media on such issues is rather 
low. 
 
 
Military Education 
 
Military education reform is an integral part of the defence reform and NATO 
accession process. 
The management of training in the Romanian armed forces has moved to a 
U.S./U.K. model. Similarly to the previously operational Regional Training Centre for 
staff officers established in Bucharest within the Advanced Military Studies 
Academy, brought into existence with United Kingdom assistance, a Regional Centre 
for Defence Resources Management was formally set up, with U.S. support, in April 
1999. Located at the Academy of Aviation and Anti-Aircraft Defence in Brasov and 
devised in co-operation with the Defence Resources Management programme in 
Monterrey, California, the Regional Centre for Defence Resources Management has 
started to operate in 2000 under the aegis of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC). It is a practical, “hands-on” training institution modelled on programmes for 
American junior officers, which is open to leading staff and specialists from East 
Central and South East Europe who have completed civilian or military university 
education. The aim of this post-graduate Centre is the upgrading of the training for 
military and civilian personnel in charge of planning and administration of defence 
resources, and their chief constituents: the planning of defence, the management of 
human resources, and the management of other resources that contribute to defence. 
By setting up this Centre, Romania has been integrated into the “PfP Training 
Centres” network, thus contributing to the achievement of the standards of 
interoperability of defence systems of East Central and South Eastern European 
countries with NATO member countries’ defence systems. 
Aiming at improving the decision-making process through modern simulation 
and modelling methods, the Romanian MoD proposed to set up a simulation centre. 
The Training Simulation Centre has been established within the Higher Military 
Studies Academy and has become operational in 2002. Several other higher education 
institutions active in the area of security and defence are worth mentioning. In the 
framework of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) a National Institute for 
Intelligence was set up in 1992, later on, in 2000, relabelled the National Intelligence 
Academy. Since 2002, a National Intelligence College within the National 
Intelligence Academy was established also for training high-ranking civil servants on 
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intelligence matters. A highly appreciated postgraduate programme is the one-year-
and-a-half MA programme in International Relations organised since 1997 by the 
Faculty of History and the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies at the University of 
Bucharest. Since January 2003, the National School for Political and Administrative 
Studies in Bucharest has been organising a NATO Senior Executive Programme in 
co-operation with the NATO Defence College in Rome and the George C. Marshall 
European Centre for Security Studies in Garmish-Partenkirchen. This course offers 
tailored training for civil servants and military personnel to prepare them for posts 
linked to NATO and positions within the Alliance itself.42  
In addition, following the US model, in 2003 a National Defence University 
was set up in Bucharest, uniting in an overall framework the already existing MoD-
run academic and research institutions. Furthermore, an impressive number of officers 
and civilians working for the military took part in foreign languages or security-
related courses (most of them in English) at different military and civilian institutions 
abroad.  
 
 
The Way Ahead 
 
The Romanian military still needs to focus its contribution to NATO in terms of niche 
capabilities – alpine units, military police, de-mining and military intelligence sub-
units – and infrastructure facilities for air, sea and land operations. 
Preparing for NATO membership as well as for a future active involvement in 
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence 
Policy (CFSP/ESDP) is an intergovernmental, interdepartmental and interdisciplinary 
matter. As a result, establishing functional horizontal contacts between governmental 
officials and various security agencies is imperative.  
Since the new threats and especially that of terrorism have blurred the 
boundaries between internal and external security, Romania also needs to launch a 
wide-ranging review of the division of labour between law-enforcement and 
intelligence agencies as well as between the domestic and foreign branches of the 
latter. In addition, the country must actively promote inter-agency security co-
operation under strict political guidance between the defence establishment, the law-
enforcement and intelligence agencies, between the domestic and foreign branches of 
the latter as well as between various military and civilian institutions. It must also 
effect changes in defence research and development, with priority given to high-tech 
intelligence systems. 
The issue of remaining agents of former state security structures in positions 
of authority has to be tackled properly for NATO to have confidence in the ability of 
Romania to handle classified and sensitive information. Two scandals have only 
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reinforced the need for handling properly that particular sensitive issue.43 These are (a) 
one concerning the Protection and Anti-Corruption Independent Service of the 
Ministry of Justice, whose former head, Marian Ureche, had to present his resignation 
after being shown by the press as being involved in political police activities before 
1989; and (b) the one related to the General Directorate of Intelligence and Internal 
Protection of the Administration and Interior Ministry, which is still staffed mainly by 
ex-Securitate agents, and which has a history of exceeding its intelligence remit being 
solely under the Government’s control.  
Finally, of course, civil society has a major role to play in the area of SSR. 
The forging of a new security culture based on a genuine partnership between 
government and civil society is particularly needed in the case of Romania. A public-
private partnership (PPP) in the area of security will likely create a new awareness on 
the part of the population of the need for its active involvement in countering the new 
security threats. 
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V. ROMANIA: REFORM AND PARLIMENTARY RELATIONS 
 
Tudor Munteanu  
 
 
As this is written, Romania is poised to accede to NATO. The country demonstrated 
its readiness for entry by, among other things, putting in place sound arrangements for 
the democratic control of armed forces, reforming and restructuring those forces (a 
process that will continue for some time yet) and revising the domestic legal 
framework for military provision. Innovative approaches to parliamentary liaison and 
public information characterised the preparations. These are elucidated in the later 
sections of this paper. 
 
 
Democratic control of the Armed Forces 
  
In Romania democratic control is exercised not only over the military, but also over 
the public order and national security forces. 
Parliamentary control is comprehensive, complex and effective, based on 
elected representatives’ position as a public authority in the society. According to the 
Constitution, the Parliament is not only the supreme representative body of the 
Romanian people, but also the legislative authority of the country. Its role consists in 
establishing the legislative framework for the Armed Forces, which sets out the role 
of the Armed Forces, their size and organisation, as well as the strategic requirements 
and the priorities for certain periods of time. According to the constitutional 
provisions the Parliament shall approve laws regarding: the budget, the structure of 
the national defence system, economy and territory for defence, status of the military 
personnel, the regime of state of siege and emergency, ratification of the treaties and 
international agreements in this field or other legal acts regarding the Armed Forces. 
Also the Parliament appoints the Romanian Intelligence Service director and exercises 
its control over the activity of this agency. 
The legislature also performs oversight functions. It examines the annual 
report of the activity carried out by the Supreme Council for National Defence and it 
has the power to issue certain measures to be taken by this body. The parliamentary 
committees for Defence, Public Order and National Defence examine all the bills, 
Government emergency ordinances, Government decisions and legislative proposals 
regarding the Armed Forces activity. Important also are questions and 
interpellations/inquiries asked by Senators and Representatives, to which Government 
members (including minister of National Defence) have to answer in due time. 
Civilian direction is exercised by the executive branch. The President is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the Supreme Council for 
National Defence (see below). The President has the power to declare the partial or 
general mobilisation of the Armed Forces. Another Presidential prerogative is the 
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declaration of the state of siege or emergency (subject to the Parliament’s approval in 
5 days). 
The Government has important responsibilities which derive from its 
constitutional role: to ensure the implementation of the country’s domestic and 
foreign policy and to exercise the general management of public administration. A 
special role is played by the Prime-Minister, who is by law the vice-president of the 
Supreme Council for National Defence. 
The Supreme Council for National Defence organizes and coordinates the 
activities regarding the country’s defence and national security. The Council analyses 
and proposes, at the request of the President of Romania, measures at the declaration 
of state of siege or emergency in the entire country or in certain counties, and at the 
declaration of mobilisation (partial or general) of the Armed Forces. The Council 
analyses and proposes the promotion of Romania’s national security strategy, the 
military strategy and advises on defence-related legislative drafts. 
Both the executive and the legislature thus have a voice in defence policy 
making and planning, from defining the military’s role to allocating the resources and 
assessing the results, from managerial plans and details to the strategic vision that 
encompasses changes in the international environment and re-definitions of the 
concepts of power and security. (Our national documents, which give guidelines in 
defence and security areas are: the National Security Strategy, the White Paper, and 
the National Military Strategy.)  
Important too is the fact that military offices and civil officers work together 
harmoniously in implementing policy. A topical illustration is the internal co-
ordination mechanisms set up to manage reform of the Armed Forces and preparation 
for NATO integration (including participation in MAP). A hierarchy of civilian and 
military structures, committees, bodies and various (ad-hoc) working groups is in 
place, to ensure co-ordination of the decision making process. Overall coordination of 
planning, analysis and review is the responsibility of the National Commission for 
Romania’s Integration into NATO, chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and is 
monitored by the Prime Minister. The most senior committee set up to deal with 
military issues is the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) chaired by the Minister of 
National Defence. Subordinate to this structure is the NATO Integration Committee 
chaired by the State Secretary for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defence Policy, 
which is charged with overseeing all matters associated with the restructuring and 
reform process (including MAP). There are also some ad-hoc working groups in the 
Ministry of National Defence and General Staff in an effort to promote consistency 
and transparency across all the structures of the Armed Forces.  
Finally under this heading, all defence activities are subject to external 
oversight. Here NGOs play an important role by addressing petitions, notifying 
certain illegal aspects and asking for information about specific cases or favourable 
solutions. Also, NGOs cooperate with the Ministry of National Defence in various 
ways, as organizing national and international seminars, or promoting the efforts 
made for joining EU and NATO. Moreover, the issue concerning the human rights 
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has become a central concern of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence also due 
to the aspects signalled by these organisations. 
 
 
Reform and the Restructuring of the Romanian Armed Forces  
 
The first two stages in restructuring and reshaping the Romanian Armed Forces lasted 
between 1990 and 1999 and aimed at a radical transformation to a modern, western 
style military. Many of their prescriptions, though, were overtaken by events. A third 
restructuring stage (2000-2003) marked a qualitative change of approach by 
implementing the provisions of the first Multiannual Planning Cycle and of the 
Program Force 2003 document that provided a force structure in the limit of 112, 000 
military and 28,000 civilians. The period also saw the launching and running of 
Romanian Annual National Programs I-IV that brought coherence to the reform of the 
Armed Forces, and our preparation for NATO membership. The current stage (2003-
2007) is linked with the Objectives Force 2007 Concept: to provide a leaner, modern, 
well equipped, trained and more affordable force in the limit of 90,000 personnel 
(75,000 military and 15,000 civilians). 
This was not an easy ride for the Romanian military since we had to run this 
process coping with the unprecedented dynamics of the new wind of change towards 
a new security paradigm. We had to deal with substantial changes and restructuring 
under some very difficult circumstances. The resources needed were not always 
available, and we had to downsize our forces in an unfavourable economic 
environment. Due to the lack of experience, our vision on objectives to be 
accomplished was not always very clear. So, in these circumstances the real challenge 
was to take decisions, notably those important decisions with serious impact on the 
development of the process concerned, but also with a serious impact on the people, 
on other sectors of the country such as health and education or on the social policy of 
the Government. 
After a too long period of endeavours and straggling efforts it seems to me that 
now we are on the right path. The 2002/3 MAP cycle’s objectives and their 
implementation – together with the prior achievements within the MAP process –  
provided the appropriate framework for receiving, by Romania, the invitation to join 
NATO. The progress recorded in the objectives’ implementation also provided the 
right support for accession discussions and for the ratification of the Accession 
Protocols by the NATO countries’ parliaments. Romania was able to accomplish a 
high percentage of its objectives during the this MAP cycle because the experience 
gained in earlier ones led to more realistic planning and a better correlation of 
objectives and resources.  
The 2003/4 MAP Cycle is of paramount importance to Romania because it 
will not only prepare us for full NATO membership, but it will also assist us in 
adjusting our military reform priorities and ensure that they reflect the needs of 
NATO in this new security environment. Political and public support for the reform 
agenda remains high and the Government is strongly committed to ensuring the best 
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conditions for completion of our reform programme. To this aim, a defence budget 
profile reaching 2.38 per cent of GDP was established for 2002 and 2003, and this 
same level is planned for the period 2004-2006. The priority areas for this cycle are 
consistent with the June 2003 NAC Defence Ministerial decisions and guidance, and 
have been selected to ensure fulfilment of NATO’s requirements for invitees. The 
military reform priorities reflect Romania’s commitment towards enhancing NATO 
capabilities and focus on the development of a new, more flexible and more effective 
force structure, improved deployability and sustainability, and preparing forces for the 
whole range of NATO missions.  
 
 
The way ahead 
 
Implementation will not come rapidly, but in accordance with a timetable for 
Completion of Reform (due to be completed in May 2004) and a long-term Armed 
Forces Restructuring Plan (due to start in 2004). Immediate priorities cover 
1. Defence Planning 
2. Participation in the full spectrum of NATO-led operations 
3. Force Restructuring  
4. Host Nation Support  
5. Airspace Management and Air Defence  
6. Personnel Training and Development  
7. Personnel Management 
8. Procurement 
9. Disposal of Excess Equipment and Infrastructure  
In addition, continuing work has to be done in revising the domestic legal framework, 
using the machinery to expedite this whose creation is a notable special feature of 
Romania’s recent defence reform. 
 
1. Defence planning. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System 
(PPBES) will be further improved and adapted to meet NATO’s defence planning 
requirements. The gist of the current defence planning exercise is to complete the 
Strategic Defence Review (the fundamental review of Objective Force 2007). The 
2004 defence budget will represent 2.38 per cent of GDP and we are committed to 
support our defence reform programme, by maintaining this level of expenditure at 
least to 2006. Taking into account annual GDP growth of approximately 4.5 per cent, 
we expect that our defence budget will continue to increase in real terms through the 
current defence planning period.  
Further this level of defence expenditure should be sufficient to support 
reform and restructuring plans, to implement NATO Force Goals, begin a modest 
investment and modernisation programme, and make some needed improvements to 
infrastructure. Approximately 25-35 per cent of the defence budget is planned to be 
earmarked for modernisation of the new force structure, with a view to improving the 
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interoperability, combat effectiveness, deployability, sustainability and survivability 
of the forces earmarked for NATO missions. 
 
2. Participation in the full spectrum of NATO-led operations and in the international 
fight against terrorism. In 2003 participation in overseas missions exceeded planned 
provision. Forces participating in all missions abroad are part of the force package 
Romania will make available for the full range of NATO missions starting in 2004. In 
the new global environment directly affected by non-conventional risks from 
terrorism to organized crime, illegal trafficking and WMD proliferation, the fight 
against terrorism is a priority for Romania and we continue to expand our capabilities 
to counter terrorism. A concept for establishment of a Special Forces battalion has 
been developed and we will begin to stand up this unit in 2004. 
We have given a special attention to NBC defence capabilities. The new NBC 
defence concept and doctrine, reflecting NATO standards and procedures, has been 
completed and is pending approval. 
 
3. Force Restructuring. As regards the forces’ restructuring and operationalisation, we 
have continued to restructure our forces by disbanding, re-organizing, establishing or 
re-locating units in accordance with the current force structure plans. We have also 
focused on maintaining the readiness level of units declared for NATO missions, and 
on increasing the combat capabilities of the forces scheduled to be operationally ready 
by the end of 2003. All of these forces achieved an increased level of readiness 
despite manning problems in some of these units (especially NCOs). The 
operationalisation process of some units was, however, affected by the cost of the Iraq 
mission. These units are now programmed to become operational in 2004. A Strategic 
Defence Review (SDR) has validated Objective Force 2007 plans. Implementation 
plans for the new force structure will be approved in the first quarter of 2004. 
Affordability will be the key challenge for the final force structure option. Romania is 
giving special emphasis to ensuring the deployability of units by upgrading and 
procuring additional C-130 aircraft and maintaining the agreements with civilian 
companies for sea and airlift, and is examining the possibility of further enhancement 
of these capabilities. Consistent with the results of the SDR and in accordance with 
NATO needs, the forces Romania is prepared to consider available upon accession 
include mountain troops, paratroopers, military police, reconnaissance troops, UAV 
and NBC capabilities and forces. In the longer run NATO is seeking from Romania a 
deployable division and contributions to special forces and multinational formations. 
 
4. Host Nation Support. The HNS Capabilities Catalogue was submitted to NATO at 
the beginning of 2003 and the concept and procedures to provide HNS are being 
developed by an inter-ministerial working group. Romania’s capabilities are 
continuing to be improved following experience gained by hosting allies’ rotation to 
the Balkans and Middle East. The HNS concept and procedures that are currently 
being developed will be finalized and supported by additional necessary national 
legislation. We will further improve the arrangements and review requirements for 
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railheads, airports and seaports and other infrastructure facilities for the reception and 
onward movement of allied forces.  
Also, we will continue to modernize the firing ranges, training facilities and 
the airports and seaports which are needed for allied deployments. 
 
5. Airspace Management and Air Defence. Within the air space management and air 
defence area, important additional steps have been taken towards the integration of 
Romania’s air space into the NATO air space control system. The Air Sovereignty 
Operations Centre (ASOC) has achieved initial operational capability, and the initial 
interface between ASOC and the NATO Integrated and Extended Air Defence System 
(NATINEADS) has been achieved. The ASOC has also a connection interface for 
NATO Air Early Warning & Command (NAEW&C) aircraft. Romania is ready to be 
integrated into NATINEADS and has undertaken to streamline the decision process to 
facilitate its ability to police Romanian airspace. 
 
6. Personnel Training and Development focused on English language and NATO staff 
procedures training to ensure that Romania can effectively man all of its national and 
international positions at the various NATO HQs; revision of curricula to teach 
NATO concepts and operational procedures; six brigades (company through brigade 
staff) and three battalion-size units were trained; the training of NCOs; and the 
revision of all joint training regulations to encompass NATO strategies, doctrines, 
procedures and standards.  
 
7. Personnel Management. In the area of human resources management, the Military 
Career Guide remains the main instrument for achieving the pyramidal personnel 
structure and effective military personnel career management. In parallel, most of the 
regulations concerning human resources management, especially regarding the 
civilian personnel management, individual military career management and the 
improvement of quality life of personnel, are being reviewed to ensure that they 
reflect NATO personnel management standards. Compensatory packages and re-
conversion programmes shall be provided to discharged personnel. 
 
8. Procurement. In the short to medium term force plans primarily seek to ensure 
NATO standard communication and communication security. Over the longer term 
they seek to improve Romanian capabilities to deploy and support its forces, and to 
enhance the forces’ combat capabilities.  
 
9. Disposal of Excess Equipment and Infrastructure. The Sales Agency will continue 
to dispose of excess equipment. Excess equipment will continue to be identified 
during the restructuring process and destroyed or sold in accordance with 
international regulations and agreements. Redundant infrastructure will be transferred 
to state institutions and local authorities. 
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Legislation and Parliamentary Relations 
 
Adopting the NATO acquis, and passing related secondary legislation represents a 
huge working process of legal harmonisation. In 2001, as Romania continued moving 
toward full NATO integration and European Union membership, it became obvious 
that a more efficient mode of cooperation with the Parliament was required for the 
timely harmonisation of Romania’s then-current legislative framework with the 
established laws and legal procedures of NATO member states. To accomplish this, 
the Government created the Ministry for Parliamentary Relations as the special 
authority of the central Governmental administration. Right now it is a department not 
a ministry and the head of it is a delegate-minister, also member of the Government. 
This Department for Relations with the Parliament (DRP) has a number of 
critical functions, including responsibility for planning, coordinating, and ensuring 
that proper legislative procedures are followed for each and every item of 
Government-initiated law. In addition, the DRP is charged with developing an 
efficient programme of liaison between corresponding Governmental and 
Parliamentarian organisations, and within the Government itself. 
In a further innovation, a State Secretary (Deputy Minister) for Parliamentary 
Liaison was appointed within every ministry. This innovation increased the quality 
and efficiency of the DRP dramatically. The Minister for Parliamentary Liaison 
convenes monthly meetings with all state secretaries for Parliamentary Liaison who 
correlate and coordinate their legislative activities in order to provide a more effective 
and efficient legislative process. 
Within the Romanian Ministry of National Defence (MND), the Department 
for Parliamentary Relations is charged with implementing the defence-related 
legislative process. This Department provides not only the general liaison between the 
Ministry and Parliament, it also coordinates all defence-related legislative activities 
directly with other public authorities and non-governmental organisations, including 
the drafting and submitting of bills. In addition, this Department has the very 
important task of harmonizing these important actions with those of the NATO and 
EU member states. 
Prior to 2001, ministerial representatives did not participate in Parliamentary 
debates concerning their ministries’ draft legislation. Today, however, ministerial 
representatives participate fully and efficiently. As such, they may present the 
reasoning behind – and answer questions regarding – specific legislation, as well as 
pointing out key aspects of particular interest to the Parliamentarians. Either the 
Minister of National Defence or the State Secretary for Parliamentary Liaison must be 
present when defence-related legislation is officially submitted for debate and 
approval to a Plenum of the two Chambers of Parliament.  
In addition the MND often hosts official meetings between its key leaders and 
members of the Standing Committees for Defence, Public Order, and National 
Security. These meetings regularly demonstrate their value in close cooperation that 
results when all parties are involved with the legislative process from its inception 
within the ministry to its debate and passage in Parliament. 
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The activities of the Department for Parliamentary Relations and Legislative 
Harmonisation have contributed significantly to the improved quality and increased 
efficiency of all defence-related legislation proposed by the MND. It has proven 
extremely adapted at interfacing in these areas with the Parliament, with other 
governmental organs, and with the public in general. Greater attention is now paid to 
liaison with national and international non-governmental organisations, especially 
when the goal is the adoption or passage of draft legislation that is systematic, 
cohesive, and harmonized both internally with prior legislation and externally with the 
legislation of EU and NATO member states. 
The harmonisation of defence-related legislation with NATO member-states 
laws has its ground in Chapter V – Legal Issues from Romania’s National Program 
for NATO Accession and the Timetable for Completion of Reforms. 
The main objective of this activity is to remove any legal impediments that 
would hamper the fulfilment of commitments: rapid deployment of troops over 
borders, entry of Allied troops into the national territory, efficient cooperation in 
fulfilling the missions, and so on. 
Besides these main objectives, in pre-accession stage there are also other 
activities that need to be achieved, such as: reorganisation and re-structuring of the 
Armed Forces, reconsideration of the system for the preparation of population, 
national economy and territory for defence, participation of Armed Forces in peace 
support operations, in PfP activities, as well as contribution with personnel in multi-
national military structures. 
We could say that harmonisation of legal framework to NATO accession 
requirements started in 1994, after Romania had accepted the PfP framework-
document. Right after that, in 1995, Romania concluded the PfP Status of Forces 
Agreements (PfP SOFA) and protocols.  
Besides PfP-SOFA, the legal status of forces on Romanian territory was also 
established by concluding bilateral agreements with USA, UK and France. At the 
same time, it was taken into consideration the creation of the necessary legal 
framework for the logistic support of troops that conduct exercises or other missions 
on national territory. 
The legal framework for participation of armed forces in military missions and 
collective defence – and for a simplified procedure in granting approval for 
participation in exercises and joint operations – was made by amending the Law no. 
45/1994 on national defence. 
The creation of a NATO compatible structure, able to fulfil the new missions, 
led to a complex restructuring process, which also implied major changes in the 
legislation on management of human resources. As a result, the Status of Military 
Personnel was modified and the Military Career Guide was adopted, which aimed at 
the creation of a pyramidal structure. The restructuring process was supported by the 
adoption of legislation for social protection of military personnel: the Law no. 
164/2001 on State military pensions, the Government Ordinance no. 7/1998 on 
certain social protection measures for military and civil personnel, applicable during 
the restructuring process of large units. 
Harmonie Papers No.17 
 
 67 
The will to have professional Armed Forces and training improvement 
according to NATO standards required broad conversions in training methods and 
standards. For this purpose, STANAGs on personnel training were enforced, even at 
institutional level. Based on the Government Decision no. 1287/2003 was established 
the National Defence University, and according to the provisions of the Government 
Decision no.466/1999, a Regional Centre for Defence Resources Management was 
created. 
The Law no. 182/2002 on protection of classified information and the four 
Government Decisions for the enforcement of protectionist measures, as well as the 
Government Decision no. 835/2002 establishing the National Security Authority were 
also duly adopted. I have to mention also the Law no. 257/2001 on the measures to be 
taken against aircraft that use Romanian air space without clearance and the Law on 
the preparation of national economy and territory for defence.  
Under the coordination of the National Committee for Romania’s Integration 
into NATO, the compatibility of the national constitutional framework with the 
provisions of Art. 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty has been studied. This is the article 
which stipulates that an armed attack against one or more of allies shall be considered 
an attack against them all. The conclusions of the study pointed out that the 1991 
Constitutional provisions are compatible to NATO stipulations and other agreements; 
but it has been decided that, in the context of revision of the Fundamental Law, 
NATO integration should however have a specific Constitutional basis. As a 
consequence, the specialists from the MND made proposals and supported the 
amendments to certain constitutional texts so in the future we would have 
constitutional ground and flexibility for other necessary changes in defence-related 
legislation based on the revised Romanian Constitution, in force from October 2003. 
The modified Constitution gives new legal grounds for military obligations. 
The text no longer stipulates the obligation of Romanian male citizens to military 
service. An organic law shall stipulate the conditions for the fulfilment of military 
duties, applicable to all Romanian citizens, regardless of gender. This phrase allows 
the regulation of military duties according to the military alliances Romania will 
become a part to and of military training requirements. The age limit for recruitment 
is still between 20 and 35 years old, except for volunteers. This is in accordance with 
the requirements of a professional army. 
To have a Constitutional expression of Romania’s commitments to NATO 
structures and to further developments in the process of Romania’s preparation to join 
the European Union, the revised Constitution says that: “According to the law and 
international treaties Romania is a part to, the Armed Forces shall contribute to 
collective defence within military alliance systems and shall participate in 
peacekeeping or peace making operations”. In the spirit of these provisions, the MND 
has submitted for approval the draft Law on participation of armed forces in missions 
abroad. Based on the provisions laid down in the revised Constitution, within another 
bill is in preparation establishing the conditions in which foreign troops can enter into, 
station, conduct operations or transit Romanian territory. 
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Another improvement is the establishment of a Constitutional basis for the 
elaboration of a new status of military personnel. The MND specialists are working to 
a new draft Rule in this field, in order to ensure a more effective management of 
human resources and enforcement of new principles that NATO member-states 
military personnel are already accustomed to.  
A further important amendment to the Constitution is the introduction of art. 
145, according to which Romania’s accession to NATO shall be made by a law 
passed in joint session of the two Chambers of Parliament, with a majority of two-
thirds from the total number of Deputies and Senators. This is a very specific 
Constitutional basis for NATO accession. 
 
 
Public information: ensuring transparency  
 
Restructuring and modernisation depend on public support and confidence in the 
credibility of our Armed Forces. Building this confidence and credibility is the main 
goal of the Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) of the Ministry of National 
Defence. Traditionally, public trust in the Romanian Armed Forces has constantly 
exceeded 70 per cent, supporting the evolution and modernisation of our military 
structures during preparation for NATO accession and Euro-Atlantic integration. 
As the public image of the Armed Forces is a component of its combat 
capability, gaining and maintaining continued public support for its actions are 
strategic objectives. Any decrease in public support could detrimentally influence our 
capability to fulfil basic missions. An example would be restricting public funding for 
military infrastructure, training or, as we have seen in some other NATO candidate 
countries, peace support operations. 
Public information is a mandatory activity of the military, resulting from the 
citizen’s right to be informed granted by the Romanian Constitution. As a public 
institution the Armed Forces are bound by law to ensure all citizens have free access 
to unclassified defence-related information. In practice, our experience shows that 
military transparency is the key which unlocks the door of successful implementation 
of military reform. 
Making use of the citizen’s right to information granted by the Constitution 
and Freedom of Information Law, our civilian media represent a complementary 
means of exercising democratic oversight of the military. In Romania, the Armed 
Forces’ media dialogue is both permanent and effective. Primarily through the actions 
of the DPR, the taxpayer is kept informed of how public funds are spent for defence-
related matters, as well as on a variety of other relevant topics such as our ongoing 
military reform efforts, military training, combat readiness, housing conditions, 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) participation and the ongoing NATO accession process. 
Within the Romanian MND, the Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) has 
functioned, in one form or another, since 1991. Now a part of the Ministry’s 
Department of Parliamentary Relations, Legislative Harmonisation and Public 
Relations, this organisation has developed a unique and special relationship with our 
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civilian media. The main objectives of the DPR are to ensure transmission of correct 
and complete defence-related information (both internally and externally), promote 
the ‘special relationship’ Romanian Armed Forces have within society, and promote a 
proper image of the Romanian military that develops increased public support for, and 
raises public interest in, defence-related issues.  
Media activities include publishing press releases, organizing regular press 
briefings and press conferences, distributing weekly information bulletins on the 
upcoming scheduled military activities, periodically inviting journalists to observe 
various military exercises and deployments, arranging and publishing interviews with 
key military leaders and other specific activities such as international conferences, 
workshops, seminars, debates and roundtable discussions on topics of mutual interest. 
In addition, the DPR prepares promotional materials and bulletins, publishes 
military reviews, prepares special TV and radio programmes about military topics of 
special public interest such as coverage of its extensive NATO support and overseas 
peace support operations in nations such as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and, most 
recently, Afghanistan (where Romania was the first NATO candidate nation with 
troops on the ground under coalition command), Kuwait and Iraq. The Directorate of 
Public Relations also makes direct contact with well-known national and international 
leaders and other famous personalities, as well as with local communities and 
authorities across the country. 
In Romania, an operational debate system of national scale was developed to 
discuss defence and security-related issues. It is here that periodical national seminars 
have been organized with such topics as: "The Armed Forces and Society", "The 
Military Career and Youth in the Armed Forces", "The Transparency of Security - 
Security of Transparency", and "The Defence of Transparency - Transparency of 
Defence", and so on. All of these debates demonstrated to the Romanian public the 
value and imperative of democratic control of the military by discussing major issues 
confronting the military in the reform process and, last but not least, educating the 
people by facilitating the flow of communication between society and the Armed 
Forces. 
In 2002 and 2003 the overall image of the military was positive (81.01 per 
cent) and improved as compared to 2001 (78.00 per cent) and to 2000 (76.98 per 
cent), and it matches closely the people’s trust in the Armed Forces. This ascending 
trend may be explained by media interest in the capability of the Romanian military to 
cooperate with NATO forces under all circumstances. The interest grew significantly 
mainly after the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks (2001), and following the US interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq 2002 and 2003, but also due to generally increased transparency 
of the military and intensified media coverage of military activities. 
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VI. SLOVAKIA: GETTING REAL ABOUT SECURITY 
 
Ivo Samson 
 
 
The Slovak Republic is an example of a successful comeback in terms of NATO 
aspirations. Although it was excluded from the first round of NATO integration in 
Madrid and not even mentioned there as a possible candidate for the second round of 
Eastern enlargement, during the discussions in 1999 and 2000 about qualified 
candidates for that next enlargement, it started to be seen as the most probable next 
NATO newcomer. This change of fortune was brought about by progress in political 
and military reforms in accordance with the instrument offered to candidate countries 
at the 1999 Washington Summit: the Membership Action Plan (MAP) procedure.  
The problem Slovakia experienced in the past was a discrepancy between 
declamatory and declaratory objectives on the one side, and the real political output –  
the realpolitik – on the other.44 Since independence in 1993, all Slovak governments 
have unambiguously declared their intention to gain full membership in Western 
institutions such as NATO and the EU. Unfortunately, the governments´ declarations 
were contradicted in 1994 – 1998 by repeated violations of Western democratic norms, 
negating any chance the country had to join transatlantic political and security 
structures in the short term.  
At the beginning of 1993, the day it became an independent state, the Slovak 
Republic shared the same opportunities as the Czech Republic – plus neighbouring 
Poland and Hungary – to continue the political and economic transitions necessary to 
secure invitations to join those structures. Beginning at the end of 1994, however, 
policy decisions taken by the then government provoked mild criticism, then sharp 
criticism, and finally clear warnings from the West that Slovakia was going to spoil 
its NATO and EU integration chances. 45 This while three of Slovakia´ s neighbours 
were proceeding well on the track to both NATO and EU. At the 1997 NATO 
meeting in Madrid it became clear officially what was known even before: that after 
Slovakia´s refusal to get rid of the so-called “democratic deficits”, criticism and 
warnings were replaced by the decisions to exclude Slovakia from the first wave of 
post-Cold war NATO enlargement.46  
 
 
Threat perceptions 
 
In the 1990s, Slovakia was not in a position in which it would be endangered by 
armed attack. Economic coercion and/or political pressure, however, were 
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conceivable and Slovakia had to balance national security interests with a secure 
political and economic coexistence among its direct or indirect neighbours in order 
that the society might pursue its development. The former Minister of Defence of the 
Slovak Republic47 summarized the opinion of security experts in 2000, at the time 
Slovakia had already started another attempt to meet NATO admission criteria.48 The 
following goals can be noted as an example of thinking two years before the official 
invitation to NATO in November 2002.  
• The development of international relations in the European region can be 
characterized as a dynamic process of transition from possible confrontation to 
gradual creation of new models of co-operation. In spite of the fact that the 
Slovak Republic need not face direct military threat to its territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, new security challenges, risks and threats are arising.  
• The greatest security risks which can have significant destruction impact upon 
the society and the State are the threats connected with international terrorism, 
uncontrolled proliferation of mass destruction weapons, migration, mass 
spread of drugs or organized crime.  
• The ethnic conflicts based on nationalism, territorial disputes or extension of 
latent armed conflicts are especially dangerous. These and many other facts 
effect the rationale, size, structure, armament and character of the armed 
forces.  
• The Government of the Slovak Republic takes into account the new 
geopolitical situation in the Central European area, where more than 86 per 
cent of the state’s borders are neighbouring with NATO countries. 
• The increased integration efforts to become Alliance member, and the 
complicated situation in the country that negatively influences the effective 
provision of the defensive capability of the state, has set an aim to reform the 
Armed Forces and to assert the optimum variant of guaranteeing the security 
of the State, based on acquiring full-fledged NATO membership.  
The reform of armies together with the decrease of the number of armament, 
manpower and introduction of progressive elements is a worldwide trend. The Slovak 
Republic did not want to lag behind in this process.  
Besides "security risks" official Slovak documents also use the term "security 
challenges". One of the crucial challenges was the participation of Slovakia in the 
forming of European security system.49 Other challenges have been formulated in a 
very standard and general way as follows: active participation in Central Europe in 
the sphere of establishing and developing good neighbourhood relations; using the 
chances of cooperation within the Visegrad Group; strengthening of democracy, legal 
state and fundamental human and civic rights; establishing social-oriented and 
environment-oriented market economy; managing the transition of Slovakia from an 
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industrial to an information society. 
 
 
National Interests  
 
Formulated in the document Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic (2001), like 
other states, Slovakia draws a distinction between "vital" and "important" national 
interests. Four "vital interests" have been specified: 
• Guaranteeing the security of the Slovak Republic, its sovereignty and 
integrity; 
• Safeguarding and developing the democratic fundaments of the state, its 
domestic security and domestic order; 
• Securing the lasting economic, social, environmental and cultural development 
of the society and protecting the important infrastructure of the state; 
•  Preserving peace and stability in Central Europe and spreading the zone of 
democracy, security and prosperity, including the full membership of Slovakia 
in NATO and EU. 
In addition to the these, there exist six "important interests":  
• Preserving peace and stability in the world and preventing tensions and crises, 
eventually solving them by peaceful means.  
• Good relations with direct neighbours and development of mutually 
advantageous cooperation. 
• Domestic stability based on a corresponding social consensus concerning vital 
and important interests of Slovakia.  
• Transformation of the Slovak economy to an environmentally balanced market 
economy. 
• Safeguard of social peace and stability based on the equality of all citizens 
regardless of political orientation, religious affiliation, gender, ethnicity and 
social classification. 
• Reaching of environmental security within the framework of domestic and 
international structures.  
From this enumeration it appears that the security decision makers, policymakers and 
politicians were not able to get deeply into the problems or to avoid generalisations 
and clichés. They approved such a formulation and division of national interests that 
results partly in overlapping goals, partly in clearly tautological definitions.  
 
 
Threat Assessment in the New Security Documents 
 
To attain the objectives of the Program Declaration of the post-1998 Slovak 
Government,50 the Ministry of Defence elaborated the strategic document Concept of 
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the Reform of the MoD until 2002 (with the Outlook up to 2010), which was approved 
by the SR Government on 13 October 1999.  
The objective of this text was to eliminate contradictions between the demands 
laid upon the MoD and the capacity of the state, on the basis of internal resource use. 
The declared goal was to contribute to the stabilisation of the activities of the Defence 
Department and to create conditions for successful integration of the Slovak Republic 
into NATO; and at the same time to initiate a solution of the whole system of defence 
of the Slovak Republic. The new concept of reform has followed the failed attempt to 
reform the army in three stages: 1993-1995, 1995-1997 and 1997-2000. The year 
2000 should have been the year of the concluded reform of the armed forces. In the 
mid-1990s, however, it had been assumed that by 2000 Slovakia would be already a 
full NATO member.  
Yet the document was proposing neither a security vision for the country, nor 
a comprehensive programme of the defence system, but only a reform within the 
MoD. Afterwards, the reform draft of a whole defence system was formulated under 
the title Force 2010. In fact, though, this means once more postponing real reform of 
armed forces until 2010.51 The Concept of the Reform of the MoD until 2002 (2010) 
stirred, therefore, contradictory reactions both in army circles and among the expert 
public.52 
A second important document is the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic –  
still valid at the end of 2003 – which was presented to the public for an open 
discussion during 2000 and was approved in 2001 by the Parliament.53 It represents 
more a generalisation of the security position of the Slovak Republic after the failed 
NATO integration of Slovakia in 1999.  
The document summarizes and defines the security risks that can be faced by 
the Slovak Republic since 2000 in the following way. 
1. The probability of a global war has remained very low after the end of the 
Cold War. In a long-term perspective, however, the risk of a large-scale 
armed conflict cannot be excluded. As unstable countries tend to increase 
their military capacity including the accumulation of weapons of mass 
destruction, hypothetically Slovakia still faces an armed threat. 
2. Another source of security risk for Slovakia is formed by conflicts in 
unstable regions. 54  Due to the extreme nationalist, religious and 
ideological fundament these risks bear a long-lasting character. 
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 Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic: SR Force 2010. Bratislava, Ministry of Defense of the Slovak 
Republic 2002, 53 pp. The analysis of this document for the present publication has been the task of 
my Slovak colleague Gabriel Kopecky. 
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 Bartak, Peter: "Vyuzivame poznatky a skusenosti z polskej cesty do NATO" /Using Know-how and 
Experience of the Polish Road to NATO/, Samson, Ivo - Strazay, Tomas: Europska bezpecnost a 
proces rozsirovania NATO /European Security and the Process of NATO Enlargement/, Bratislava 
2000, pp. 11 - 14.  
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"Bezpecnostna strategia Slovenskej republiky" /Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic/, Bratislava, 
Ministry of Defense, 2001. 
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 The document has localized this risk in the regions of South-eastern Europe and the Caucasus (pp. 7-
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3. Non-controlled migration represents only a future – even if increasing – 
threat  because Slovakia stands outside the main migration channels. 
Migration could easily develop into an actual threat as a consequence of 
regional conflicts. 
4. International organised crime has in-between begun to threaten the vital 
interests of the Slovak Republic. The most distinctive manifestations are 
smuggling of arms, trafficking in women and children and money 
laundering.  
5. "Criminalisation" of social relations. Here, the document mentions crimes 
that form modern domestic forms of criminality, particularly racketeering 
and criminality of minors. Further social security threats are to be seen in 
corruption, embezzlement, clientelism, xenophobia and racism. 
6. Activities of foreign intelligence services. The document does not specify 
these services, but states that their activities will increase with the 
probability of Slovakia´s NATO integration. 
7. Interfering with the information system of the state as a consequence of 
information terrorism. This activity can lead to a total failure of the 
country’s information system. 
8. The document also criticizes implicitly the excessive dependence of the 
Slovak Republic on Russian energy sources claiming that "the excessive 
dependence on unstable sources of basic raw materials and energy, as well 
as of their transport", can result in a threat for the security of the state.55  
9. Negative demographic development consisting in the aging of the 
population and in the resulting inability of the state to secure the social 
system. 
10. Environmental threats that include industrial and technical accidents and 
natural catastrophes. 
Here one can often see a repetition of the "national interests" of the Slovak Republic. 
What is striking is the mixture of politico-military and domestic security problems. 
The document, however, succeeded in catching some crucial "politico-military" 
threats almost by name (especially no. 2, 6, 8). 
 
 
Resources and Instruments: Political and Military Resources 
 
Slovakia’s participation in the programme Partnership for Peace (PfP) has remained a 
distinct element of engagement with NATO 1999-2003. The military-associated 
security activities of Slovakia within the programme are traditionally more explicit 
than security policy activities.56 Also Slovakia supported the establishment of the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and up to 2003 the associated military 
involvement has been on the increase. Hence, Slovakia appropriately took advantage 
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 "Security Strategy...", p. 9. 
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 Samson, Ivo et al., "The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic", in: Grigorij 
Meseznikov et al.: Slovakia 1998-1999 (Bratislava: IVO - Institute for Public Affairs, 1999), pp. 168-
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of its participation in the PfP programme, including taking part in the PfP exercises.57 
In looking for the objective to reach the NATO membership (invitation), it proved to 
be a successful strategy in 2002.  
Even if participation in PfP did not provide guarantees within the meaning of 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it did provide the opportunity of consultations in 
case of a threat to national safety. Moreover, Slovakia, like many other countries, has 
always understood participation in the Partnership as a pre-accession activity intended 
as a support for integration plans.  
The programme has been implemented in particular via the Individual 
Partnership Programme between the Slovak Republic and NATO (IPP), which has 
since 1994 been prepared annually. Cooperation is conducted in a number of areas, 
which have been decisive for reaching the minimum level of interoperability of the 
Slovak armed forces with the armies of the NATO member states. A quality 
breakthrough in the approach towards the IPP appeared after the Washington Summit 
(1999), in particular after the adoption of the National Membership Action Plan of the 
Slovak Republic (N MAP SR), when in 2000 the IPP clearly focused on the support 
of Slovakia’s accession process aims.  
 
 
‘Priorities’ 2000 and 2003  
The objectives of N MAP SR reflected in the preparation of the crucial IPP for 2000, 
i.e. in the time Slovakia restarted its efforts to win a good position for NATO 
membership negotiations, were as follows:  
• Conduct a reform of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic while exploiting 
the knowledge and experience of NATO´s defence-related planning. 
• Achieve the required level of interoperability and compatibility of the 
command and management structures, communication and intelligence 
systems, logistics and infrastructure.  
• Increase of language training.  
• Improve defence-related planning and procurement of resources.  
• Plan the modernisation of armaments, technology and military materiel.  
The reform priorities by the year 2003 were the following:  
• Restructure and harmonise the armed forces structure to be comparable to the 
armed forces of the NATO member countries, and adapt it to the human, 
material and financial resources available. 
• Develop the armed forces while stressing the improvement of operational 
skills, capabilities to operate within international groups, doctrines and 
administrative procedures; modernise the command, management and 
communication systems, plus specialised and language training of the key 
staff. 
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 Samson, Ivo et al. "Integracia SR do EU, NATO a OECD" /Integration of the SR into EU, NATO 
and OECD/, in: Kollar, Miroslav; Meseznikov, Grigorij: Slovensko 2000 /Slovakia 2000/, (Bratislava: 
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• Decrease the military staff in number, optimize the proportions in the staffing 
structure, switch to professionals in the immediate and fast reaction forces –
applying the criteria of intellectual compatibility with the staff in NATO 
armed forces – and improve the living conditions of soldiers, their social and 
health security. 
• Gradually modernize the command, management and communication systems, 
plus armament and technology of the armed forces, and develop scientific and 
technology-related cooperation with NATO, exploit own defence industry 
potential and develop the defence infrastructure. 
• Shape the defence and military capacities capable of contributing to the joint 
defence of the member countries after accession to NATO, provide training to 
the required numbers of military staff to extend Slovakia’s representation 
within NATO and to adequately represent Slovakia within the NATO military 
structures and agencies.  
• Foster the Operational Partnership and compliance with the standardisation 
requirements. 
• Improve asset and fund management, increase the share of expenditures on 
development programmes. 
Predictably, Slovakia also declared as a ‘priority’ activity for 2003 to rationalize the 
support activities of the defence sector, and eliminate positions not related to the 
combat power of the state.  
In the field of Slovakia’s preparation for NATO accession, several 
fundamental issues seem to be important. One of them has been the issue of political 
stability. It was imperative that agreement existed between the coalition and 
opposition about the country’s basic course and that the issue of joining NATO was 
not disputed. Up to 2003/2004 there has been unanimity: the most powerful 
opposition entities according to public opinion polls, SMER and HZDS, have 
repeatedly declared their support to Slovakia’s accession to NATO (and the EU). 
Another concern has been defence-related planning, in particular with a view 
to stabilizing the financial resources allocated for defence. It is impossible to allow 
defence expenditures becoming subject of ambiguities while approving the state 
budget every year. The official government policy foresees an annual increase of 
defence expenditures by 0.1 per cent of GDP. With this pace of expenditure growth, 
the government expects to be able to reliably comply with pre-accession obligations.  
Another issue has been the problem of establishing links between Slovakia’s 
industry and the industries of NATO member countries, in particular the defence 
industry. The public is interested, too, if – apart from expenditures on defence related 
to NATO accession – membership would also mean positive economic aspects. This 
interest of the public is reasonable, as Slovakia is amidst a period of economic 
recovery linked with a temporary drop in living standards. The cooperation of NATO 
and its membership applicants does not have to and maybe should not be restricted to 
military and political cooperation, but expanded in the field of economic cooperation.  
 To co-ordinate domestic efforts, immediately after the Washington NATO 
Summit the Slovak Government had approved the programme of national preparation 
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under the designation PRENAME (Preparation for NATO Membership).58 A special 
institutional basis was formed and the NP PRENAME (National Program of the 
Preparation for NATO Membership) could start its activities. 59 The NP PRENAME 
served as the necessary document for the adoption of the N MAP SR (National 
Membership Action Plan of the Slovak Republic) that has been monitored both by 
Slovak national ministries, and by the NATO International Staff.  
For formulating the security goals of Slovakia within the PRENAME, the 
experience of NATO´s newcomers in 1999 could be utilized. There exists a general 
consensus that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had an indirect impact on the 
security orientation of the Slovak Republic in several respects: army reform, 
compatibility and interoperability with NATO standards, technical and language 
preparation of Slovak officers, adaptation of a part of Slovak armed forces for NATO 
needs.60  
The fourth ANP PRENAME (Annual National Program) Slovakia 2003 was 
approved in 2002 and in its five parts dealt with the MAP headings: political and 
economic issues, defence and military issues, resources related issues, security issues 
and legal issues.61 
 
 
Critique: the Garrett Report 
In 2000, US experts wrote an evaluation report on the defence situation of Slovakia. 
The team headed by General Joseph Garrett – and working in cooperation with 
experts of the Slovak Minister of defence and General Staff – came to disturbing 
findings.62 Their Study on the Defense Reform of the Slovak Republic was very critical 
to the state of Slovak armed forces. According to Pavol Kanis, the former Minister of 
Defence of the Slovak Republic (until January 2001), the inquiry Report analysed 
“the historical state of the Slovak Army that has been reached after many years. 
Partly, the problems of the Army of the Slovak Republic have roots in the old regime, 
partly they are due to the lack of dynamic changes that took place in other 
countries".63  
The findings of the Garrett Report have not made been public, but even the few 
released details could be regarded as alarming for Slovakia’s ability to reach its 
NATO integration objectives. 
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• Slovakia has belatedly tried to revise its basic security and defence documents 
that do not correspond to contemporary defence needs of the state. 
• There exists a deficit in planning and distribution of defence resources. 
• If Slovakia wants to integrate into Western defence structures, it needs to build 
smaller and more professional armed forces fit for action.  
• Most military formations do not reach the necessary personnel limit (in the 
average, they have only 70 per cent of the strength) and depend heavily on 
reserve mobilisation. 
• In spite of the fact that the annual growth of the GDP has been calculated at 2-
3 per cent in the next years, there exist no reliable standards in planning the 
resources.  
• The system of defence in the Slovak Republic lacks a unified command: there 
still exist military and paramilitary parts of armed forces that are subordinate 
to three different ministries (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and 
Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications). 
• In personnel policy, the Army of the Slovak Republic still acts according to 
the principles it inherited from the Communist regime. 
• Maybe the most important deficiencies are to be found in the planning and 
implementation of military exercises that lack a coordination between land and 
air forces.64 
In the recommendations for the Slovak Ministry of Defence, the Garrett Report 
proposed the system of defence planning for several years in advance, the 
centralisation of all military and paramilitary elements under one command (with the 
exception of police forces), change of personnel management, more efficient training 
(exercise) programmes. Some findings and recommendations of the Garrett Report 
met opposition in army circles. Certain reservations were expressed by the then State 
Secretary of the Ministry of Defence (namely concerning the problem of purchase of 
military aircraft which has not been recommended by the Garrett team).65 
 
 
Catching up with Reforms 
Following the Garrett critique, Slovak experts produced three general security and 
defence documents that were approved by the Parliament soon afterwards (the Slovak 
Security Strategy, the Slovak Defense Strategy, and the Slovak Military Strategy).66 
There was also legislation: The Constitutional Law on State Security in Times of War, 
States of War, Endangerment and Emergency No. 227/2002 and laws which secure 
the defence of Slovakia and at the same time create conditions for Slovakia’s entry 
into NATO viz. the Law on the Defense of Slovakia, the Slovak Armed Forces Law, 
and the Law on Conscription.  
The Law on the Defense of Slovakia above all defines the roles of state organs, 
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municipalities and regional parliaments, as well as the responsibilities of legal entities 
and individuals in preparing the defence of the state.67 The approval of the Law on the 
Slovak Armed Forces repeated the Law on the Slovak Army of 1993 and abolished 
the forces serving the Interior Ministry and the state railways firm.68  
The Law on Conscription brought in one fundamental change: conscription 
will affect men from 18 to 55 years, apart from exceptional changes. 69 Another set of 
legislative procedures is represented by military doctrines. 70  The development of 
military doctrines unfolded in keeping with the needs of armed forces reform 
according to the Force 2010.71 
Clearly, for Slovak military reform, 2002 was a crucial year. Without the 
accelerated process that gained momentum in 2002, Slovakia would not have been 
invited to NATO at the end of that year. And there is still much unfinished business.  
 
 
Last points 
 
For practical reasons, the decade of reforms in Slovakia’s security sector can be 
divided in the following way: 
1. 1993 – 1995: time of identifying the problems;  
2. 1996 – 1998: continuity of reform attempts; 
3. 1999 – present (2003): transition from declamations to real reform. 72 
In all three periods, one can discover one basic moment – an effort to:  
• define the place, role and capacity of armed forces in the new security 
environment 
• reduce the financial requirements for maintaining the original armed forces 
• reduce the numbers of armed forces, 
• turn the personnel pyramid from head to feet (i. e. reduction in number of high 
officers and increase in number of rank-and-file). 
Reform in armed forces would not have been sufficient without political progress in 
Slovakia. This progress in turn was possible only because of political pressure on the 
side of NATO and EU countries in the years 1994 – 1998.73  
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VII. SLOVAKIA: SIZING AND SHAPING THE FUTURE FORCE 
 
Gabriel Kopecky 
 
 
After a peaceful separation of the former Czechoslovakia in 1993 the Slovak Republic 
became a new sovereign state. Since that time the government formed national 
institutions, including Armed Forces. The new Slovak armed forces assumed 
responsibility for sizable force structures, including a large number of bases and 
installations and significant equipment stocks throughout the country. A Warsaw Pact 
organisation, doctrine, and management system legacy was inherited as well. 
Over recent years, a clear objective has been established to join the trans-
Atlantic security structure. Due to a critical situation in the defence establishment, 
downsizing has occurred and several attempts at systemic reform were initiated. Even 
the most recent efforts, begun in 1999, did not provide a clear direction for the Armed 
Forces of the future nor did they satisfy NATO membership requirements. These 
reforms were severely underfunded and were not guided by appropriate defence 
planning documents, such as the Security and Military Strategies. Although training 
levels of the Army of the Slovak Republic (ASR) have increased marginally as a 
result of reorganising the Land and Air Forces, units are not trained to high combat 
readiness standards. The ASR was largely a product of the past, with legacy structures 
that were inefficient and unaffordable. A number of studies and assessments from 
outside sources confirmed the severity of the problems facing the ASR.  
In 2001 a newly-appointed Minister of Defence decided that these must be 
addressed as a matter of urgency on the basis of up-to-date conceptual defence 
documents. A Steering Committee was established. The State Secretary of the 
Ministry of Defence was assigned as the Chairman. The Chief of the General Staff 
was designated the Deputy Chairman. This Steering Committee supervised five 
Working Groups, under the direction of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. The 
mission of the Steering Committee and the five Working Groups was to develop the 
following documents: 
• The Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic 
• The Organisational Structure of the of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak 
Republic 
• Concept “The Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010” 
• The Long-term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the 
Slovak Republic 
All elements of the Slovak military, as well as advisors from the US, UK, Germany, 
and France, were represented in this work. 
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Method 
 
To determine a realistic but affordable future military force for the Slovak Republic, a 
methodology was developed to provide discipline and focus to the work. This 
methodology provides the analytical framework that focused first on determining 
required capabilities and then, based on an assessment of risk, determining those 
capabilities that are affordable. The methodology led to the selection of a Program 
Force – the peacetime force of the SR. Also reflected in the methodology, the 
strategic direction for military activities of the Republic was a precondition for this 
analysis and for the structural and systemic reform deemed necessary. 
Given the current threat assessment the planning group was able to reduce the 
structure to a more realistic and affordable force by focusing the planning efforts to 
counter the more likely threat of Regional Armed Conflict. Analysis of several 
scenarios developed for this possibility led to the conclusion that more limited 
capabilities would satisfy the military needs of the Republic. These capabilities are 
reflected in the military organisation referred to as the Program Force.  
An important criterion to be considered in developing the blueprint for SR 
Force 2010 was the annual funding level that could be expected for military activities. 
In this regard, the current commitment by the government of approximately 1.89 per 
cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the MOD budget through 2005 was 
adopted as an overall target. With GDP currently at 1,058 billion SKK and forecasted 
to grow to 1,242 billion SKK by 2010, this equates to approximately 20 billion SKK 
in 2001 stable prices. In the force development process, this was the amount used as a 
datum. Of the total, personnel and operating costs represent 15 billion SKK (75 per 
cent) and investment costs represent 5 billion SKK (25 per cent). Beginning in 2006 
the growth of the defence budget is expected to increase to a minimum of 2 per cent 
of GDP. This would be represented by annual growth of the defence budget by 1.3 
billion SKK.  
Here it is also appropriate to note that devising and planning implementation 
of a new blueprint for a nation’s defences has implications for legislation. An urgent 
need for new acts and legal arrangement was elaborated in a special team of legal 
experts and the inputs from working groups were taken into consideration. 
Coordination with the Parliament and other ministries was an important part of work 
to avoid disharmony or conflict in different acts. 
 
 
Outcomes: (1) General 
 
When most of the information was collected and understood, the work in five teams 
started. Everybody knew were we want to go, what we have to achieve and what are 
our limits. We were able to focus on the main areas of our work. Some examples of 
general accomplishment in our on-going effort are: new Security, Defence, and 
Military Strategies; reduction in military manpower; initiation of military structure 
reduction; Ministry Of Defence and General Staff re-design; reduction of excess 
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material; initiation of base realignment; equipment modernisation begun; increased 
English language education. (Currently, the need for a separate Defence Strategy text 
has been reconsidered and only Security and Military Strategy documents are 
foreseen for future.) 
The process of development of “affordable forces” is straightforward. The 
objective is to develop the smallest possible structure of forces with which we may in 
our own respond to threats covered by military strategy, which are primarily oriented 
for most common scenarios created for regional conflict as the first step. It accepts a 
degree of tolerable risk (major armed conflict low probability, help from allies, in 
2010 as NATO member). Availability of resources is taken into consideration (that 
means we assume current budget, today’s mechanics and possible evolution of 
population), but it has not been exactly defined yet. 
In the second step there will be further elaboration on force details. In the third 
step there will be developed the cost of this force. In fourth step there will be further 
modelling of this force according to the next points: 
a) if we have any unemployed resources we can increase the proposed 
affordable force, and decrease the level of acceptable risk or, 
b) if there are enough resources, we can work on proposed affordable 
force and make it the programme force,  
c) if the resources are not sufficient we decrease proposed affordable 
force and increase the level of acceptable risk implying pressure on 
politicians, so that they increase availability of resources, or accept 
higher level of risk. 
This approach enables proposal of the affordable force which balances probable 
threats, acceptable risks and available resources. In other word we will make the 
provision we can afford. We know that the resource constraints make prioritisation 
critically important. 
The strategic goal is to build a smaller, but high-quality, force that is 
appropriately armed and trained; and to integrate that force into NATO's collective 
defence arrangement. This force must be capable of operating, as a member of a 
coalition organisation, across the entire spectrum of war, from High Intensity Conflict 
to Operations Other Than War. Additionally, the force must be capable of 
accomplishing all of the missions assigned in the Military Strategy. Analysis has 
shown that this future force must emphasise mobility, flexibility, and the leveraging 
of emerging technologies. To help deliver this it was decided that the Ministry of 
Defence and General Staff should be integrated and reduced in both size and 
complexity. This reorganisation was implemented from 1 October 2001.  
 
 
Outcomes: (2) Force Structure, Organisation and Employment 
 
Land Force 
The Land Forces organisation will contain the Land Forces Headquarters, a light 
infantry brigade, a mechanized infantry brigade, an artillery regiment, an engineer 
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battalion, a signal battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, an NBC battalion, an 
electronic warfare battalion and a command support battalion. Both brigades will 
contain an organic tactical air defence capability. The structure is designed to meet all 
tasks and requirements of the Military Strategy, to support national and international 
missions, and to be NATO-compatible. 
Much of the major items of equipments within the Land Force are considered 
obsolete or inappropriate for the new force structure. Major equipment upgrades will 
include the replacement of heavy, tracked combat vehicles with a lighter, more 
deployable wheeled combat vehicle. 
 
Air Force 
The organisational structure of the Air Force will consist of the following: an Air 
Force Headquarters; an Air Operations Control Centre; an AF tactical base with 
fighter wing and transport squadron; a helicopter base with helicopter wing; an air 
defence brigade; a radio location reconnaissance and warning battalion; a signal 
battalion, and a command support battalion and an NBC battalion.  
Current equipment is old and obsolete. Most aircraft will reach the end of their 
technical life before 2010 and the cost of modernising the Air Force will be high. The 
plan for this modernisation is included in the Long Term Plan. The Air Force for 2010 
is designed to meet all tasks and requirements of the Military Strategy, to support 
national and international missions, and to be NATO-compatible.  
 
Training and Support Command 
The Training and Support Command will consist of a Training and Support 
Headquarters; Training Command; Logistics Command; Signal Command; and the 
Bratislava Garrison Headquarters. 
Training Command will be responsible for conducting Initial Entry Training 
(Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training) for new enlisted recruits; 
education of career NCOs; oversight of the Lest Training Center, and the conduct of 
reserve force training, upon their mobilisation. Logistics Command will have major 
responsibilities for logistical support throughout the ASR. This organisation will have 
a key role during mobilisation and for the support of deployed forces. Signal 
Command will be organized to provide strategic communications support to MOD 
and the General Staff and operational-level communications support to both the Land 
and Air Forces. The Bratislava Garrison Headquarters provides command and control 
for the various separate support units stationed within the Bratislava area. 
  
Employment of the Force 
The force structure outlined above was developed to counter the threats specified in 
The Military Strategy. Additionally, the force has been designed to ensure that it can 
be committed to meet all of Slovakia’s international obligations.  
As developed during the war gaming scenarios, the force has been designed to 
be able to be deployed and employed for all operational contingencies, both within the 
country and – as part of a collective defence arrangement – outside of Slovakia. The 
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deployment capability is made possible by the addition of strategic and operational 
logistic support units to the force structure. 
Operationally, SR Force 2010 is structured to function as a joint force under 
the command of a designated Joint Force Commander. This joint force will be self-
sustaining and capable of integration with other western-style coalition forces. The 
force can be employed as an up to two brigade joint task force, with supporting air, 
artillery, air defence, engineer, intelligence, signal and logistic units. For operations of 
a lesser scope, the force can be deployed/employed as a brigade or battalion joint task 
force.  
 
  
Outcomes: (3) Other Matters 
 
Personnel Reform  
The fundamental objective of personnel reform is to achieve an integrated personnel 
management system that incorporates all aspects of force sustainment – accession, 
development, assignment, compensation, and separation programmes or systems. This 
system of systems is essential to create and sustain a professional, modern force. It 
must be able to provide for the assignment of quality personnel with correct skills to 
the right unit at the required time. 
A large number of military and civilian personnel will be separated from the 
Ministry of Defence to achieve planned strength for 2010. The objective of the 
separation programmes is to ensure compassionate treatment of soldiers and civilian 
personnel as a result of unanticipated separation from the military due to downsizing. 
Conducting the necessary reduction with compassion will not only ensure that 
soldiers and civilians are treated fairly, but will create a better future recruiting 
environment.  
Increasing the number of professionals in the ASR will result in a higher 
quality military force, with increased readiness. Only those who meet established 
standards will be accessed into the military. Standards for individual performance will 
be created and enforced for personnel at all grades. An objective personnel evaluation 
system is needed to provide systematic performance reporting. A fair, unbiased, 
competitive promotion system will be implemented to identify individuals for 
advancement who possess the potential for increased responsibility and continued 
service. Conversely, an objective evaluation system will support forthcoming 
additional personnel reductions.  
As part of the transition to a professional force, there will be a change in grade 
structure as well as the ratios among the personnel categories. The number of officers 
will decrease while the number of NCOs and junior enlisted soldiers will increase. 
The rank structure will consist of officers (01-10), warrant officers (WO1-WO3), 
noncommissioned officers (E5-E9), junior enlisted (E1-E4), and civilian employees 
structured according to government-wide civil service standards. SR Force 2010 will 
be much less top heavy.  
Barracks, family housing and recreation programmes are key elements of an 
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effective Quality of Life programme. Modern personnel management practices in 
support of SR Force 2010 will require regular assignment rotation of personnel. 
Reassignment or rotation of personnel promotes professional development, enhances 
military experience, and improves unit effectiveness. Increased personnel rotation will 
require an improved military housing programme. The ASR housing programme must 
include new construction of family quarters and soldier barracks, renovation of 
existing facilities, implementation of housing allowances to help officers and soldiers 
procure housing in the private sector, and household goods transportation 
compensation. 
 
 
Doctrine 
The General Staff of the ASR is developing the Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the 
SR. It will provide the guidance for the employment of air and land forces and will be 
NATO compliant. Doctrine will prescribe a strategic view of joint and combined 
military operations across the spectrum of war. Doctrine will include strategic 
guidance for the conduct of operations in response to non-military threats such as 
counter terrorism and natural disasters. This capstone manual will serve as the 
foundation for subsequent development of operational and tactical level doctrines.  
 
 
Training  
A new training management system is being developed and implemented in order to 
support SR Force 2010. This system will place more control and responsibility for 
unit training with unit commanders. Commanders will analyse and define training 
tasks and set priorities based upon a thorough analysis of the missions assigned to 
their unit in accordance with training priorities established by periodic training 
guidance documents. Through this system, commanders will be able to prioritise 
training tasks to ensure that they focus their resources to achieve combat readiness for 
those missions they will most likely be tasked to accomplish.  
To support the implementation of a new training management system, it will 
be necessary to develop, publish and distribute an overarching document that will 
effectively standardise training so as to achieve the necessary level of 
professionalism.  
One of the most important changes associated with SR Force 2010 will be the 
creation of a professional NCO Corps. The NCO Corps will become the primary 
trainers for Initial Entry Training and for unit training. To ensure that future NCOs are 
properly prepared to execute the responsibilities that they will be given, a formal 
programme of professional development has been incorporated into the Long-Term 
Plan for SR Force 2010.  
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Logistics  
With respect to logistical reform, logistics doctrine has the first priority. The goal of 
this doctrine will be to ensure compatibility of logistical structures, processes, and 
activities with NATO systems. This doctrine will also be based on the Security, 
Defence and Military Strategies.  
The force structure for logistics will be changed to provide more responsive 
support and to better reflect western procedures. New logistics units and organisations 
will be established at all levels of the force. Staff responsibilities for logistics within 
the MOD and GS will also undergo realignment. These changes are more fully 
detailed in the Long Term Plan.  
A key element of this new structure is the creation of the Logistics Command, 
which will be subordinate to the Training and Support Command (see above). It will 
serve as the material management centre for all supply, transportation, maintenance, 
and medical material management for the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. The 
Logistics Command will control the material supply bases.  
During the logistics transformation process provision of selected services such 
as food service, maintenance and administration of buildings, guarding of buildings 
and facilities, laundry and cleaning, repairs of commercial types of material and 
equipment and transportation services will gradually shift to the civilian sector.  
The ASR’s maintenance system will be converted to a four-level military 
recovery, maintenance, repair and replacement system with Organic, Direct Support, 
General Support, and Depot-level logistics. 
 
 
Core Basing 
A Core Basing Plan has been prepared. It consists of those essential installations 
required for housing, training, and support of SR Force 2010. As a result of an 
analysis of the basing needs of SR Force 2010, a significant realignment and 
reduction plan has been prepared. This analysis included the military requirements for 
SR Force 2010 as well as an analysis of the impact of possible base closures upon the 
regional economies. The base realignment plan that has been proposed provides the 
location of bases to be retained in support of SR Force 2010. The current plan calls 
for the retention of 23 major installations with 17 satellites for a total of 40 separate 
installations. Two additional Air Defence radar sites are currently being considered 
for inclusion to the list of satellite installations. 
This radical change will go beyond the 2010 planning period. The details for 
the transition to this new basing concept are included in the Long Term Plan. 
 
 
Host Nation Support 
The development of a credible Host Nation Support capability is firmly linked to 
potential NATO membership. In this regard, there are two principal Host Nation 
Support Partnership Goals. The first deals with the creation of concepts for providing 
Host Nation Support. The second focuses on reception and onward movement of 
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NATO forces through the Slovak Republic. Related to these are specific logistics 
Partnership Goals that require the development of a single-fuel concept and 
establishment of fuel handling equipment for ground vehicles. These programmes will 
be realized over the course of the next years. 
There are also a number of initiatives that focus on the upgrade of existing 
reception/staging support capabilities. This includes upgrade of NATO specified 
airfields and railheads. A centralized Host Nation Support database will be established 
by the end of 2004. This will include both military and civilian assets and resources, 
as well as data from other ministries. 
 
 
Modernisation 
The following infrastructure modernisation activities are planned for the period to 
2010: 
• Reduce the quantity of military infrastructure based on financial analysis, 
effectiveness and the need for personnel and material;  
• Establish the legislative preconditions necessary for disposal and transfer of 
unused and unnecessary facilities and material; 
• Allocate sufficient funds, in phases, for modernisation of infrastructure 
elements to fulfil the modernisation plans of the SR Force 2010 Core Basing 
Plan.  
Vital to any infrastructure modernisation and revitalisation plan is its environmental 
and ecological impact. Plans have been developed to convert heating facilities on 
installations that use wood and coal to natural gas burning facilities. There are also 
plans to modernize old fuelling and refuelling stations using modern storage tanks, 
and reconstruction of wash racks, parking areas, etc. to comply with environmental 
standards. 
The ASR has large quantities of equipment, material, ammunition and 
armament that are rapidly reaching the end of their useful economic life. A 
considerable amount of this equipage and supply does not match current requirements 
or expected needs of SR Force 2010. 
Without modernisation, over 75 per cent of land equipment and 90 per cent of 
air equipment of the ASR will be obsolete by 2010. Nearly 80 billion SKK will be 
required in this timeframe to address this problem. However, this estimate does not 
include potential costs associated with leasing or purchasing a replacement, multi-role 
combat aircraft for the Air Force.  
A comprehensive acquisition strategy is being developed for the new multi-
role combat aircraft. A part of this strategy will be a thorough review of the most 
effective way for financing this acquisition. An option under consideration is delayed 
long-term payment beginning in 2008 with aircraft delivery beginning in 2004. A 
tender, or series of tenders, will be released as part of the decision making process. A 
proposed plan for equipment modernisation will be developed in the Long Term Plan.  
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Conclusion 
 
The blueprint for Slovakia’s future forces reviewed here emerged – as noted at the 
beginning of this Chapter – from an urgent ‘defence review’ exercise begun in 2001. 
This was run by a strong Steering Committee and engaged much effort in a relatively 
short time period. It is appropriate, in conclusion, to recount what was involved. 
 All products from each working group were subject of discussion and final 
approval at the meetings of the Steering Committee. These meetings were organised 
once a month or when needed. Between the meetings of the Steering Committee the 
work was evaluated and coordinated by an integration team, which was the body of 
all team leaders and top officials of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. 
The Minister of Defence himself visited meetings of the integration team frequently. 
All proposals had to be presented in form that would allow the Government and 
National Assembly to understand clearly each detail. General agreement was achieved 
that all documents, except a few very sensitive ones, should be unclassified.  
When the work of the Steering Committee was finished, an approved 
document was submitted to the Minister of Defence. This was the last stage of work 
on the final document “Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010” at the 
Ministry of Defence. The next step was a request for approval from the State Defence 
Council. All documents related to security and defence matters have to be approved 
by this Council.  
The final step in this process, before implementation of the plan, was approval 
of the document at the Parliament of the Slovak Republic. Special attention was paid 
to explain our plan in particular committees of the Parliament. Taking care of all 
details which should cause any problem among members of the Parliament was 
reflected in significant support of the document. About 70 per cent of deputies voted 
for approval.  
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VIII. MOLDOVA: REFORM REQUIREMENTS 
 
Nicolae Chirtoaca 
 
 
Like in many countries of South Eastern Europe the lack of security and stability is a 
major obstacle to the democratic stabilisation of Moldova that has already the 
negative consequences for individuals, groups and even the state as a whole. 
Therefore one of the main transitional challenges Moldova is still facing is Security 
Sector Reform (SSR). The very quick geopolitical changes, proliferation of new risks 
and dangers, especially of a non-military character, unsettled conflicts and frozen 
crisis situations have already a direct impact on the emerging new European security 
order, making the reformation of defence and security a difficult task especially for 
the small states that recently have appeared on the political map of the old continent. 
Most of these countries face a wide range of security threats and risks, not just 
to themselves but to Europe as a whole. These include organised international crime, 
the drug trade, human and arms trafficking, illegal migration, political manipulation 
of territorial and ethnic conflicts and the insecurity of energy supply routes and 
infrastructure. To a large extent these problems are spilling over into the European 
Union (EU) through its new direct neighbours.  
While those “soft threats” are real challenges for the EU’s eastern-
neighbourhood countries, some of them also face risks and threats in the area of “hard 
security.” These trends are generated by post-Soviet instability and from current 
attempts to pull those countries into Russia’s political and security orbit. In Moldova 
the political and territorial separatism remains one of the main concerns and an 
obstacle in the process of state building and in the way of the reintegration of 
Moldovan society. The military, economic and political support provided to the 
separatists from outside the country’s borders, the Russian military presence on the 
left bank of the Dniestr river against the will of the Moldovan people and the 
decisions of the international organisations, lack of control over the eastern border 
with neighbouring Ukraine – these remain the immediate security threats for the 
country. 
The enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community of nations inevitably has to 
deal with the problem of securing and integrating its immediate perimeter. The 
existing “grey” areas of Eastern Europe prejudice long lasting security and stability. 
Therefore Moldova and Ukraine (and Belarus) – the new European “borderland” 
cannot be left without assistance in their search for reliable guarantees for secure and 
stable development. The weakness of these transitional states from one side and the 
post-imperial syndrome in Russia’s policy towards its “near abroad” creates a 
dangerous mixture generating permanent instability and growing risks. NATO and the 
EU cannot be excluded from this region’s security arrangements by accepting 
Russia’s primacy in re-creation of its own sphere of influence. Therefore it is 
important to estimate how the enlargement processes may involve Moldova and the 
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neighbouring countries, to examine what a changing security environment implies for 
them and what kind of security and defence arrangements are on offer.  
Regarding its own provision for security, like many other Eastern European 
nations Moldova finds it exceptionally difficult to identify a successful model of 
security sector reform, reducing this process to the periodic downsizing of the armed 
forces and the redistribution of tasks among the institutions and organisations 
responsible for national security. The need to ensure the cost-saving and efficient 
inter-agency co-operation is also taken into consideration. Historical heritage and old 
mentality that still influence the state of mind and behaviour of political society plus 
perception of the exclusive role of the state by a big part of the society have a direct 
impact on the formation and functioning of the executive and legislative branches of 
state power. Therefore impartial analysis of the current state of democratisation of the 
national army in general and civil-military relations in particular – within the 
framework of SSR – is important for further actions aimed at democratic stabilisation 
of the country. The aspirations to reintegrate the country into Europe and complete 
transition toward a law-governed democracy and market economy create good 
preconditions to reach these objectives.  
 
 
Security-sector reform: why and what? 
 
The reasons for wanting SSR in Moldova derive from the democratisation process as 
a whole, from the contradictions of the recent past, as well as from the unfinished 
construction of the nation and the state. At the same time the dynamic character of 
new threats and risks and the permanent lack of security and stability requires from 
the country a more pragmatic and realistic approach in efforts to address these issues. 
Difficulties in assessing the commonly accepted definition of SSR arise, however, 
since the sector itself is at the same time the building block of strategy and a tool 
driving democracy in the field of security and defence. The absence of a common and 
clear understanding as to what are the goals and instruments of the SSR has already 
produced problematic consequences: 
First, SSR as a rule is not located in a broader context of democratic reforms 
in Moldova and adjustment of the armed forces, security services and law enforcing 
agencies of the state to democratic norms and mechanisms. The political control over 
the military by the democratically elected legislative and executive powers is 
considered enough for the democratisation of civil-military relations.  
Second, SSR is defined in a context of adjustment to new risks and threats, 
taking into consideration the real economic and military potential of the country as 
well as the new geopolitical realities and the established balance between the potential 
and interests of the force structures and institutions inside the state. At the same time 
there are real conservative trends in attempts to address the challenges existing 
already in the security sector, on the basis of old approaches and policies (without re-
evaluating what needs exist and thus to make them relevant to the circumstances in 
the country and at the regional and sub-regional levels). 
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Third, without shared conceptions and a common strategic approach to SSR, 
different stakeholders like government, civil society representatives and international 
institutions pursue different objectives and therefore commend sometime conflicting 
policies being focused on different aspects and priorities of the same processes. The 
growing number of issues in the area leads to a loss of focus and risks diminishing the 
efficiency of reforms. 
Fourth, the new kind of civil-military relations is understood mainly as a need 
to correspond to requirements imposed from outside the country by multilateral 
organisations. In the absence of adequate understanding about the fundamental 
democratic norms that should regulate the relationship between civilians and armed 
forces, that form the checks and balances system, it is premature to speak about the 
concrete model of democratic and efficient control over the military to be 
implemented in the country. This is one of several sources of confusion in terms of 
exactly what policies, ideas and values should be considered as a basis for the 
reformation of the existing security and defence system. 
The general assumption of political and democratic control of the military in 
Moldova is that the armed forces should be the neutral, apolitical servant of a 
democratic, civilian leadership and that their role should be limited to implementing 
the policy choices of that leadership, rather than engaging in domestic politics or 
playing a central role in determining the direction of foreign or defence policy.  
From this perspective there is a range of factors which shape the current 
situation and can help identifying the vectors of further development. The democratic 
control of the military revolves around three distinct but inter-related issues:  
a) the military’s role in the development of defence policy in particular and of 
the national security concept and strategy as a whole (in terms of force 
structure, defence spending, procurement and military strategy); 
b) the non-involvement of the armed forces and of the power structures in 
domestic politics, especially in the struggle for power as well as in the 
settlement of internal political crises; 
c) the clearly stipulated military role and impact on the formulation of foreign 
policy priorities, especially decisions on the external use of military force 
Despite a certain degree of confusion in Moldovan society concerning the real content 
and the ways of SSR implementation there are already the key policy instruments in 
this field.  
 
 
SSR and the New Concept of Military Reform  
 
On 26 July 2002 the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova approved a Concept of 
Military Reform. Officials have explained the necessity of this document by a need to 
solve a range of problems the Armed Forces are confronted with. The establishment 
of a new efficient and flexible system of military security able to guarantee the 
defence of territory, sovereignty, independence, territorial unity and integrity of the 
state is considered the main objective of the reform. Despite the fact that the Concept 
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has been developed exclusively within the framework of the MoD and therefore has a 
certain departmental character it has the features of the national security concept 
representing a complex of ideas, objectives and directions of activities followed by 
the assertion of force structure, mechanisms and budgeting procedures. 
In this document is highlighted that the Republic of Moldova does not have 
enemies and therefore the probability of a major threat to the military security of the 
state is a minor one for the time being. The main sources of threats are regional 
instability and the emergence of a large diversity of non-military risks. For the first 
time the cross-border risks such as organised crime, illegal drug, weapon and strategic 
material smuggling and trafficking are listed in the official document. The Concept of 
Military Reform also considers as military threats the territorial separatism and the 
internal political, social and economic conditions capable to diminish the military 
potential of the state and the authority of the state.  
The Concept asserts the leading role of the armed forces within the security 
arrangements of the state. The army bears a major strain and for the third time in a 
decade has to be reorganised in order to meet the new challenges and the new threats. 
One of the main objectives of the latest army reform concept is to transform it into a 
flexible, agile, and sustainable force with well determined tasks able to be the leading 
force in any crisis management.  
The SSR agenda put forward in the Concept describes concrete goals which 
the government and the respective ministries should strive to achieve. There is only 
the problem of the central agency of the state that will assume all the responsibility 
for reform implementation. According to the Concept the president of the country and 
the presidency as institution plays the essential role involving in this process the 
government and its structures. The problem consists in the lack of real and reliable 
mechanisms to allow the head of state to put into practice the main ideas of the reform 
and to monitor the process itself. The Supreme Security Council lacks the resources to 
play an active role; and SSR is not a high priority for the governing majority as 
compared to stabilisation of the economic and social situation in the country. 
The MoD can play the leading role in this situation but there is a risk that this 
ministry will try to pursue its own corporate interests without paying too much 
attention to the interests and co-operation with other state power structures involved 
in the process. In the favour of the special role the MoD should play is the fact that 
the military forces will be a key part of SSR. At the same time, without clear 
mechanisms for accountability, the armed forces potentially can constitute a threat to 
democratic governance and consume more resources than other parts of the security 
sector. The military forces should be oriented exclusively towards those tasks for 
which they are most appropriate. The latest Law on National Defence strengthens the 
leading role of the army by the creation of the General Headquarters and appointing 
the vice-minister of defence as its chief.  
Effective police forces under civilian control and management is another 
essential element in establishing the conditions for community security and enhancing 
economic and social stability. At the same time organised crime is interested to 
infiltrate the law-enforcing agencies, provoking the antagonistic relationship between 
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the police and different sections of the citizenry. Building the capacity of police forces 
according to democratic standards is particularly important in the current situation.  
Judicial reform is not yet finished in Moldova and this element of the 
democratic transition of the country is included in the list of priorities monitored by 
the Council of Europe. Judicial appointments are frequently politicised, trials can be 
subject to long delays, and corruption is a real problem. Effective and impartial 
judicial and penal systems can play a key role in reducing crime and in consolidation 
of justice and social stability. Building the capacity of judicial and penal systems, and 
encouraging reform in this area should stand high on the SSR agenda.  
 
 
The way forward 
 
There are several objectives (or needs) to which attention should be paid. This is 
essential for Moldova. 
 
First, to strengthen the civilian oversight and management of the armed and 
security forces. Without doubt larger civilian involvement in policy development and 
management is the key element of responsible governance in this sector. The 
competence and the professionalism of the civilian expertise as well as efficient 
independent institutions can ensure the civilian leadership for the security sector 
functioning according to democratic norms and principles. The reform agenda in this 
area could include:  
• strengthening civilian expertise in ministries of defence, internal affairs, 
justice and special services through the training of experts and specialists;  
• raising the decision-making capacity and competence of the standing 
parliamentary committees that monitor defence, internal affairs, policing and 
secret services; 
• developing a concrete model of civil-military relations and of democratic 
oversight of the military according to democratic norms and the situation 
existing in the country;  
In addition, there would be value in establishing independent research institutes 
(think-tanks) specialised in the problems of national security and defence to work in 
direct contact with the decision-making structures;  
Second, to raise the level of transparency in security sector planning, 
management, and budgeting. Military and especially security forces are often 
unwilling to share information with civilians, and there are limited possibilities to 
develop specialists that will be in the future independent analysts in this area. A lack 
of transparency creates the dangerous trend toward the politicisation and abuse of the 
military and security services by the authorities or political groupings. Such a 
situation can undermine a country’s long-term economic and political stability as well 
as the democratic development of the country. Theoretically such situations are 
regulated by the Moldovan legislature. Some categories of information about the 
security sector are considered confidential and are stipulated in a relevant Law but the 
Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building 
 
 98 
rest can be made public without the risk of compromising state security. In practice 
there is still a disposition to make secret much more information and data than the 
legal norms allow.  
Third, to involve more actively the institutions and organisations of civil 
society in monitoring the security sector and in developing defence and national 
security policy, budget policy and resource allocation. These institutions and 
organisations require more assistance from the state and from international agencies 
to play a more visible role. Efficient monitoring that involves civil society 
organisations and the media is able to raise the efficiency of civilian control over the 
security sector organisations. These steps can be introduced in the SSR agenda in 
Moldova. Increased transparency in budgeting and improved auditing mechanisms 
can help to reduce the level of corruption and waste of resources in security sector 
programmes. 
Fourth, to develop the international co-operation that promotes regional and 
sub-regional peace and security actively involving the participant countries in 
partnership. Both governmental and non-governmental sectors can play an active role 
in enhancing mutual security so that local problems do not become regional. Such co-
operation can yield knowledge transfer and contribute to the change of mentality of 
participating Moldovan civilians and military, reinforcing balanced civil-military 
relations. Promoting regional confidence-building mechanisms within the framework 
of existing security arrangements can enhance mutual understanding between 
governments and reduce the risk of inter-state conflict. More attention should also be 
given to including civil society in regional dialogues.  
Fifth, to consider as a priority conflict settlement and post-conflict 
transformation including the reintegration of the eastern part of the country currently 
controlled by the separatist regime. The settlement of this conflict can considerably 
enhance local and regional security by removing the source of destabilisation and the 
surplus of weapons and munitions that are not under the control of the Moldovan 
authorities. These efforts should be followed by concrete measures aimed at 
enhancing border controls as an integral part of security development programmes.  
Respect for human rights and rule of law by the security sector organisations 
can be ensured by relevant training helping the police and other security forces to get 
the appropriate knowledge and an understanding of the code of conduct in a 
democratic society. Greater attention to such training would be a strong claimant for a 
place on a longer agenda.  
 
 
The Transnistrian issue and the security of the new EU Neighbourhood  
 
The current status of the discussions on resolving the Transnistrian problem is still 
marked by the different stances of the parties involved regarding the future of the 
Moldovan state. Both the Moldovan government and the leadership of the breakaway 
republic agree in principle that a political settlement should include the establishment 
of a federation. But whereas Chisinau sees its Eastern region under control of 
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separatists to be an autonomous territorial-administrative unit of the country the 
Tiraspol leaders insist on a formula based on recognition of two ‘equal’ entities, 
possibly in a ‘common state’ as called for by a Russian 1997 proposal. The separatist 
authorities also insist on Russia and Ukraine as guarantors of a settlement, with the 
stationing of troops from these countries on Moldovan territory.  
In terms of security and defence components of the process of conflict 
settlement, the discussions started in 1999, when both parties agreed to establish five 
‘common spaces’. There would be common border, defence, juridical, economic and 
cultural spaces. Transdniestria insisted on keeping separate military forces and its own 
policies concerning weapons and ammunition stationed on its territory. Moldova 
insisted on having a single military force. Demilitarisation of the state has also been 
discussed. 
To keep a military presence and political tutelage under the guise of 
peacekeeping are central goals of Russian policy in Moldova. Russian troops act as 
“peacekeepers” between the legitimate government and secessionist forces that Russia 
itself has created and armed. The Kremlin “mediates” between the legitimate 
government and its own proxies, seeking political settlements that would legalise the 
separatists in power and would cast Russia in a new role as “guarantor” of such a 
settlement with its troops in place and a semblance of international mandate. Moscow 
has been pushing for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to 
develop a peacekeeping role, assuming the OSCE’s role would be confined to 
authorising Russia itself to take the lead role to “guarantee stability” in ex-Soviet 
countries.  
Unfortunately in Moldova the OSCE has proven incapable of enforcing its 
own resolutions on the withdrawal of Russian troops and munitions. At the 1999 
Istanbul summit, the last that the OSCE was able to hold at heads-of-state level, 
Russia agreed to scrap or evacuate its arsenals from Moldova and all its troops from 
that country. Four years after signing on to those commitments, Russia retains to this 
day [late 2003] the greater part of its arsenals, and all the troops that were supposed to 
be evacuated by December 2002. (At Porto in late 2002 the OSCE extended the troop 
withdrawal deadline until 31 December 2003 "provided the necessary conditions are 
in place". At Porto the Russians also ruled out a reference to the "free consent of any 
state to any foreign military presence on its territory," although this principle is 
enshrined in the CFE Treaty.)  
The authors of the International Crisis Group Europe Report N°147 (12 
August 2003) came to the conclusion that “The conflict in the Transdniestrian region 
of the Republic of Moldova is not as charged with ethnic hatred and ancient 
grievances as others in the area of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), and it is more conducive to a sustainable settlement. However, a 
“quick fix” in 2003, as envisaged by the Dutch Chairmanship of the OSCE, is also 
unlikely. To reach the sustainable agreement that is required if the forthcoming 
European Union (EU) enlargement is not to be compromised by a nearly open border 
with international crime and serious poverty, a comprehensive approach is needed that 
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takes into account the root causes of the original conflict and the factors that have 
blocked the settlement process since 1992”.  
After the European Union and Russia had declared at their summit on 29 May 
2002 that they would cooperate to resolve the Transdniestria conflict and the 
Netherlands identified a settlement as a priority for its Chairmanship-in-Office of the 
OSCE in 2003, the negotiation process gained fresh momentum in July 2002 when the 
so-called Kiev Document was presented by mediators as a new concept for a final 
settlement agreement based on the principle of “federalisation” of Moldova. A draft 
agreement was proposed by Russia and the OSCE, but finally was not accepted by the 
Moldovan government as a basis for further negotiations with the separatists. The 
current Moldovan leadership is still wary of "federation" for two reasons. First, 
"federation" as it was proposed by Russia under the auspices of OSCE covers a deal 
with the incumbent Transdniestrian leaders, cementing their control there, and 
awarding them a share of power in the central government. Secondly, this 
arrangement would hand Moscow a permanent lever of influence on "federalized" 
Moldova placing the country under the "guarantees" of Russia, Ukraine, and the 
OSCE, an arrangement that would ensure multiple Russian representation (in its own 
right, via OSCE, and indeed via Kiev), while reducing the West to indirect 
representation through the OSCE. 
Even so, in February 2003 President Voronin proposed the establishment of a 
joint commission to elaborate a constitutional settlement of a federal Moldova. Russia, 
Ukraine as mediating countries and the OSCE agreed with this initiative. Later the 
Moldovan president officially invited EU to join the process of peaceful settlement of 
the conflict. The EU had declared already its intention to become more involved. The 
European Commission decided to support the establishment of a joint Ukrainian-
Moldovan customs post on the Ukrainian side of the border with Transdniestria in 
order to reduce considerably smuggling. Previous EU statements concerning the lack 
of prospects for Moldova to join the EU have also been softened in recent statements, 
although membership cannot be envisaged for many years. In addition, the EU has 
adopted a tougher position towards the Transdnistrian leadership, imposing a ban on 
travel to the EU by its leaders in February 2003, a decision supported by the US 
administration.  
However, the EU had no part in these proposals, nor should it now. It needs to 
think up a European-style solution. The EU’s interest is to ensure that Moldova does 
not become a Russian military and political satellite, while most Moldovans want to 
become part of Europe. More broadly, the EU member states’ interest in a settlement 
derives from the following factors.  
• Moldova’s deep economic and social crisis is partly a result of the high 
economic costs of the unresolved conflict and this situation transforms the 
country into a source of instability and different risks in the larger Europe;  
• Transdniestria is a strip of land transformed over the past years by the 
transnational mafia structures into a criminal offshore zone and as such is a 
threat to security not only for Moldova but for the wider region;  
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• The paramilitary formations under the control of the separatists – and trained 
by the officers of the Russian military contingent located illegally in the 
eastern part of the country – present a real military threat to Moldova and for 
the region as a whole; 
• The lack of effective control at the internal Moldovan boundary alongside the 
Dniestr river (so the border between the future EU (Romania) and Moldova 
will be all that separates Western Europe from Transdniestria).  
It is evident that stability and prosperity on the expanded EU’s new frontier will not 
be achievable without the settlement of this conflict.  
Taking into consideration the factors that have impeded an agreement thusfar one 
can make a conclusion that a multifaceted approach is necessary based on: 
• breaking-up vested interests, especially in the eastern part of the country 
controlled by separatist authorities and now a criminal haven; 
• the unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and munitions from the 
eastern part of Moldova and demilitarisation of the region;  
• promoting democracy, rule of law and human rights in Transdniestria; 
• strengthening the economic and democratic reforms in Moldova; 
• settlement of the conflict on the basis of autonomy for the new Transdniestria 
within a territorially and politically reintegrated Moldova.  
Moldova can become the test for the EU in the use of its peace-support capabilities, as 
part of developing its European Security and Defence Policy. The European 
Commission’s Communication on Wider Europe Neighbourhood made public in 
March 2003 mentions such a possible support role. Moldova is also the country with a 
frozen conflict in which EU-Russia conflict settlement cooperation can be tested. 
These perspectives argue for an entirely new format for negotiations and post-conflict 
guarantees in Moldova. In this way the goal of de-militarisation of the conflict area 
can be achieved easily: Russia’s troops would leave, and Transdniester’s own military 
formations would be demobilized.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Over the years of independence, Moldovan society has gained certain experience in 
democratizing the military and reforming the national security system. From one point 
of view, the institutional and law making issues have been successfully accomplished. 
Moldova has already recognizable democratic structures in place. However, 
attitudinal change appears to be taking place over a longer time period than 
institutional or legal change.  
In terms of civil-military relations, the principle of democratic (civilian) 
control over the armed forces has been recognised as a rule of the democratic game 
and partly institutionalised. Some efforts have been made to raise public awareness 
concerning defence planning and military budget approval. Within the society there is 
already some understanding of the necessity to ensure the accountability of the 
military, secret services and law enforcers to the elected public authorities. What has 
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been ignored until now by the Moldovan political establishment is that defence policy 
and decisions regarding the use of military force involve complex military-strategic 
and military-technical issues, requiring expertise which civilian leaders are unlikely to 
have.  
The interdependence of the SSR and other modernisation agendas requires, 
however, a much broader approach in comparison with the existing one. The lack of 
generally applicable norms and criteria on SSR and its elements makes the problem 
even more difficult. Reform involves fundamental issues of governance. The 
problems Moldova is still confronted with are a result mainly of poor governance and 
failure to respond in an adequate way to the new challenges as a whole and to the 
changing structure of risks and threats in particular. The steady improvement of the 
conceptual approach to the problem this sector has to address is not followed by the 
concrete activities. The inertia of old approaches and conservative tendencies remain 
very visible. 
One of the main tasks is to insure that both civilians and military work as a 
team on defence problems, avoiding counter-productive rivalry. At the same time 
security sector problems should become a real priority in the internal political 
dialogue as well as that with international organisations and institutions. 
Commitments to agreed SSR objectives have little chance to lead to success 
without cooperation with continental and Euro-Atlantic organisations plus their 
support.  
Moldova will become in a short period of time a direct neighbour of both 
NATO and EU. In this way however, Russia’s near abroad has turned into NATO’s 
and the EU’s front yard. This should be the basis for any Western decisions in this 
part of South-eastern Europe. There are risks but also opportunities. 
One opportunity is for the EU to play a decisive role in the settlement of the 
frozen conflicts in Europe: for example by deploying a peace-consolidation force to 
Moldova in order to create the necessary preconditions for the settlement of the 
Trandniestrian dispute. (The EU is prepared to conduct the operation using certain 
NATO assets, in accordance with the “Berlin-Plus” agreement between these two 
organisations. The United States, which actually controls most of those NATO assets, 
favours a NATO-linked EU operation.)  
One of the main strategic goals of the Moldovan state consists in stabilisation 
of its situation and escaping from a downward spiral wherein insecurity, corruption, 
criminalisation and underdevelopment are mutually complementing and reinforcing. 
The complexity of this stabilisation agenda and of strategy development means that 
the socio-economic, governance and security dimensions of reforms must be tackled 
simultaneously. Systematic consideration of what constitute the main goals of the 
planned reforms is of paramount importance. So is compatibility of the democratic 
rules and principles in SSR area with Moldova’s particular background and political 
and social environment. The central objective is to ensure good and competent 
governance and efficient co-operation with the international partners.  
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IX. MOLDOVA: IMPLICATIONS OF NATO/EU ENLARGEMENT  
 
Vlad Lupan 
 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the departure from the bipolar world and a radical 
change in the political and security architecture in Europe and globally. This process 
was augmented by the events of 11 September 2001. Against this background, the 
enlargement of NATO and the European Union became for a number of states 
objective processes on their way of returning to stability through unity of democratic 
values shared on the European continent.  
Although the connotations for the development of democratic values and 
institutions are obvious, there is another not less important consideration – the 
pragmatic implications for the states in these processes. And, indeed, the states do 
operate with the criteria of national interests for the sake of their own citizens’ 
prosperity and security. Therefore, the extension of NATO and EU and the 
establishment of a viable and trustworthy security system on both international and 
national levels are perceived as essential factors by a number of states in this part of 
Europe and their efforts plainly demonstrate that. Particularly relevant examples of 
such efforts were the actions taken to implement conditions, not least in the Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) area, stipulated in the Membership Action Plans (MAPs) of the 
countries aspiring to NATO membership, as well as commitments taken as a result of 
negotiations on accession to the EU. 
It is clear that NATO and the EU are perceived by these countries as 
institutions through which they would achieve their security goals and for several of 
them the membership in these organisations is not such an historically-speaking long-
term prospect. At this particular point the borders of both in South-eastern Europe will 
approach Moldova and Ukraine.  
The direct security implications for these two countries are substantial. Not 
only the new members could directly benefit from enlargement, but the new 
neighbours too, since the organisations might also pay more attention to resolution of 
the neighbours’ immediate problems. NATO and EU would look to guarantee security 
of their new borders, and would take steps to make impossible the outbreak of new 
problems and conflicts or the spill-over effects of such problems on these new borders. 
They would, therefore, be more sensible to events in the Republic of Moldova and 
subsequently would encourage Moldova to continue democratic reform, in order to 
become more stable and at least neutral to them. Proximity to NATO and EU would 
turn into an advantageous factor for Moldova, as the country would be placed in an 
area of priority interests of the West.  
Although the Republic of Moldova is a neutral country and declared its desire 
to become only an EU member, this situation has anyway a particular relevance from 
both NATO and EU perspectives, since the country is facing economic difficulties 
and its security is compromised by a “frozen” conflict: each factors of anxiety for 
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these organisations. Because of the mentioned reasons, a dual EU and NATO 
engagement in Moldovan affairs might be considered as imminent. 
 
 
SSR first steps in Moldova 
 
Despite all the impediments and problems on the way to comprehensive SSR, some 
steps were already taken by Moldovan authorities since the declaration of sovereignty 
and independence of the country. The old Soviet structures of KGB, Militia and Court 
system were transformed, while the Armed Forces were created with limited 
resources, mainly inherited in poor condition or in limited numbers from the Red 
Army. 
 
Security and Information Service (SIS) 
Thus, firstly, the local branch of one of the most secretive and to a large extent feared 
bodies in the former USSR, the Committee of State Security (KGB), was transformed 
into the Ministry of National Security through a Decree of the President of the 
Republic of Moldova of 9 September 1991. The conflictual events of 1990-1992 in 
the Gagauz and Transnistrian regions brought new aspects to the functioning of this 
service. At the same time, the processes of democratisation of the society, 
establishment of the new international relations and ultimately orientation of the 
country towards the European Communities required new approaches. Along with 
positive “opening” processes, new problems came along and new threats and risks to 
security were recognised. Therefore, subsequent modifications of the structure and 
activities of the Ministry of the National Security became necessary, adequate to the 
requests of the time and adjusted to the legal reform operated in accordance with 
Council of Europe requirements.  
Hence, the process of reorganisation started by Parliament’s decision of 12 
January 1998; and the Ministry of National Security ceased to exist on 23 December 
1999 being replaced by the Security and Information Service (SIS) of the Republic of 
Moldova, which declared as its values the establishment of an institution based on 
European principles and generally accepted norms of international law in conditions 
of a democratic state. A less intrusive way of investigation was foreseen and the main 
burden for actions to be taken to enforce the law was placed on the shoulders of the 
Ministry of Interior and judicial bodies. In this context the SIS currently considers that 
the period of its construction came to and end.74  
 
 
Ministry of Interior 
Another institution that underwent transition changes was the Ministry of Interior 
(MoI) of the Republic of Moldova. After the declaration of sovereignty of the 
Republic of Moldova on 23 June 1990, a new legal statute, structure and competences 
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were set and the process of construction of a new, national body for interior affairs 
started. On 13 September 1990 the Government of the Republic of Moldova adopted a 
Decision on the reform of the MoI, which foresaw the establishment of the National 
Police. This decision was confirmed in December 1990 by the Parliament through a 
Law on Police. New structures, mainly corresponding to those of the European states, 
and firstly France and Italy, were considered when building the new MoI. Currently, 
among other departments characteristic of Ministries of Interior there is also a 
Department of the Carabinieri (interior troops), having military structures, ranks and 
incorporating both recruits and contracted personnel, exercising similar functions as 
the Carabinieri in Italy and the Gendarmerie in France. 
In an attempt to respond to the emerging problems and continuing its 
adaptation to the new realities the MoI decided to review the current legislation that 
governs its activity and has started the drafting of a new Law on Police.75 
 
The Army 
However significant were the transformations within the SIS and MoI, there is no 
other more noteworthy change than that in the Moldovan National Army. The 
construction of the Army itself was also influenced by the outbreak of the military 
conflict in the Transnistrian region. Due to the crisis circumstances the Army had to 
quickly build its structures from the existing resources. Firstly, these were officers 
who returned to Moldova from the Soviet military structures, who operated with 
outdated concepts and considered the military doctrines no longer necessary for a 
small state like Moldova and unsuitable for internal conflicts. Secondly, it was the 
weaponry, not always in decent shape, which remained on the territory of Moldova 
after the withdrawal of the Russian Army units. In conditions of inadequate 
equipment and with an evolving internal armed conflict, the sense of emergency in 
constructing the armed forces was predominant.  
With the Transnistrian conflict transformed in due course into a “frozen” one, 
the efforts of the Army were redirected on its own construction. However, with time 
and the more significant involvement of the former Soviet command personnel – who 
were objectively the most competent persons – as well as with limited funding 
possibilities, the Moldovan army became even more like a scaled-down version of the 
USSR armed forces. With other factors, including external ones, this influenced the 
entire course of action in the political-military field. As a result of the larger political 
circumstances, Moldova decided to declare its neutrality and build its forces 
accordingly – with the idea of sufficiency for temporary defence, until it could count 
on external help if it were threatened. 
After numerous reductions, the Moldovan National Army is currently headed 
by the Main Staff and includes land, air and air defence forces and can be augmented 
by Frontier troops and Carabineer troops. It is composed of three motorised infantry 
brigades, one artillery brigade, an air force element, an air defence element and 
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combat support units, all reporting to the Chief of the Main Staff. The current strength 
of the National Army is about 6,000, while the authorised strength is about 8,000 
personnel. The authorised number of civilian personnel is 2,400. There are currently 
2,113 civilian personnel, of which most are specialists [end-2003]. 
 
 
Strategy, Connections and Reform again 
 
As it was previously suggested, the leadership of the country, as well as the Army and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were mindful of the fact that an “isolationist” neutrality 
policy had to be counterbalanced by extensive external cooperation that would ensure 
the necessary help, experience and perhaps financial support. Therefore, the decision 
was taken to promote an active foreign policy, including in the field of military 
cooperation, and one of the most appropriate ways to implement such an approach 
emerged with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. The President of Moldova 
signed the framework PfP document on 4 March 1994 at NATO Headquarters.  
The Government of Moldova recognises that the PfP programme served as an 
effective instrument of co-operation with new partners. Its positive results were 
favourably acknowledged given the fact that through a single source – NATO – 
Moldova was able to find and use the experience of several member-countries and 
partners in the improvement of their military forces, as well as to strengthen its own 
defence capabilities. 
The first Individual Partnership Plan was prepared by Moldova in 1995, and 
since then the process is a regular practice. Moldovan military participated ever since 
in numerous PfP joint exercises and even hosted a number of them. Therefore, a part 
of the objectives set forth at the beginning of the armed forces construction were 
achieved.  
At the same time, independence and creation of international relations 
channels also meant more “openness”. The contacts with former enemies, now current 
partners, resulted in additional effects – the ideas of civil control of the armed forces 
and the reform of the army according to the new democratic principles were 
penetrating the Moldovan society, including the military, and resulted in the first 
attempts to bring up the idea of the reform of the armed forces. These attempts 
succeeded with the MoD initiative in 1998 to start a reform, when the first civilian 
minister was directing the activities of this institution. After a period of extended and 
quite intense deliberations a Concept of  Military Reform was sent to the Parliament, 
which approved it on 26 July 2002. Notably, the Concept mentions that one of the 
main directions in which the co-operation with other armed forces will be carried on 
is the “democratic command and control of the armed forces”. Phase II of the reform 
(2005-2008) includes the “creation of a civilian and military command structure of the 
Armed Forces with a detailed delimitation of the attributions in the sphere of political, 
administrative and military command”. 
This Concept also states that it is intended to respond to the current 
geopolitical situation and the need to adapt to the new realities, risks, threats and 
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missions of military character. It recognises that the Armed Forces are in poor 
condition due to the lack of practical experience in the area of military construction 
and management, mistakes made and insufficiency of funds. It also recognises that 
although the current resources are insufficient, it is essential to correlate the needs, 
available means and economic development possibilities of the country. The 
document appreciates that fulfilment of military reform is not possible only through 
the efforts of the “force structures” and that merger of efforts would be necessary, 
including in the legal and financial matters.76 
Additionally to the reform of the bodies directly involved in enforcing the 
security, transformations were brought to the very basis of the functioning of these 
structures. As mentioned, the reforms could not proceed without anticipated changes 
in the legislation and such adjustments came about as a result of two major factors – 
the urgent need to draft the necessary legislation for newly created structures, as well 
as in response to the international and especially European requirements. Thus, first of 
all the security sector related legislation was analysed and changed in accordance with 
the requirements set forth by the Council of Europe. Further changes are expected to 
take place on the way of Moldova’s European integration. 
 
 
Moldova and NATO & EU enlargement 
 
The current processes of NATO and EU enlargement are already influencing the 
attitude of Moldova towards these organisations. Thus, in a context when 
neighbouring Romania will become in 2004 a NATO member and possibly in 2007 
an EU member – and when Ukraine declared as its aim the membership in NATO and 
EU – the approach of the Republic of Moldova will naturally be directed at an 
increased cooperation with these organisations. 
Against this background the NATO (PfP) Planning and Review Process 
(PARP) process is particularly relevant. It gave an opportunity to check Moldovan 
performances within the PfP and not least new possibilities for co-operation with 
NATO. The PARP document itself stipulates that Moldova attaches great importance 
to deepening its participation in the framework of PfP and PARP as tools to pursue 
the democratisation of its internal structures. 
The NATO document also stipulates that in 2002, Moldova participated in 
four NATO/PfP exercises and in two other ‘in the spirit of PfP’ exercises. Financial 
constraints continued to hamper Moldovan participation. NATO confirms such a state 
of affairs by suggesting that the economic status of Moldova remains critical. This 
situation of severe underfunding has been repeated for a number of years and has had 
a severe impact on the ability to operate and sustain the armed forces. It mentions that 
the government has approved the general outline of a plan to implement a Concept of 
Military Reform, but it is not based on an up-to-date National Security Strategy nor on 
solid costing data. The Concept anticipated that the defence budget would have to be 
increased from 0.5 per cent to 2.5 per cent of GDP during the next 12 years. However, 
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in view of the current economic situation and the fact that 11 other ministries will be 
competing for very limited resources, this is unlikely to happen.  
On this more pessimistic background regarding a successful implementation 
of the Concept NATO experts recommend that Moldova conducts a thorough defence 
review, based on a revised National Security Strategy, as the old one was drafted in 
1995 and does not cover new threats and risks. NATO recognised that Moldova will 
need external assistance to conduct such a review.  
One of the possibilities that could be thoroughly considered to overcome this 
situation is adopting an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) – similar to 
Ukraine’s Action Plan with NATO – which, inter alia, covers very much the SSR 
issue. In this respect, it would be relevant to mention the ideas of a new Partnership 
circulated by Switzerland, which spin around the SSR. An important factor would 
also be NATO’s availability to assist the Republic of Moldova in the process of 
solving security problems and identifying new areas of co-operation.  
Therefore, we could say that both interests of the Alliance and of Moldova for 
mutual co-operation increased, not least due to the approach of NATO borders to 
Moldova. 
Another not less important subject for Moldova, resulting from EU 
enlargement, is the Wider Europe concept – or, in fact, new neighbours’ border 
security – in the context of the Transnistrian conflict resolution that has an important 
relation to an effective SSR. Currently, the central authorities do not have effective 
control over the entire border with Ukraine. In these circumstances the Transnistrian 
leadership seized the possibility to enrich itself from illegal border activities. 
Therefore, we are currently facing cases of smuggling, including cases of weapons 
proliferation, mostly Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Their source is the 
paramilitary Transnistrian units and local Transnistrian factories in the Security Zone. 
The last ones are specifically designed for illegal markets. As the issue of SALWs, 
their proper control and their movement across borders was numerous times 
mentioned as an important element for a successful SSR, there is no need to further 
elaborate on the impact that it has over the SSR in Moldova. 
From this perspective, we believe there is a need to organise a joint border 
control with Ukraine along the entire frontier and we perceive Ukraine co-operation 
as crucial to ensure success that would have an impact over the future of our border 
control services, a factor that has relevance for the SSR in both our countries. 
From this perspective, it is recognised that the EU has already started to play a 
role in the border security activities and it should go further: “Until now the EU took 
some actions intended to support the Transnistrian conflict settlement. … EU initiated 
three-sided negotiations between Moldova, Ukraine and the EU, regarding Moldova's 
Eastern border management.” 77 
Returning to the EU Wider Europe initiative, or new neighbourhood – and the 
fact that an eventual EU Action Plan for Moldova might be drafted – we could 
assume that these would include appropriate provisions related to SSR. 
Simultaneously, the declared strategic goal of Moldova to become an EU member 
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would also impose the country to take a number of actions to comply with EU 
policies in this respect. 
 
 
SSR and the Transnistrian conflict 
 
It might be regarded as an axiom that the first problem that had an impact on the 
effective evolution SSR in Moldova from the beginning was the outbreak of the 
Transnistrian conflict in the Eastern region of the country. 
So-called “state structures”, separate from the central authorities, were 
instituted by local leaders unhappy with Moldovan independence; and illegal military 
and paramilitary forces were quickly created. The military clashes ended with the 
signature of an Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian 
Federation on 21 July 1992, in Moscow, on the principles of the peaceful settlement 
of the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.  
As stipulated in the agreement a Joint Control Commission (JCC) was set up 
and a Security Zone (SZ) established. In order to implement the decisions of the JCC 
in SZ, the Agreement stipulated that this body should receive military contingents 
representing the parties involved in the implementation of this Agreement (Russian 
Federation, Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian region itself).  
The reality showed that the Transnistrian leaders perceived and used their 
military presence in the Security Zone, as well as the presence of the 14th Russian 
Army, as a shield for the construction of their "state structures", especially a Ministry 
of Security and a “Transnistrian Army” – institutions used by the separatist regime to 
control the population. There have been Russian troops in the area ever since. But a 
withdrawal agreement has been brokered by the OSCE. 
Currently the withdrawal process is nearly blocked and the Russian Federation 
quotes the obstructive attitude of the separatist leaders. At this stage, we think that the 
Russian Federation might have not exhausted all the possibilities to ensure that the 
leadership of this region becomes more flexible, so that the Russian Federation could 
have complied with internationally taken obligations to complete the withdrawal by 
the end of 2003.  
For the Republic of Moldova the issue of the withdrawal and subsequent 
developments in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict is directly related to the 
future of its armed forces, police and other security structures; and NATO and EU 
have already paid sufficient attention to this situation. Thus, both NATO and EU are 
already supporting the OSCE efforts in withdrawal both financially and politically.  
However, at this stage, the situation that derives from the Transnistrian 
conflict, which is categorised as a “frozen conflict”, reflects this labelling. The 
negotiations focus on such issues as political agreement. Some separate opinions 
regarding the demilitarisation of the region or entire country are already known. 
However, the negotiations do not produce real results since the separatist leaders 
insist on a union of two states or a confederation, which they call a “federation on 
contractual basis”, with unconnected and independent structures, a stance that comes 
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against the internationally and internally agreed principles of building a re-integrated 
Moldova. The opinions presented by the conflicting sides regarding the future status 
of the security structures are as diverging as the political views. The Transnistrian 
separatists are envisaging two separate Armies, Customs, Police, Security services, 
etc, while the Constitutional authorities have in sight projects of a state built on 
federative principles with asymmetric distribution of powers, one Army, one Customs 
and other unified security systems, as they represent the attributes of a state’s 
independence and sovereignty throughout the entire territory. 
 
 
Serious SSR soon? 
 
The reforms of the security sector institutions in Moldova are ongoing processes since 
the proclamation of sovereignty and later independence of the country. However, SSR 
is not an integrated process in Moldova: these are separate actions that are making a 
parallel movement in the same direction, creating an impression of a co-ordinated 
process.  
Yet the Moldovan realities show that there is much to be done; especially, 
since the level of final support is sometimes unsatisfactory, mostly due to the 
country’s economic profile, as well as due to the lack of expertise (as was recognised 
in the Concept of Military Reform).  
Obviously, as the national knowledge on this subject is still insufficient, the 
reform could be more easily implemented with international support. Thus, the 
enlargement of NATO and the European Union up to the borders of Moldova, the 
recently declared EU policy on wider neighbourhood and the expressed strategic goal 
of Moldova to integrate in EU might be those factors that could provide new solutions 
and give a new momentum for SSR. 
We may conclude with the idea that a future Transnistrian conflict resolution, 
as well as some positive signals from the EU on its greater and more direct 
involvement in Moldovan affairs, as well as a possible IPAP acceptance and 
implementation, would give some additional impetus for a sustainable and 
comprehensive future SSR in the Republic of Moldova. 
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X. MOLDOVA AND TRANSNISTRIA 
 
Dov Lynch 
 
 
After the mid-2004 enlargement, the Republic of Moldova will lie in the immediate 
periphery of the European Union (EU). For Brussels, this small state is already a 
gateway into Europe for drugs and arms smuggling, as well as human trafficking. 
Throughout the 1990s, the EU did not address Moldova’s conflict with Transnistria 
(Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika – hereafter, PMR), Moldova’s eastern-
most region that has declared independence. As a whole, despite OSCE involvement, 
there has been little progress towards resolving the conflict. Failing a settlement, there 
is a danger that Moldova will become a black hole on Europe’s border, radiating 
instability externally while collapsing internally. 
The PMR is the centre of gravity of Moldova’s weaknesses. The conflict 
between separatist Transnistria and the central Moldovan authorities occurred in a 
series of small-scale clashes in late 1991 and early 1992, culminating in a battle in the 
town of Bendery in June 1992. Compared to the wars in the Balkans and the South 
Caucasus, the conflict is not ethnically or communally driven. It was also of low-
intensity and short duration, with relatively low casualty figures (about 1000 killed). 
Despite this low military start, the situation on the ground between the two parties has 
become increasingly militarised over the course of the 1990s. In and around the 
Security Zone that stretches north to south along the Dnestr River, there are a 
Russian-led peacekeepers, elements of Moldova’s security forces and quite extensive 
Transnistrian forces.  
This militarisation contributes to sustaining the status quo of a divided 
Moldova. The peacekeeping operation, and the mechanisms established to control the 
Security Zone, were effective throughout the 1990s in maintaining a cease-fire but 
have not contributed to settlement talks. These security arrangements have become 
counter-productive, as they work with an undesirable status quo rather than against it. 
New security arrangements must be designed to demilitarise the situation in the 
Security Zone as well as relations between the two parties. These arrangements 
should be primarily civilian, and should have the function of launching the process of 
demobilising the security forces on both sides of the Dnestr and eventually of 
integrating them. The EU is well placed to take the lead in designing and directing 
new security arrangements, working under the aegis of the OSCE and with its Mission, 
and with Ukraine and Russia. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. A first part outlines briefly the 
military/paramilitary forces that are deployed in and around the Security Zone. The 
second part examines the international and regional factors that have opened a 
window of opportunity for settling the conflict in 2003-2004, and notes the 
countervailing trends. Third, the chapter discusses the state of affairs in the 
negotiations, including the informal proposal for a Peace Consolidation Mission to 
Moldova (PCMM) put forward by the Dutch Chairmanship-in-Office of the OSCE. 
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This section also examines the proposal put forward by the Russian government in 
November 2003 for a constitutional settlement of the conflict. The final section 
explores options for greater international, and especially EU, engagement to stimulate 
the demilitarisation of the conflict and its settlement.  
 
 
Forces In and Around the Security Zone 
 
Moldova is relatively small country with a population estimated at just over four 
million.78 For this size, it is quite highly militarised. This section outlines the forces 
that contribute to this trend. 
The Moldovan armed forces are 7,000 strong. 79  The army contains 5,500 
troops, distributed in three motor-rifle brigades, a guard battalion, special forces, an 
artillery and an air defence brigade. The Moldovan air force is limited in aircraft, 
having sold its fleet of MiG-29s to the United States, and in personnel (1,000). In 
addition, Moldova has around 3,400 paramilitary forces, mostly with the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, and including a carabineer force as national guard. In all, the 
equipment base of Moldovan forces is minimal and largely obsolete.  
The PMR, with a population of 650,000, maintains a proportionally larger 
force. While exact figures are difficult to find, the PMR has an estimated 10,000 men 
under arms. These troops are distributed between the PMR guard - composed of four 
motor infantry brigades, a tank battalion, an artillery regiment and an air defence 
brigade - and various paramilitary forces. The latter include units of the State Security 
Ministry (MGB), a Black Sea Cossack formation and a substantial force under the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The equipment base is stronger, and includes Mi8 
helicopters and important numbers of mortars and artillery.  
The Moldovan and separatist authorities also have separate border and 
customs services. The numbers are unavailable for the PMR, but they are deployed in 
posts in the Security Zone and on the border with Ukraine. Moldova has around 5,000 
personnel in its border services, which are deployed only on the border with Romania. 
Both have retained conscription and the principle of reserves, while containing come 
contract elements.  
Moldova also hosts relatively large numbers of foreign troops. After the Soviet 
collapse, the Russian Federation inherited the former Soviet 14th Army, deployed 
mainly on the left bank and in control of extensive equipment and ammunition stocks 
(some 42,000 tons). The Army has since been transformed into an Operational Group 
of Russian Forces (OGRF), composed in 2003 of between 1,300 and 1,500 troops, 
mainly officers. At the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999, Russia pledged to withdraw 
the OGRF and repatriate/destroy the equipment stocks by 31 December 2002. Unable 
to complete the commitment, the deadline was extended for Russia by twelve months 
by the Porto OSCE ministerial. 
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Finally, the Moldovan state is divided into two by a Security Zone that 
stretches north to south along the Dnestr River. The Security Zone was created in July 
1992 after an agreement between the conflicting parties and Russia to deploy a 
trilateral peacekeeping operation. Initially, the peacekeeping operation was composed 
of mainly Russian troops (five battalions), and included limited numbers of Moldovan 
(three battalions) and Transnistrian (two battalions) forces, distributed in checkpoints 
in three sectors of the Security Zone. In 2003, the peacekeeping operation stood at an 
estimated 1,000 troops, deployed in thirteen posts – some Russian only, others 
trilateral. In addition, a military observer mission was launched in 1992, with ten 
observers each from Russia, Moldova and Transnistria (this was enlarged to include 
Ukrainians in 1998). 
There are four facets of the militarisation of this conflict to be noted. First, 
contrary to the July 1992 agreement, the Security Zone is not demilitarised. The PMR 
has deployed units of its armed forces, as well as separatist border guards and customs 
points. These units block the normalisation of relations and exchanges across the 
Dnestr.  
Second, the Joint Control Commission (JCC) – the mechanism created to 
control the peacekeeping operation – allows the right of veto to its Moldovan, Russian 
and Transnistrian co-chairmen in determining the agenda of the weekly meetings and 
in voting on questions resolved. This procedure has allowed the separatist authorities 
to block Moldovan attempts to demilitarise the Security Zone and to expand the role 
of international actors.  
Third, as a result of these security arrangements, the PMR has made great 
strides to the consolidation of its separatist independence and self-declared statehood. 
Over ten years of peacekeeping they have acted as a shield behind which Tiraspol has 
created all the institutions of statehood.  
Finally, the presence of the peacekeeping force and the Security Zone are used 
now in the political rhetoric of the separatist leaders as a justification of Moldova’s 
threat to PMR. These arrangements allow Tiraspol to mobilise fear as a political 
resource and to strengthen their myth-making about the ‘war of 1992’ as a revanchist 
act of brutal aggression. The separatist state survives off fear, isolation and external 
threat – the 1992 peacekeeping arrangements play to this. 
 
 
A Window of Opportunity? 
 
Negotiations have been underway to resolve this conflict since 1992. Three external 
actors have taken the lead in the talks – Russia since mid-1992, the OSCE, following 
the deployment of an observer mission in April 1993, and Ukraine, since 1998.80 
High-level Russian attention, in particular by then Foreign Minister Y. Primakov, led 
the parties to sign an agreement in Moscow on May 8, 1997. The Memorandum ‘On 
the Basis for the Normalisation of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and 
Transnistria (PMR)’ seemed to open the way for an accommodation of Moldovan 
                                                 
80
 On the OSCE Mission, see http://www.osce.org/moldova  
Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building 
 
 114
demands for respect of its territorial integrity and the PMR pursuit of self-
determination. The Memorandum stated that the parties would seek to establish ‘state-
legal relations.’ In particular, Article 11 declared: ‘The parties shall build their 
relations in the framework of a common state within the borders of the Moldovan 
Soviet Socialist Republic as of December of the year 1990.’ However, following the 
agreement, talks between the parties centred on defining the meaning of ‘common 
state.’ Serious differences have blocked attempts by the OSCE to determine a division 
of competencies within the framework of territorially integral Moldova.81  
Faced with continued obstruction by the separatist authorities, Chisinau 
withdrew from talks between September 2001 and May 2002. Moldova rejoined the 
negotiations in mid-2002 at the insistence of three mediators, who presented a new 
discussion framework, known as the Kiev Document, in June 2002. The Kiev 
Document proposed a federal structure as the basis for relations between Chisinau and 
Tiraspol, and determined levels of divided and shared competences, new federal 
institutions, and a system of international guarantees. Despite international pressure, 
talks never gathered pace (it took six months to discuss the first four of forty-two 
articles). The basic divergence between Moldova and the PMR on future relations 
blocked serious progress.  
A number of factors - international, European and regional – have woven 
together since late 2002 to open a new window of opportunity. These forces are five-
fold.  
First, the framework of the talks has changed. In February 2003, the Moldovan 
President, Vladimir Voronin, proposed the creation of joint commission in which the 
two parties would develop a new constitution on a tight time-line. For six months, 
three experts from both sides would work within the Joint Constitutional Commission 
to draft a new constitution that would settle the question of Transnistria’s status. 
Then, for two months, the draft would be presented for public discussion, and by 
February 2004, a referendum would be held to ratify the new constitution. By 
February 2005, Voronin proposed that new parliamentary elections be held following 
the new constitutional provisions. After initial agreeing to the proposal, the separatist 
authorities delayed starting work in the Joint Constitutional Commission for several 
months. The two sides exchanged draft constitutions in early August.  
Second, the Dutch Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2003 gave priority to conflict 
settlement in Moldova. The Dutch government has stressed the link between the talks 
on political settlement and those on the security guarantees – both were to advance 
together in a ’transitional period.’ As a result, parallel to the talks being held in the 
Joint Constitutional Commission, the Dutch government launched discussions on 
future guarantee and security arrangements. In July 2003, the Netherlands put forward 
an informal ‘Food-for-Thought’ paper with options for a peace consolidation force to 
replace the current peacekeeping operation.82 
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Third, at the wider European level, 2003 saw the birth of the EU as a security 
actor. In 2003, the EU launched three missions – in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These operations have been 
mandated tasks from law enforcement and ceasefire monitoring to security and 
humanitarian crisis management. Over 2,000 police and military personnel have been 
involved in the three operations.83 The military operations, in particular, are the first 
test cases of the Union’s ability to apply some of the military policy instruments 
envisaged under the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. More widely, the Iraqi crisis 
stimulated thinking on the development of a EU Security Strategy, written by Javier 
Solana and approved in draft at the Thessaloniki Summit.84 A major point made in the 
Security Strategy is the need to have a belt of well-governed countries on the EU’s 
borders. The EU is developing a strategic view of the states on its borders. 
Fourth, linked to its emergence as a security actor, the Union started 
discussions on participating in a new security arrangement in the Moldovan conflict, 
under the aegis of the OSCE, at the informal request of the Dutch Chairmanship. The 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) – the committee of fifteen ambassadors in the 
Council –discussed the question on a number of occasions from late May 2003. The 
PSC also tasked the Council Secretariat to develop options for EU involvement in 
conflict settlement, including through possible civilian/military arrangements.  
In fact, the EU Council has taken a more targeted stance in the conflict since 
late 2002. On 4 December 2002, the EU Council issued a statement highlighting 
Transnistrian obstruction as the main problem in the settlement talks. This was 
followed by a similar statement by the Greek Presidency on 29 January and a joint 
action on 27 February 2003 that stated: ‘The Council […] considered the 
obstructionism of the region's leadership and their unwillingness to change the status 
quo to be unacceptable. The Council therefore decided to apply targeted sanctions in 
the form of a travel ban against certain Transdniestrian leaders responsible for the 
lack of cooperation in the search for a political settlement.’85 The EU has sought to 
work in coordination with the United States (US). The travel ban on the separatist 
elites was undertaken jointly with Washington. The US and the EU have also started 
to work together with Ukraine to clarify Moldovan-Ukrainian border relations.  
A final factor opening a window of opportunity was the deadline of 31 
December 2003 for the withdrawal of Russian equipments, arms and troops from the 
OGRF. Between March and June 2003, Russia withdrew thirty-two trainloads of 
equipment, representing approximately 16,500 metric tons and leaving in Moldova 
still about 25,500 metric tons. 86  After June, the process was halted, because of 
Transnistrian obstruction and Tiraspol’s desire to negotiate with Russia over its gas 
debts.  
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The combination of these factors brought significant - and novel - 
international attention to Moldovan conflict settlement. It also stimulated some 
progress in the talks between the two parties. The involvement of the EU is 
particularly interesting, given Moldova’s declared European vocation and the wide 
range of tools the Union can bring to support the talks and the settlement process. Still, 
one should note three countervailing trends. First, the electoral cycles in Russia 
(parliamentary elections in December 2003 and presidential elections in March 2004) 
and Ukraine (presidential elections in 2004) complicate the international community’s 
ability to exercise pressure on the two states to make constructive contributions to 
settlement. Second, as important, Transnistrian obstruction has not changed. The 
strategy of the separatists remains that of seeking to gain time through negotiations, 
which defuse the pressure on them, give them space to consolidate and create the 
pretence of good will rather than the reality. Their objective of a loose confederal 
relationship with Moldova has not changed.87 A final point is that, for all its new 
attention to Moldova, the EU is very busy with its own house-keeping. As such, the 
international context may not be so conducive to conflict settlement, either in terms of 
Chisinau-Tiraspol relations or in terms of developing new security arrangements to 
replace the Russian-led peacekeeping operation. 
 
 
The State of Affairs 
 
As a result, the settlement process became blocked in late 2003. The Joint 
Constitutional Commission devoted its attention first to the chapter on human rights 
of the proposed future constitution. Even this relatively ‘non-political’ chapter (it was 
chosen for this reason) posed difficulties. In all, Moldova and the separatist PMR 
remain divided on three questions. First, regarding the future reunified state, the 
Moldovan government seeks the creation of a federal state with a centre and two 
subjects. By contrast, the PMR still insists on a confederation - even if they call it a 
‘federation.’ The Transnistrian vision would have the future state follow a model 
similar to that agreed between Serbia and Montenegro, where a free vote on 
independence will be possible in three years time.88 For Tiraspol, the new constitution 
should be based on the principle of equality between Moldova and the PMR, and a 
treaty-based contractual relationship.  
The parties also disagree on the appropriate mechanism for leading the 
negotiations. On 11 September 2003, Vladimir Voronin proposed that the EU assume 
a formal role in the negotiating mechanisms – that is, the format of the five, which 
include the two parties and the three mediators (OSCE, Russia and Ukraine).89 The 
Transnistrian authorities insisted on the enduring utility of the existing framework for 
talks.  
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The two parties also disagree on the nature of security guarantees. In the Kiev 
Document, both signed up to the principle of considering new security arrangements 
in an ill-defined ‘transitional period.’ For Tiraspol, this period would start after an 
agreement in the Joint Constitutional Commission and with the implementation of an 
agreement. The Moldovan authorities seek to define the ‘transitional period’ as 
starting during the talks. The Dutch government also took the position that 
discussions on new security guarantees had to run concurrently with the constitutional 
talks. In the words of Ambassador Adriaan Jacobovits in October 2003: ‘We know 
that a political settlement cannot be reached when we do not have also an agreement 
on a peace consolidation force.’90 
Moreover, the PMR has voiced its opposition to EU involvement in any 
security guarantee operation. Quite the contrary, the separatist leaders seek to reduce 
the parties involved in peace consolidation on the ground and to preserve as many as 
possible of the structures set up in July 1992. Tiraspol has also stated that it would 
welcome a bilateral Russian guarantee to a future settlement with Moldova. Valery 
Litskai, the separatist Foreign Minister, declared in September 2003 that the best 
solution would be a ‘Russia guarantee similar to that of Great Britain to Cyprus.’91 
The Moldovan government has been keen on guarantees for an agreement reached 
with the left bank of the Dnestr that ensures a reduced Russian military presence, an 
internationalised peace consolidation mission and wide international involvement. As 
a result, Moldova has heartily welcomed discussions in Brussels on a EU role. 
In addition, the Russian government has come out openly as well as behind the 
scenes against a change in the current negotiating format. A long list of high-level 
figures in the Russian Presidential Administration (Aleksandr Voloshin and Dmitry 
Kozak) and government (Vyacheslav Trubnikov) visited Moldova and the PMR after 
Spring 2003. In a statement of 21 July 2003, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
spokesman, Aleksandr Yakovlenko, declared: ‘One should however avoid any 
statements or initiatives which complicate the already very difficult negotiations and 
prematurely distract the attention of their participants from the most vital substantive 
issues of settlement and lastly that are taken without a prior diplomatic discussion 
with the use of the well-oiled negotiating mechanisms.’92 The Russian government 
has argued that discussions on new security arrangement were premature and counter-
productive. These should be conducted after a settlement agreement has been reached. 
At a more fundamental level, Moscow perceives little need to change the 
peacekeeping operation currently in place, ‘the effectiveness of which is confirmed by 
more than ten years experience and which no one casts doubt upon.’93  
In the meantime, the Transnistrian authorities continue to consolidate their 
self-declared independent statehood. In September 2003, the Tiraspol authorities 
announced their preparation of a new round of privatisation of firms on separatist 
territory. And in Moldova the notion of a ‘federal solution’ has become increasingly 
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discredited, at least in the eyes of some sectors of civil society.94 It is difficult to judge 
the depth of public discontent with the notion of federalism. However, the Communist 
Party government in Chisinau will be forced at one point to tackle intellectual and 
opposition challenge on this account.  
By late 2003, Moldova found itself in an uncomfortable position - caught 
between a EU that was not quite convinced or certain of its future security role in the 
conflict, and a Russia that was more certain and that had the means to act on its 
interests. On 11 March 2003, the Commission published its Communication on Wider 
Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and 
Southern Neighbours, which launched a debate about EU policy to its new 
neighbours.95 The political and security role of the EU receives strong emphasis in the 
Communication.96 In particular, it contained a pledge that the EU will take a more 
active role in seeking conflict settlement in Moldova ― in mediation, post-conflict 
reconstruction and security arrangements. The EU has taken from the Communication 
the idea of developing Action Plans jointly with its new neighbours. The Moldovan 
government has voiced its desire for a joint Action Plan, and a Moldovan strategy 
document for European accession was presented to Brussels in October 2003.  
Apart from these declarative advances, however, Moldova has made little 
substantive progress in preparing the country for European integration.97 Nonetheless, 
Chisinau did resist in 2003 Russian pressure to turn more eastwards in political, 
security and economic terms. Voronin turned away demands for bilateral Russian 
guarantee mechanisms in the conflict and refused to join the CIS Joint Economic 
Space, created at the CIS summit in Yalta in September 2003.98 For all the new pluck 
to be found in Chisinau, one may query how long Moldova can hold off sustained 
pressure from the east without greater European support, given its economic 
dependence on Russia and the multitude of political ties it has with Moscow. 
The Russian proposal, developed and put forward by the deputy head of the 
Russian presidential administration, Dmitry Kozak, on 16 November 2003, illustrates 
the pressures under which the Voronin government is operating. The proposal consists 
of a ‘Memo On the Basic Principles of the States Structures of the Unified State.’ 
Under its terms, Moldova would become the Federal Republic of Moldova (FRM) 
within its 1990 borders. The FRM would be based on the following principles: it 
would be united and democratic, demilitarised and neutral, and contain two Federal 
Subjects (the PMR and Gagauz formation with all their state organs and powers, and 
symbols). Moldovan would be the state language of the FRM, and Russian would 
become an official language. Federal Subjects would be given the right to exit the 
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FRM, through a referendum on the territory of the Federal Subject, if the FRM should 
change its status or suffer a loss of sovereignty. The FRM would have three 
institutions: a Senate, with twenty-six members (four Gagauz and nine PMR, and 
thirteen from the House of Representatives); a House of Representatives (with 
seventy one members); a Federal President and a Constitutional Court (with eleven 
members: six from the House of Representatives, one Gagauz, four PMR). All 
legislation in the FRM would have to be ‘confirmed’ by the Senate. In a transition 
period, the PMR would retain its military formations. Moreover, there would be no 
review of PMR laws enacted since 1992. 
To all intents and purposes, Voronin seemed to have agreed to sign the 
unilateral Russian proposal and was only convinced to the contrary by two factors. 
First, Moldova’s political forces and society united for the first time in ten years 
against the Russian proposal. Second, the international community, through the OSCE, 
voiced criticism of the proposal. Voronin begged off signing at the last minute, much 
to the ire of the Kremlin, where the presidential plane had been readied for a brief 
‘signatory visit’ to Chisinau. The Moldovan president stated that he would confer 
with the OSCE and the Participating States at the Maastricht ministerial summit 
before proceeding. In early December, the Maastricht meeting failed to produce a 
joint statement because of differences over the Moldovan question and Russia’s 
failure to fulfil the obligations agreed at the Istanbul Summit of 1999 (concerning 
Georgia and Moldova). Diplomatic exchanges have gone cold since Maastricht 
between the US, the OSCE and the Russian Federation, with the US calling for a 
return to discussions in the established framework and for the speediest Russian 
withdrawal from the PMR. 
The ‘Kozak plan,’ as it is now known, was so riddled with problems that one 
wonders if the Kremlin seriously expected it to succeed. In many ways, the proposal 
contained the worst of previous documents that had been put forward, with too many 
joint powers between the federal centre and the subjects, and too vaguely defined. The 
PMR was recognised as a state formation in the proposal, and provided with over-
representation in the federal centre, to such an extent that Moldova itself may have 
been transnistrianised. Certainly, the PMR would have been in a position to block 
serious movement of Moldova towards the EU. Moreover, the proposal was strangely 
silent on the question of security guarantees. The presumption, made clear in a 
subsequent statement by the Russian Defence Minister, was in fact that Russia would 
deploy a peacekeeping operation of 2000 troops to guarantee security during the 
implementation of the agreement. The content of the proposal was so flawed that it 
would not have been acceptable to the OSCE. Russia’s style also alienated many. The 
tone from Moscow was almost arrogant on the question of the status of the Russian 
language in Moldova – always a prickly question in this small country. The unilateral 
nature of the initiative also irked the participants in the five-sided format, who have 
invested significant time and energy to the question since the early 1990s. 
The results are quite gloomy. The Moldovan president may have lost the slim 
confidence he had acquired in Europe by appearing dangerously equivocal. Certainly, 
he has not gained in domestic popularity for his manoeuvrings. Moscow has been 
Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building 
 
 120
‘burned’ in the process, by Moldova’s last minute rejection of what was planned as a 
surprise coup, and by the OSCE and important Participating States, which have come 
down firmly against Russian unilateralism. The only clear winners are the leaders of 
the PMR. The negotiations have gone on ice.  
 
 
Options to Stimulate Progress 
 
Before discussing options, it is important to accept a starting premise: The current 
situation in Moldova and in the conflict should be seen as a system, or as a logic, that 
sustains itself thanks to supporting factors in Transnistria, Moldova and the wider 
region.99 Recognising the difficulty of changing the entire equation in a single sweep, 
the international community should rather seek to alter a few of the ‘x’ and ‘y’ factors 
in the equation that sustains the status quo. Five measures might be considered at the 
outset. 
First, the discussions underway on new security guarantees should be 
continued. The principle must be established for parallel discussions on a new 
constitution and a peace consolidation force. In fact, the deployment of such a force 
would best be tied to a calendar date and not a moment in the constitutional talks 
themselves. New security arrangements on the ground are in themselves important to 
stimulate settlement. The current peacekeeping operation, and its command and 
control mechanisms, have done little to demilitarise the conflict, either at the level of 
rhetoric or in terms of forces deployed in and around the Security Zone. Rethinking 
the security arrangements in the Security Zone would be a first step towards the 
demobilisation and integration of the two parties’ security forces.  
The Dutch ‘Food-for-Thought’ paper is an interesting starting point but not 
optimal. According to the paper, a peace consolidation force would consist of two 
components: first, a limited military operation of several hundred armed troops, 
deployed under the aegis of the OSCE for an initial period of six months; and second, 
a civilian component of unarmed civilian observers (60-100) deployed for a longer 
period of time. The paper also envisaged the appointment of an OSCE Special 
representative to provide overall oversight to both components. The paper developed 
two options for a military component. The first would be a full-fledged OSCE 
operation, commanded through the Military Committee and with troops from willing 
member states. The second, and more preferable option - because of the OSCE’s lack 
of experience and planning capacity - would be for the OSCE to mandate another 
organisation to undertake the operation, such as the EU.  
Despite being an improvement on the current peacekeeping operation, the 
proposal contains a number of dangerous ambiguities. Most importantly, there is no 
need for a military operation on the ground – the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict was 
never heavily military in shape. A new security arrangement must work against the 
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artificial militarisation that has emerged since 1992. 100  Moreover, the area of 
deployment for the peace consolidation force is not defined in the paper. In order to 
move to demilitarise the conflict, the principle of the Security Zone must be 
abandoned. Normalised and free relations must be allowed between the banks of the 
Dnestr. Any new operation should have a free-ranging and mobile zone of 
responsibility throughout all Moldova. The Dutch paper also sets a 50 per cent limit 
for one single troop contributor. Discussions in the OSCE in the early 1990s over a 
possible operation in Nagorno-Karabakh had set a 30 per cent ceiling - there are good 
reasons for returning to the lower ceiling. Contrary to the Dutch proposal, a new 
security arrangement led by the EU, with Russia and perhaps Ukraine, and mandated 
by the OSCE, should have a civilian and police focus. The basic objective must be to 
promote the demilitarisation and normalisation of relations between the two parties.  
Second, the EU, in particular, should consider further measures to press the 
Transnistrian leaders towards settlement. These measures could include the freezing 
of Transnistrian assets in European and North American banks, as well as the 
institution of a EU-wide ‘refusal-to-deal’ with companies active on the left bank. In 
addition, the EU could offer technical support to the registration of Transnistrian 
firms in Moldova and assistance to their contribution to the state budget. Sticks must 
be combined with carrots to press and induce the Transnistrian leaders to settle the 
constitutional process. 
In addition, the EU and the US must continue to work with Ukraine to 
increase control over the 400km border between Moldova and Ukraine which lies 
beyond the control of Chisinau. Coordinated work between Brussels and Washington 
was instrumental in securing agreement to a Moldovan-Ukrainian customs protocol in 
May 2003. The precedent could be taken further with renewed focus on the Ukrainian 
border. In particular, the Moldovan proposal for internationally monitored joint 
customs points on the Ukrainian side of the border could be raised with Kiev. The EU 
and the US are well placed to push on this front, given Ukraine’s declared European 
aspiration and desire for NATO membership. With regard to Moldova’s other border, 
with Romania, the question of non-regularised relations between Moldova and 
Romania could be raised within a EU context.  
Fourth, within the framework of the ‘Wider Europe’ discussion, the EU should 
press forward with the development of a joint Action Plan in 2004. The development 
of closer ties between the EU and Moldova will provide vital support to President 
Voronin and counter-balance other sources of external pressure. In this respect, the 
international community should consider supporting the launch of an information 
campaign in Moldova to stimulate public debate on conflict solutions and the notion 
of federalism – the terms of the debate must be recaptured from the anti-federal view 
in order for a future agreement to stick with Moldovan society.  
Finally, the international community must seek the quickest possible 
fulfilment from Russia of its obligation to withdraw forces and equipment from the 
left bank. Failing the deadline of 31 December 2003, three-monthly extensions might 
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be considered within the OSCE. Pressure must be maintained to ensure this is 
completed early in 2004. 
 
 
Dilemmas  
 
There are three broad dilemmas complicating conflict settlement and the future of 
Moldova, which must be noted.  
First, might greater international/European support to Moldova in the 
settlement process actually derail the talks by stimulating greater Transnistrian (and 
Russian) obstructionism? How can this danger be offset?  
Second, would the creation of a ‘federated Moldova’ actually undermine 
Moldova’s desire for European integration by allowing the Transnistrian authorities 
too much say over political and economic developments in the state as a whole? How 
can a settlement be reached that preserves Moldova’s ‘European vocation’ while 
integrating the left bank? 
Finally, how can the Transnistrian authorities – and the Russian government - 
be convinced of the need to change the current security arrangements in a transitional 
period before a final political settlement? 
The answers to these vital questions remain unclear. 
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XI. MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE  
 
Alexander Rahr 
 
 
The new eastern border of the EU will present the West with different neighbours, 
from an increasingly authoritarian Russia, a stagnant and dictatorial Belarus, a divided 
Moldova, an uncertain Ukraine to the conflictual region of the South Caucasus. The 
EU is frightened by such instabilities and is actively seeking possibilities for conflict 
resolution. 
Recent policy statements stress the need of a joint European strategy towards 
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. While Belarus seems to be in a process of partial 
reunification with Russia and will be reluctant to cooperate with the EU, Moldova and 
Ukraine are eager to emancipate themselves from the dominant Russian neighbour by 
means of closer ties with the West. In other words, Russia’s former “near abroad” is 
now becoming the EU’s “near abroad”. 
Imminent NATO expansion and the EU enlargement will have a serious 
geopolitical impact on Moldova and Ukraine. Both countries are welcoming – and not 
resisting – the expansion of the Western military and economic structures to the 
former Soviet borders. Consequently, Chisinau and Kiev want ties to NATO and EU 
at the earliest possible stage. They will do their outmost, to convince their Western 
partners, through intensive and concrete cooperation, to be granted candidate or 
associate status certainly for EU membership in the nearest future.  
At the end of the 1990s, both countries formed – together with Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan – a new strategic alliance, GUUAM. Collaboration of the 
group generally included issues of security policy, but a close military cooperation, 
proposed by Baku, has not been favoured by Moldova. GUUAM was designed to 
become an alternative to the CIS, but got paralysed half-way through. Nevertheless, it 
may become an important regional partner of the EU and NATO, should the West 
position itself strategically beyond the Balkans. So far, there is no consensus inside 
the EU on such a move. However, the fragile security situation on the South-East 
European continent may require the extension of the Stability Pact for the Balkans to 
the Black Sea region and the Caucasus.  
The recent events in Georgia, which brought young pro-Western politicians to 
power through a velvet revolution, may now accelerate the rapprochement between 
EU and the Caucasus. The significance of GUUAM may grow. Energy flows from the 
Caspian Region to the West through the territories of transit countries such as Georgia 
and Ukraine may increase. Georgia’s radical orientation towards the US and the EU 
could facilitate similar steps in Ukraine and Moldova.  
Ukraine and Moldova have several opportunities to enhance their strategic 
cooperation with NATO and, particularly, the EU. They can assist each other on the 
way into the West. For example, Ukraine could take a stronger mediator role in the 
long-standing conflict over the separatist republic of Transdniester, which was a 
territorial part of the Ukrainian Republic in the early days of the Soviet Union. 
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Transdniester has become a vivid example of how business, crime, security services 
merged together with the state structures. The Transdniester conflict’s resolution is a 
new priority for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
 
 
Ukraine’s involvement in the Transdniester conflict 
 
The major threat for Moldova’s and Ukraine’s national security consists in the 
presence of the Transdniester conflict. While the international community, including 
the UN, has attempted to deal with this issue, it has chosen not to become militarily 
involved in Moldova itself. The UN preferred that Russian peacekeeping forces 
should be posted in Transdniester. The obligation of Ukraine to be another mediator 
in the settlement of the conflict and a guarantor of security of the parties became an 
important contribution to the resolution of this problem of international security.  
The most important issue between Ukraine and Moldova remains the 
settlement of the dispute. Ukraine is part of the tripartite mediating team, along with 
Russia and the OSCE. As Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said during a visit to 
Chisinau, “the Transdniester problem is important not only for Moldova … it is 
indisputably important for Ukraine, too, for we are interested to have a stable state as 
a neighbour.”  
 
 
Mediation and peacekeeping 
 
Moldova needs Ukraine’s assistance. All political forces in Moldova understand that 
Moldova’s territorial integrity is only guaranteed if Ukraine’s sovereignty is not 
questioned. Some Moldovian newspapers had suggested that Ukraine wants to push 
Russian peace-keeping troops from Transdniester and place its own troops in the 
separatist republic only for the reason of adding Transdniester to Ukraine’s territory. 
The risk of Ukrainian expansion into Transdniester was seen as a concern, particularly 
through the activities of Ukrainian nationalist movements such as UNA-UNSO in 
Transdnistria.  
However, Ukrainian politicians assured Moldova that Kiev needs Moldova as 
a solid partner in its desire to join the EU and as an ally in escaping Russian 
dominance inside the CIS. Both suffer heavily from their dependence on Russian 
energy. At the same time, Ukraine wishes to see Moldova’s territorial integrity also 
strengthened; a reunification of the neighbouring state with Romania is not in 
Ukraine’s interests (Kiev and Moscow had formerly shown solidarity in keeping 
Romania out of any mediator role between Chisinau and Tiraspol). Ukraine may have 
supported Transdniester’s special autonomous status in the face of a Romanian-
Moldovian rapprochement, but in the case of a further EU-enlargement Kiev will 
certainly push for membership of Transdniester as an integral part of Moldova in the 
EU. Thirty per cent of Transdniester population consists of ethnic Ukrainians and a 
civil war on the territory of Moldova would automatically draw Kiev into the conflict.  
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Under the 1999 OSCE accord, Russia had agreed to withdraw its tens of 
thousands of tons of military equipment and troops from Transdniester by the end of 
2002. But Moscow failed to observe the deadline. Russia is not interested in an 
ultimate settlement of the conflict in the region because it would deprive Russia of the 
levers of strengthening its military presence in the region. Such a presence is a way to 
keep an eye over Ukraine, which is the main political “rival” in the CIS. Russia has 
serious differences with Ukraine on many security issues, such as the latest Tusla 
conflict (following quarrels over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the status of 
Sevastopol). More than 52 percent of soldiers and sergeants of the 14th Army were 
recruited from the local population of the Transdniester Republic, which calls in 
question the very ability of the Russian contingent to stay neutral fulfilling peace-
keeping functions. Operative Groups of the Russian Army located in Transdniester 
are considered as “protection” for the Black Sea fleet dislocated in Sevastopol. Russia 
may think that without military forces in Transdniester and without infrastructure 
there, the presence of the Russian navy in the Black Sea could be jeopardized.  
Russia keeps its troops in Transdniester also for bargaining reasons, to 
negotiate benefit from the West in more important areas. Therefore, Moscow is 
unlikely to withdraw its troops and support the Ukrainian peace-keeping mission. But 
Russia reduced its forces in the security zone in 1997 from six to two battalions 
because the fulfilment of their functions required essential financial expenditures.  
Ukraine may regard the Russian troop presence at its Western borders 
negatively and as a risk for its own security. However, Kiev has, so far, remained a 
spectator in the Transdniester negotiations, not willing to challenge Russia, since it 
had neither capacity nor the political will to compete with Moscow on this issue. At 
the same time, Kiev has to protect the interests of the Ukrainian minority in Moldova 
in order to avoid an eventual process of the moving of the Ukrainian population to the 
country of their origin: that could trigger humanitarian problems. Ukraine also must 
have felt discomfort at its border with Moldova because illegal traffic and criminality 
causes problems for the population in the Western part of Ukraine.  
Ukraine was included in the tripartite mechanism at the initiative of Russia 
which wanted the negotiation mechanism to look less Russian. The Transdniester 
leaders were afraid of the prospect of a complete Russian withdrawal and preferred 
the Ukrainian peace-keeping forces over NATO-ones.  
In 1998, Kiev took a major step to push for Russia’s withdrawal. In March of 
that year, Ukraine initiated a meeting of the guarantors and conflicting parties who 
had signed the Memorandum on Principles of Normalisation of Relations between 
Moldova and Transdniester. The Odessa conference considered shrinking the security 
zone, the cut-down of peace-making units, decrease of check-points, and restoration 
of bridges destroyed during the armed conflict. However, the implementation of 
further arrangements on the unconditional withdrawal of military stocks and the 
destruction of additional arms were blocked by the Transdniestrian leaders. The latter 
demanded guarantees for the security of their “statehood” which Chisinau could not 
accept.  
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Ukraine promised to facilitate Russian troop withdrawal through its territory. 
Kiev and Moscow agreed on the principles of transit. Ukraine also agreed to provide 
necessary transport means for Russian troops and cargos. The agreement envisaged 
security measures during the transport and allowed Ukraine to control the moving of 
stocks, ammunition and military hardware. That, in turn, excluded the possibility of 
their “vanishing” in the territory of Ukraine. 
 
 
Trade and customs 
 
Sandwiched between Moldova proper and Ukraine, Transdniester has become an 
increasingly destabilizing factor not only for the region but also for European security. 
The separatists are producing and smuggling drugs, arms and human beings into 
Ukraine and Russia, which reportedly earns the Transdniester regime an estimated 
one billion US Dollars annually in illicit revenue.  
There is evidence that arms, smuggled from Transdniester, have ended up in 
the hands of international terrorist networks. Moldovan sources expressed the opinion 
that local Ukrainian officials were benefiting from the trade with Transdniester. The 
EU has repeatedly urged Ukraine to act against the contraband, if it wants better 
political and economic ties with the West. Ukraine had to support the economic 
blockade for Transdnistria under the pretext that companies from the separatist 
republic acted illegally and damaged Ukrainian interests. An idea had been voiced to 
implement a common custom space between Moldova and Ukraine that could 
positively influence the Transdniester conflict settlement as well, requiring Tiraspol to 
abandon the role of “customs abyss”. But Transdniester introduced a system of 
benefits in the trade relation with Ukraine. Many Ukrainian goods, imported into the 
Transdniester republic, were freed from duties. At the same time, the Transdniester 
authorities introduced custom barriers on goods imported from Molodova.  
In the past, the EU thought of using largely economic methods to solve the 
crisis. The existence of the separatist republic of Transdniester is largely dependent on 
its trade with Ukraine and transit of goods through Ukraine. A recent Ukrainian-
Moldovan accord forces the Ukrainian custom services to forbid products from 
Transdniester which are not registered in Chisinau to pass through Ukrainian territory. 
Goods manufactured in Transdniester are, under that blockade, not supposed to be 
transferred via Ukraine either. 
The EU wants Transdniester to adopt a more flexible attitude in its 
negotiations with Chisinau. But from the point of the Moldovan leadership, Ukraine 
hesitated to introduce tough actions. Moldova’s steps to suppress large-scale 
smuggling across the porous Ukrainian-Moldovan border at the segment controlled by 
the self-proclaimed Transdniester republic were necessary to stop the budget losses 
which Moldova suffered. The problem of deployment of Moldovian customs officers 
at joint Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossing points turned, however, into a political 
rather than technical issue. Relations between Kiev and Chisinau soured during this 
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dispute at the end of 2001. Even the presidents of both countries exchanged harsh 
statements accusing each other of interference in the other country’s internal affairs.  
Until today, both states do not have a free trade zone. Cross border 
cooperation is one of the areas in which effective transformation is possible and will 
be favourably perceived and supported by the EU. It stimulates economic growth and 
higher standards of living on both sides of the border and assists to improve 
conditions for the investment climate. Ukraine and Moldova could then be promoted 
into the European communication and transportation networks. The potential of cross-
border cooperation has been largely underexplored by Moldova and Ukraine while it 
could have become a major vehicle for reducing challenges and shocks of the 
emergence of new division lines between the enlarging EU and the non-accession 
countries.  
Taken together, the challenges have created the risk of marginalizing Ukraine 
and Moldova’s integration process into Europe.  
 
 
EU may ask Ukraine to take greater role 
 
The status of guarantor and peacekeeper considerably improved Ukraine’s image in 
the West, but also helped the West to use Ukraine as a counterweight against Russia’s 
dominance in Moldova. The further step of Kiev in the strengthening of its peace-
making mission is now to compete for the leading role in the operation. If the EU 
decides to activate its ESDP in the Transdniester crisis management, Ukraine will 
receive a historical opportunity to directly assist the West and make itself 
indispensable in a crucial peacekeeping operation directed towards stabilizing the 
eastern flank of the European continent. Ukraine has to pass the test whether it has the 
capacity and will to stabilise its neighbourhood or whether it becomes itself an 
element of instability. The latter development will close the door to EU and NATO. 
Ukraine could get a historical chance to emancipate herself from Russia in 
security affairs on the territory of the former USSR, a step which Kiev had been 
reluctant to do in the past 13 years since the demise of the Soviet Union. But Ukraine 
could strengthen its authority vis-à-vis EU and Russia simultaneously by positioning 
itself as a mediator between the EU and Russia in elaborating the terms of an ESDP-
engagement in Transdnistria. Ukraine could demonstrate its diplomatic skills and its 
adherence to European crisis management on a much larger scale than it has done so 
far in the Balkans and Iraq.  
It will, however, be difficult for Ukraine to play the role of honest broker, 
given the suspicion from Russia that Kiev is turning to become an advocate of 
Western interests on the post-Soviet space and given Western reluctance to see Russia 
and Ukraine moving closer to each other on security issues affecting Europe as a 
whole.  
Shortly before the OSCE meeting in Maastricht in December 2003, which had 
the Transdniester subject high on its agenda, Russia made an attempt to solve the 
Transdniester issue in its own way. In mid-November, Moscow put forward a plan 
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which called for Moldova to become an asymmetrical federation, with Moldova, 
Transdniester and the Gagauz region receiving the status of equal subjects. Russia 
then promised to demilitarize the federation. The official Moldovan government and 
the heads of the Transdniestrian republic seemed to have accepted the plan. It failed to 
materialise, however, because the OSCE and Ukraine were left completely at the 
sidelines of the peace process. Russia made an attempt to lock the ESDP out from that 
region. Russia wanted to stay in the area as main arbiter. The Russian plan was 
rejected by the EU on the grounds that it would “Transdniesterise” Moldova as a 
whole. 
The EU should develop a security partnership with Ukraine and Moldova 
within the new framework of the ESDP, which, of course, should not be directed 
against Russia but should incorporate Russia. The OSCE has, unfortunately, become 
weaker in its role as the main instrument of peace and stability in the post-Soviet 
space. The development of a ESDP-mechanism – more modern and up-to-date to the 
new realities of world politics – may suit the conflict solutions in Moldova and other 
states of the former USSR better. The ESDP can soon substitute the OSCE. 
 
 
Ukraine at a crossroads 
 
Ukraine faces presidential elections in the autumn of 2004 which will decide the 
future foreign political orientation of this country. Should the reformist camp under 
Victor Yushchenko win, Ukraine will almost certainly orient its diplomacy more 
towards EU and NATO. The West will give Ukraine new support for its economic 
reform policy. The prospects of integration with the West rather than with Russia will 
grow. However, Yushchenko’s victory is far from being assured. The camp of the 
present head of state and its powerful associates among business circles will do 
everything to prevent Yushchenko from taking over from Kuchma. Should the EU 
and NATO abandon Ukraine, it may orient itself to the “common economic space” – 
a renewed CIS consisting of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus.  
As long as Ukraine feels squeezed between the West and Russia and lacks the 
economic muscles to develop a stronger foreign policy, Kiev’s diplomacy also vis-à-
vis Moldova and other neighbouring states will be half-hearted and not decisive. 
Ukraine is a weak partner for the EU in the Transdniestrian conflict, at least at the 
moment. Kuchma’s stance makes it quite difficult for the West to determine where he 
really stands: firmly with the EU or in reality close to Russia.  
Ukraine should probably first develop the political will to be a real subject in 
the conflict resolution – a main actor in its own right – rather than a tool used by the 
West and Russia to balance each other. Ukraine could become a country which with 
skilful diplomacy might help to reconcile Russian and EU interests in the region.  
Ukraine gets a further chance to acquire EU and NATO membership by the 
end of the first decade of the new century. The question of Ukraine’s admissions will 
not be decided by the countries of the old Western Europe, but next time by the new 
EU-member states from East Central Europe. Will Ukraine benefit from the new 
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decision-making circumstances or will the East Central European states close the door 
for the integration of Ukraine in Western structures? 
As of today, one can assume that Ukraine will face a new “window of 
opportunity”. The East Central European states will feel more secure if Ukraine is part 
of an enlarged NATO. Although the old West and the new EU-member states will 
almost certainly face huge financial burdens during the first year of EU-expansion to 
the East, a reform-oriented Ukraine will not be treated as an alien in the bigger 
Europe. 
However, Ukraine continues to face most serious obstacles and challenges on 
its way to full-fledged integration. Many of them are home-made. The restructuring of 
Ukraine’s military forces has not shown positive results. The bureaucracy is still 
locked in former Soviet thinking. A proper civil-military relation, like in other 
applicant countries, has not been established. It is unimaginable that present Ukraine 
agrees to a joint air-control with Western powers. On the economic front too, many 
problems remain to make Ukraine a realistic candidate for EU-inclusion in the near 
future. 
As of today, unfortunately for Ukraine, the Schengen-regime is installed in 
East Central Europe to “protect” these countries from “challenges” coming from 
Ukraine. Illegal migration, drugs traffic, trade with human beings are threats which 
the EU today faces directly from countries like Ukraine.  
The Ukrainian elite do not know still what it means to be invited into NATO 
and receive applicant status for EU-membership. There is a dramatic lack of 
experience and also the political set-up of the country’s leadership hinders the 
integration processes. In Ukraine, the constitution had to be changed in order to open 
the way for Kiev into NATO and EU. Ukraine is dealing with NATO only through 
Partnership for Peace structures, which have to be improved, reformed according to 
the new requirements. There is an Action Plan between Ukraine and NATO, but Kiev 
is unwilling to proceed without a clear signal that membership is close. The same 
situation exists in the framework of Ukraine-EU co-operation within the Partnership 
and Co-operation Agreement (PCA). Only a radical rethinking of the leadership, like 
in Romania and Bulgaria in the second half of the 1990’s, can bring a breakthrough.  
Besides internal problems, a major stumbling block is Russia. Can Ukraine 
join NATO and EU against Russia’s will? Many experts doubt that Ukraine could 
preserve its internal stability in an atmosphere of hostility. As the Tusla-conflict in 
November 2003 has shown, border issues between Russia and Ukraine can still 
emerge anytime. In order to integrate Ukraine into NATO and EU, the West would 
have to accommodate Russia, i.e. to offer Russia something very important. 
It is difficult to forecast, how the security architecture of future Europe will 
develop over the next decades. Priority is given today – at all levels – to the 
preserving of the transatlantic strategic alliance, of which NATO is the principal 
element. However, the EU plans to establish the ESDP as a second major pillar of the 
old continent’s security architecture for the new century.  
It may be the case that by the time Ukraine joins NATO, the ESDP will have 
taken over many of the OSCE present tasks. Ukraine is therefore well advised to 
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focus its security agenda on all Western pillars. So far, Kiev has done little to move 
closer to ESDP. By doing so, Ukraine may gather additional support to restructure its 
security sector.  
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XII. UKRAINE’S REFORM ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
 
James Sherr 
 
 
‘Defence reform’ has become one of the orthodoxies of our time. It has also become a 
cliché, and like all clichés, it can be used to say very much or very little. The status 
quo in Ukraine threatens civic accord, national security and statehood. These dangers 
will remain unless the country’s force structures are transformed in function, 
capability and ethos. Transformation, not reform, is what is needed, and it is needed 
for three compelling reasons: 
• The security structures that Ukraine inherited from the USSR were not only 
unsuited to present day needs. In today’s context, their survival would be 
pathological because they were designed for purposes antithetical to those that 
are now so urgent: becoming a democratic state in spirit as well as form – and, 
in relations with neighbours and one’s own citizens, shifting from intimidation, 
pressure and coercion to a pattern of cooperation, dependability and trust. 
• If the process of transformation is confined to Ministry of Defence Armed 
Forces and not extended to other security and power structures, it will not only 
be incomplete, but distorted, and it will become a dangerous source of tension 
within the state. 
• Changing the character of security structures is inseparable from the broader 
enterprise of changing the relationship between state and society. The two 
processes cannot be insulated from one another. Stagnation and failure in one 
sphere corrupt and undermine what is achieved in the other. 
The term ‘reform’ also underestimates the magnitude of the challenge and the tenacity 
of the Soviet legacy that Ukraine has inherited. Overcoming this legacy demands will, 
courage, expertise and conviction. It also demands money. Yet even if these 
commodities become plentiful in the short term, the struggle will still be long term. It 
is essential that Ukraine’s partners in this enterprise have requirements and standards, 
but it is equally essential that they have knowledge and patience – and that they give 
credit where credit is due. 
 
 
Accomplishments 
 
Twelve years after the Soviet collapse, what has been done is less significant than 
what remains to be done. But what has been done is important, and the term 
‘accomplishments’ is by no means out of place. Failure to acknowledge these 
accomplishments by Ukraine’s partners merely adds fatalism and demoralisation to 
what is already a supremely difficult exercise. 
The fact that troops of the Soviet Armed Forces, MVD and KGB numbering 
1.4 million men were substantially reduced and thoroughly resubordinated – all of this 
without conflict and upheaval – was a contribution to European order second only to 
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the country’s unilateral nuclear disarmament. But it was an early and finite 
contribution, not an ongoing and dynamic one. Fortunately, such a dynamic has 
emerged (although it is repeatedly hampered and thwarted) and its potential is greater 
than it often appears to be. This is because a critical mass of state officials, security 
professionals and independent experts understand the dangers inherent in the Soviet 
legacy as well as the post-Soviet status quo. 
Their insights and apprehensions were well expressed in Ukraine’s first 
National Security Concept), drafted by the analytical staff of the National Security 
and Defence Council under the stewardship of its Secretary,Volodymyr Horbulin, and 
adopted by the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) in January 1997. The Concept assaulted 
the general war ethos (which has been inbred in the Soviet trained officer corps of 
Ukraine) by stipulating that in conditions where both state and society were weak, the 
prime security challenge would be to forestall and resolve local crises, emergencies 
and conflicts and prevent them from being exploited by actors (internal and foreign) 
with ulterior political ends. Proceeding from this analysis, the Concept identified ‘the 
strengthening of civil society’ as the first of nine security challenges for Ukraine. On 
19 June 2003, the Rada adopted an updated and far more detailed document, the Law 
on Foundations of National Security, which is the product of extensive interagency 
work. Less concise and focused than its predecessor, it nevertheless contains elements 
of wisdom and boldness, giving due attention to the connections between a distorted 
economy, dysfunctional bureaucracies, criminality and threats to the state. Both 
national security documents stress that ‘reform’ is an imperative for the entire security 
sector and not the Armed Forces alone. 
The State Programme of Armed Forces Reform and Development 2001-5 
(adopted in July 2000) represented the first serious step to give these principles 
definite content. Imprecise and unrealistic as some of the Programme’s aims and 
targets have been, they have been revised under pressure of expert criticism and 
unforgiving economic reality. The Programme was also supplemented by others, 
including the Concept of the Armed Forces 2010 and the State Programme of Armed 
Forces Transition Towards Manning on a Contract Basis. The current Defence 
Review, conducted in close consultation with NATO (and provisionally scheduled for 
completion in June 2004) is likely to iron out the inconsistencies and point the Armed 
Forces in an unequivocally clear (and realistic) direction. 
The standard Western response – ‘these are only programmes, what’s needed 
is action’ – partially misses the point. The pre-requisite for intelligent action is 
agreement about the nature of the problem and the answer to it. Unlike the operation 
of a market economy, national defence must be a planned activity. Failure to produce 
a tight correspondence between national security policy, military doctrine (the 
purpose and the priorities of armed forces) and military programmes (detailed 
schemes for their development) will lead to waste, confusion and, in the worst case, 
breakdown. In comparison to its former Soviet neighbours, Ukraine has shown a 
considerable degree of coherence, the fundamental aims and priorities of its defence 
policy are sound and the ethos behind it is increasingly Euro-Atlantic. It is impossible 
to reach this point until a lot of stereotyped thinking has been overcome. Whilst it 
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would absurd to say that a mental revolution has occurred in Ukraine’s Armed Forces, 
at least it has begun. 
A second, but closely related accomplishment is the NATO-Ukraine 
relationship. Well before the conclusion of a Charter on Distinctive Partnership (July 
1997), this relationship was unprecedented in scope and intensity for a non-member 
state. In contrast to the Russian Federation, Ukraine’s preoccupation has not been 
status, rights and a ‘seat at the table’, but the development of military-political and 
military-technical cooperation at working level. Several months after the adoption of 
the State Programme, Ukraine’s then Minister of Defence, Oleksandr Kuzmuk, stated 
that the aim of NATO-Ukraine cooperation was ‘to support defence reform in the 
country’. Today this is accomplished through several distinctive mechanisms, notably 
the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform. From 2001 Ukraine also became an 
active participant in NATO’s Planning and Review Process (PARP). Consistent with 
this ethos, the State programme of Armed Forces Reform and Development 2001-5 
was submitted to NATO Headquarters for review at the same time as it was submitted 
to President Kuchma, and both the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and the Defence 
Review have been developed in close consultation with NATO. This is an astonishing 
record for a military establishment which viewed (and to a fair extent still views) 
transparency as a threat to departmental interests and national security. 
 
 
Dilemmas 
 
The first of two key dilemmas is posed by Ukraine’s declaration of 23 May 2002, 
which states that the ‘ultimate goal’ of its policy is NATO membership. NATO is a 
collective defence organisation. Ukraine has based its policy and planning on the 
assumption that it might – and most probably will – be obliged to defend itself. 
National armed forces ‘closely resembling Euro-Atlantic standards and practice’ were 
already a stated aim of the State Programme 2001-5, yet these forces, with good 
reason, were designed to act independently and, if necessary, alone. Even before the 
adoption of this programme, Ukraine made a noteworthy if finite contribution to 
collective defence by assigning contingents of forces to NATO-led peace support 
operations – indeed by 2003 over 20,000 Ukrainian servicemen had served in peace 
support operations under the aegis of NATO or the UN – but these decisions were 
made in the context of a distinctly national defence policy. To what extent should this 
change if Ukraine advances beyond the stage of NATO-Ukraine Action Plan to 
Membership Action Plan? To what extent would any such change force revisions to 
current and projected command-and-control, force structures, procurement systems, 
training and career development – and at what cost? 
The considered answer inside Ukraine as well as NATO is that these changes 
should be evolutionary and as consistent as possible with current plans and 
programmes. The most authoritative scheme for these will emerge from the Defence 
Review, and it is no accident that this Review has been taking place in close 
consultation with NATO. There is no incompatibility between collective defence and 
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a robust national defence capability, and Alliance members have varied in their 
allocation of resources between the two. NATO’s assiduous fostering of Ukraine’s 
national defence capability was never intended to direct Ukraine down a path that 
would make membership unfeasible. To the contrary, Ukraine’s geographical position 
almost dictates that it provides the key contribution to its own defence even if it 
becomes a NATO member. To be sure, the collective guarantee provided by 
membership would decidedly alter (and presumably improve) the geopolitical context 
and even Ukraine’s definition of itself. But in straightforward military terms, it is 
likely to provide ‘value added’ rather than a replacement for national defence. 
The second dilemma is more radical and less forgiving. But it is also 
misunderstood in Ukraine. The State Programme and its sequential refinements were 
drawn up before two events which have significantly changed Ukrainian threat 
perceptions: the war on terrorism and, perhaps more dramatically, the so-called Tuzla 
crisis of autumn 2003, in which the Russian Federation set out unilaterally to resolve 
a long-standing border dispute by constructing a causeway under the protection of 
Ministry of Emergency Situation troops in the Kerch Strait – without, incidentally, 
incurring any public reproach on the part of NATO.101 Since 2000, the justification 
put forward by Ukraine’s MOD for force reductions (from 314,000 in 2001 to 
160,000 in 2005) has been twofold: economy and the nature of the threat.102 However, 
both justifications have been simplified and distorted in Ukraine. 
First, many in Ukraine wrongly equate economy with impoverishment and 
force reductions with a less capable force, whereas the clear emphasis by NATO and 
two Ukrainian Ministers of Defence has been modernisation and quality. Ukraine’s 
substantial military forces have been dangerously deficient in combat training and 
combat ready equipment, and maintenance of personnel, logistics, barracks and other 
facilities have until recently consumed 80-90 per cent of expenditure. There is no 
question that resources allocated for defence are grossly deficient. But would anything 
short of an economic miracle rescue a force of this size? 
Second, and understandably, the Tuzla crisis has been a rebuke to those who 
believe that Ukraine faces no threat of direct aggression in the foreseeable future. The 
combination of perceived Russian aggressiveness and perceived NATO indifference 
has led more than one respected commentator to call for a reconsideration of the 
fundamentals of defence policy and seriously ‘contemplate forceful resistance to a 
state whose military potential significantly exceeds that of Ukraine’. 103  But does 
Tuzla refute long-standing threat assessments or validate the long-standing view that 
local provocations and crises are distinctly possible and that ‘multi-component’ 
(MOD and non-MOD) capabilities are required to prevent the escalation of such 
crises into ‘regional war’? As long ago as 1997, the General Staff determined that the 
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 At the height of this crisis, Russia’s Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov spoke of the necessity to 
remove (ubrat’) Ukraine’s border troops and the Chief of the President’s Administration went so far as 
to state that if Ukraine resisted, Russia should ‘drop a bomb’. 
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 These are MOD figures released in November 2003.  Both quantify military personnel in MOD 
subordinated Armed Forces.  MOD civilian employees bring these totals to 415,800 (2001) and 
200,000 (2005).  The autumn 2003 totals were 288,600 servicemen and 94,400 civilians. 
103
 Valentyn Badrak, ‘The Right to Use Force’ [Pravo na silu] in Zerkalo Nedeli [Mirror of the Week], 
17 November, 2003. 
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role of Armed Forces in this schéma would be to ‘set up a zone which would make it 
possible to direct or influence the processes occurring outside it’. Although Ukraine’s 
then Minister of Defence, Army General Volodymyr Shkidchenko declared in 2002 
that ‘the probability of a large-scale and prolonged war is low’, he went on to say that 
‘transient, limited, possibly very fierce local interstate conflicts’ remain possible. 
There is nothing wrong with these assessments except Ukraine’s failure to act on 
them. 
 
 
Deficiencies 
 
Today, Ukraine’s military leadership is doing most of what can reasonably be done to 
transform the Armed Forces without money. As already noted, money will not 
overcome the harm caused by misguided policies, incoherent security concepts and 
flawed military programmes. But without money, even the best concepts and 
programmes are stillborn. Today the dynamics of modernisation, stagnation and decay 
are precariously balanced in the Armed Forces. Major General Valeriy Muntiyan, 
Assistant to the Defence Minister for Budget and Financial-Economic Activity, is 
convinced that without a sustained (and delivered) increase in financial support, ‘the 
Armed Forces have no more than five years til self-ruination’. 
The absence of money illustrates the core problem in a nutshell. For without 
real and sustained reform in the country, how can the army be financed? Today, 
Ukraine’s real GDP is probably twice the declared figure, but it is only declared (or 
discovered) income that is taxable. Who will declare income or pay taxes so long as 
the laws of the country discourage legal business, local bureaucracy strangles 
independent entrepreneurship, tax inspectors behave like pirates and judges consider 
themselves ‘practically defenceless’? Given these connections is it too much to hope 
that phrases about economic and political reform in the MOD’s Action Plan are not 
just eyewash for NATO, but an expression of self interest? 
Apart from money, the glaring deficiency in programmes of defence reform is 
that they focus on defence reform, rather than reform of the security structures as a 
whole. Today these structures include Internal Troops and a vast array of specialist 
forces within the domain of the MVS (Ministry of Interior) and militsia (police), the 
civilian and military components of the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), troops of 
the State Committee on Defence of the State Borders, Ministry of Emergency 
Situations, State Customs Service, Tax Police, and the Main Directorate for Struggle 
Against Organised Crime and Corruption. This one-sided focus on the Ministry of 
Defence (unwittingly perpetuated by PfP, which initially focused simply on the 
integration of armed forces) has already produced a schizophrenic security culture 
inside the country. Unless the problem is addressed, this schizophrenia – divergences 
in transparency, professional standards, working culture, corporate ideology and even 
geopolitical sentiment – has the potential to become a security problem in itself. 
The origin of the discrepancy between the MOD Armed Forces and the two 
core security structures, the MVS and SBU, continues to leave its mark. The USSR 
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Ministry of Defence was an all Union structure without analogues at Union 
Republican level. Unlike the Soviet Armed Forces, the MVD was organised strictly 
on territorial (republican) lines, and the KGB USSR had centralised analogues in each 
of the Union Republics. In the latter cases, the Soviet collapse left behind coherent 
structures; in the case of the Armed Forces it left ‘ruins and debris’. A second aspect 
of the Soviet legacy – ‘divide and rule’ – is also felt. Ukraine’s Armed Forces, like 
their Soviet predecessors, still do not have the right to conduct their own counter-
intelligence activity (which is performed by a department of the SBU, heir of the 
Third Chief Directorate KGB USSR). ‘Divide and rule’ is more conspicuously 
observed in the pronounced proliferation of security structures that has occurred since 
independence: a proliferation which the disbanding of the National Guard (December 
1999) still has not finally checked. Finally, a third and most damaging aspect of this 
legacy, the ethos and working culture of these entities, has undergone only limited 
transformation. In the USSR the KGB and MVD functioned as instruments of 
administrative control over society. In post-totalitarian conditions, their successors are 
widely perceived as instruments of ‘influence’ and pressure. In themselves, these 
perceptions are enough to undermine the ‘long term’ aspirations articulated in 
Ukraine’s declaration of 23 May 2002,  
Contemporary socio-political differences have compounded these historical 
ones. The roles of the Armed Forces are to defend state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, insulate the country from external conflicts and, in the worst case, defend 
the country against external opponents. In sum, they are not a component of internal 
political struggle. Yet the military and civilian components of the other structures (not 
to say militsia) are on the cutting edge of the relationship between state and society 
and subject to all of its strains and distortions. For this reason, the importance of 
securing a proper level of funding – and thorough transparency about where funds 
originate and who they reach – cannot be overestimated. If the state cannot fund 
militsia, border guards, customs officers and tax police, somebody else will. No one 
should be surprised when these professionals lose their professionalism and become 
entrepreneurial with the powers they have at their disposal. In member states of the 
European Union, the connection between business and ‘power structures’ is virtually 
nil. Today, such connections are rightly taken for granted in Ukraine. 
Given these discrepancies, the third discrepancy – the NATO-Ukraine 
relationship – has not always diminished these contradictions.  With the significant 
exception of the MChS (Ministry for Resolving Emergency Situations and the 
Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe), NATO simply has not established the 
networks and ‘habits of cooperation’ with non-MOD bodies analogous to those it has 
established with the Armed Forces. Since NATO began to recognise this deficiency in 
about 1999 (and more emphatically since 11 September 2001), Ukraine’s border 
troops and customs service have indicated genuine openness to such cooperation (and 
with the EU as well). But elsewhere, the response to such overtures has been formal 
and formalistic. 
How will Ukraine’s three Operational Commands be able to direct ‘multi-
component operations’ without training, standards and levels of cooperation that are 
Harmonie Papers No.17 
 
 137 
truly joint? Will Ukraine be able to resolve (and hopefully avoid) complex 
emergencies without a common working culture and common language between 
MOD armed forces and other force structures or without a basis of trust between them, 
local civilian authorities and society at large? Is trust, not to say proper financing and 
accountability, possible to secure when budgets and staffing levels of many of these 
bodies are treated as state secrets and programmes of reform – those that exist – 
remain unpublished? 
 
 
Two remaining challenges 
 
Ukraine not only inherited power structures from the USSR, but a culture of 
administration. The question is whether this culture and its norms and practices 
continue to serve Ukraine’s interests. The administrative culture of most NATO states 
is radically different. This difference should not lend itself to mindless imitation, but 
it needs to be considered. In NATO Headquarters and many national defence 
ministries, much policy is initiated and much of it made at mid level by committees: 
committees that are civil-military and interdepartmental in composition, with access 
to most information relevant to their responsibilities. In the experience of these 
NATO members, the result has been a clear relationship between ideas from below 
and directives from above. This style of decision making helps to break down 
departmental barriers and knit institutions together. It also helps to ensure that 
decisions are implemented swiftly and intelligently, because subordinates have 
participated in the process and have enough information to know what they are doing 
and why. This approach, centres on increasing the horizontal integration of 
institutions. It is in plain contrast to the Soviet approach to administrative problems, 
now revived by President Putin: strengthening the ‘administrative vertical’. It is far 
from clear that the latter approach offers the best route to improving the motivation of 
individuals and the performance of institutions.  
A second and related issue is the information sphere, a sphere of activity 
rightly given prominence in Ukraine’s 1997 National Security Concept and since. But 
are the challenges correctly understood? The widespread term ‘global information 
order’ suggests that they are not. The fact is that a ‘global information order’ does not 
exist. Information disorder exists. In these conditions, a shrewd information policy 
will aim not to suppress information, but to create trust.  This is not because 
information cannot be suppressed. It can. But even within one’s own country, one will 
never suppress enough, and the mere act of suppressing it, which cannot be disguised, 
fans distrust, even when trust in the state becomes vital to its survival: when in the 
words of President Kuchma, it is essential that ‘people pull together at a critical 
moment’. Should one need to remind Ukrainians of the consequences of the Soviet 
regime’s attempts to suppress information about the Chernobyl catastrophe? 
Moreover, outside one’s own country, one will hardly be able to suppress 
information at all. If Ukrainian authorities and news media do not provide full and 
timely information about military accidents, environmental disasters, banking 
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scandals and arms smuggling, then other interested parties certainly will, and these 
parties might not have Ukraine’s interests at heart. Already, a large amount of ‘facts’ 
that appear about Ukraine in Western newspapers comes from Russian sources. Many 
of these Russian sources – official, semi-official and ‘private’ – are so forthcoming, 
so ‘comfortable to deal with’, and Ukraine’s official sources so defensive and 
irritating to deal with, that a number of Western journalists simply have acquired the 
habit of consulting the former rather than Ukrainians about what is happening in 
Ukraine. Here, too, there is a historical reason for this discrepancy. Ukraine never 
experienced a ‘Gorbachevian revolution’. Of course, the Gorbachevian revolution 
failed. But it produced a whole new class of people who knew that the USSR was 
losing the information struggle and knew why it was losing it. This class and its 
descendants understand the competitive and disordered conditions in which 
information is produced, exchanged and believed. It was overwhelmingly Russian, 
not Ukrainian, and today it serves Russia. Instead of such a class of ‘information 
technologists’, Ukraine has a corps of journalists, analysts and professionals who 
believe in the truth. But today they are regarded as a threat by the state authorities, 
rather than an asset. Until this changes, Ukraine’s ‘information policy’ will continue 
to damage Ukraine’s interests. 
In conclusion, the transformation of defence structures has become a reality in 
Ukraine, and an influential network of professionals and experts have devoted their 
careers and souls to sustain it. The challenges to be confronted are formidable. The 
first of these is resources: in the short term, securing enough finance to limit 
stagnation and prevent ‘ruination’; in the long term, securing the social, economic and 
political preconditions for long-term finance. The second challenge is to extend this 
transformation to the wider security sector. This challenge is directly connected to the 
most important challenge of all: diminishing the gap between state and society in 
Ukraine.  
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XIII. UKRAINE: REFORM ISSUES AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
 
Grigoriy Perepelitsya  
 
 
With a new international security architecture actively forming, the most significant 
imperative of which is partnership and cooperation, in Ukraine as elsewhere special 
attention is paid to the enlarging NATO and European Union as the key international 
structures in Europe. The basis of this process is a natural striving of European states 
to join a unified Europe. Security-Sector Reform should proceed in the context of 
Euro-Atlantic integration.  
The second round of NATO’s enlargement to the East, as well as the first one, 
answers the main strategic interests of Ukraine and creates very good incentives for 
security-sector reform to promote Ukrainian integration to the European economic 
and political structures, as well as security structures offering security guarantees. 
Neighbourhood with new NATO members gives new possibilities for 
Ukrainian integration to the European security structures. It will lead to closer 
cooperation of Ukraine and NATO as well as other European structures. Moreover, 
NATO will be extremely interested in maintaining Ukrainian independence, and that 
is why it will have to provide political support and render assistance for Kiev’s 
joining European political and economic structures. 
The second stage of NATO enlarging should add to the stability and security 
at the south-western borders of Ukraine. If NATO’s enlarging also means spreading 
stability through Central and Eastern Europe, then joining this process by Ukraine, 
that strives to be in the European collective security system, is absolutely natural.  
The second stage of NATO enlarging also means its transformation from a 
military organisation to an organisation that protects democratic values. Thus, despite 
the disputes between European members of NATO and the USA, both will need this 
organisation. For Europeans NATO alongside the European Union is still a key 
institution of new political Europe. 
Ukraine has created the ground for cooperation with NATO and the EU. But 
now there must be other actions. Conditions require a new concept that should help 
transition from deepened cooperation to membership. Unfortunately Ukraine lacks 
agreed political strategy and tactic of getting membership. The Alliance cannot 
expand forever. To be quick is therefore of great importance. The international 
environment changes so dynamically that Ukraine is already late with applying to join 
NATO. There are no reasons for Ukraine to wait 20 years. It is of extreme importance 
to accelerate the process and start reforms necessary for Euro Atlantic integration in 
order to win favour at the NATO summit in 2004.  
During the last meeting of the Ukraine – NATO commission on 3-4 June 2003 
in Madrid, NATO Secretary General Robertson stated that from the beginning of the 
year there was done a lot to overcome the absence of trust from the part of the NATO 
to Ukraine. The meeting also noted shortfalls in accomplishing by Ukraine the Action 
Plan “Ukraine-NATO” as well as the Tasks Plan for 2003. These concerned the 
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military components of the plan such as insufficient investment, lack of qualified staff, 
inadequate foreign language training, and delays in forming of civil structures in the 
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. It is not random that NATO pays significant attention 
to the military component. After all, as Mr. Robertson stated, “reforms in the defence 
and security sphere are the fundamental basis for Ukrainian reaching of its strategic 
goal – Euro Atlantic integration”. 
Generally the Action Plan implementation provides for Ukraine approaching 
the criteria of gaining NATO membership. So there is the question to what extent 
Ukraine has met these criteria at this moment in comparison with other candidates for 
entry. Future members should satisfy the basic principles, implemented in the 
Washington Pact, such as democracy, human freedoms and other correspondent 
conditions. In general Ukraine meets most of the criteria as to NATO entering. 
However, the country has significant problems as to some: 
• Abiding to the principles of law and respect for human rights; 
• Establishing proper democratic and civil control over its armed forces; 
• Keeping the course of reinforcing stability and prosperity by observing 
principles of economic liberty, social justice and responsibility for 
environment preservation; 
• Demonstrating an ability to make its own military contribution to 
collective defence as well as to implement new tasks, and readiness to 
take liability for gradual improvement of its defence ability; 
• Accomplishing standardisation and achieving interoperability. 
As far as purely military criteria are concerned, the main problems fall under at least 
two headings. A reform in the defence and security sphere is exactly intended to make 
Ukraine closer to these criteria.  
The problems are explained mainly by the very limited number of officers of 
new European generation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as by restricted 
budget allocations for reinforcing. The main direction for improving the state of 
Armed Forces’ financing is reducing the quantity of Armed Forces, outdated 
armaments and infrastructure without cutting the share of GDP allotted for the 
military budget.  
Progress towards standardisation and interoperability is at a very early stage. It 
is possible to say about definite changes only concerning the interoperability of forces 
and means that are allotted for taking part in common action for peacekeeping. The 
main problem is the absence of decisive actions from the state and military leadership 
as to raising the Armed Forces to NATO standards. Moreover, the military-technical 
policy of Ukraine is aimed at preserving a monopoly of Russian armaments as well as 
military technology on its internal market. Requirements are planned in perspective to 
accomplish just with Russian options of armament as well as military equipment from 
domestic production made in cooperation with Russian enterprises and companies. 
Russia will be given priority also in modernisation of all kinds of arms equipment of 
the Ukraine Armed Forces.  
So the top-priority tasks of reforming defence sector in the context of Ukraine 
integration to NATO should be completion of a defence review and realisation of the 
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tasks stated in the Action Plan of Ukraine – NATO. The next important step is to 
launch an intensive dialogue as to membership in NATO and joining the Membership 
Action Plan process in order to start the definite preparation for entering NATO. After 
this, preparation requires the following: 
• completing and producing the recommendations of the “Defence review”; 
• changing information policy in Ukrainian mass-media concerning NATO’s 
image; 
• taking diplomatic actions in NATO countries in order to form a positive 
international attitude as to Ukraine entering the Alliance; 
• strengthening the state border and signing with the European Union an 
Association Accord; 
• reinforcing control over Russia’s military presence and creating 
preconditions for withdrawal from Sevastopol; 
• elaborating and attaining NATO standards in the sphere of control over air 
space; 
• standardisation of communications and procedures in order to achieve 
operational alignment; 
• optimisation of the structure and function of the military organisation of the 
state; 
• establishing a well-balanced system of military industrial cooperation; 
In addition, the country must execute economic and political reforms that are able to 
provide prosperity and stability, without which Ukraine cannot be a valuable member 
that deserves trust. Among the main demands of NATO are forming a democratic 
society inside a country and establishing democratic civil control over its security and 
defence sector.  
Ukraine assumes definite enough liabilities in relations with NATO and the 
EU as to implementation of democratic control over the National Armed Forces. 
These liabilities are fixed in such international texts as: the framework document of 
the “Partnership for peace” programme and the Charter of strategic partnership 
between Ukraine and the European Union.  
Such international support has pivotal importance for civil society 
development and implementation of democratic civil control over the Armed Forces 
in Ukraine. Given the course of Ukraine towards expanding international cooperation 
in the security sphere it can be expected that civil control will progress in Ukraine.  
As NATO and EU expand towards Ukrainian borders the attention to civil 
control over the security and defence sector of the country will grow. Yet civil 
structures are only slowly forming within the military organisation. The appointment 
of E.K. Marchuck as minister is the first significant contribution to forming civil 
structures in the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. But the problem here is on the one 
hand lack of competence of civil experts in the security sphere, on the other hand 
distrust to civil leadership from the side of professional militaries. Also there is a lack 
in Ukraine of experienced political managers who are educated and skilled enough in 
the military sphere, who have experience of state administration and who constitute a 
loyal elite. We also need civil experts in the sphere of defence and security.  
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We have not enough political support of the Armed Forces in political parties, 
civil organisations, and independent mass media. There is low trust from the side of 
militaries concerning the competence of civilians in the defence sphere. So a majority 
guessed that appointment of the civilian minister will not influence on the state of the 
Armed Forces positively. Although simultaneously many expect that he will be able 
more suitably to represent the Armed Forces and country: as political administrator, to 
present and protect the interests of the Armed Forces in the Rada and Government; 
and to exert effective control over discipline in the Armed Forces. For the most part 
militaries treat political leaders as temporary figures. There is little public discussion 
of military problems both from the side of militaries and politicians themselves and 
from the side of society.  
The main job of the civilian minister and of civil control, in the militaries’ 
opinion, is to protect their social rights and interests, enhance the prestige of military 
service, elaborate and implement decisions aimed at reinforcing military security of 
the country. Ukraine considers civilian appointments to the key positions inside force 
structures as well as conditions of their work as important to the making of well-
weighed, well-founded and well-balanced decisions. However, formal staff 
appointments are not the same as creating the integrated system of democratic control 
in the state bodies of the security and defence sphere. For this problem civilian 
leadership is not enough. The appointment of a civil man as defence minister still 
does not provide civil control over the Armed Forces, because there are still the same 
militarised structures as existed under a military minister.  
That is why it is also necessary to establish in force departments balanced 
proportions between civil people and military staff as well as definite differentiation 
of their authorities and functions, plus educative programmes regarding security 
matters for civil personnel.  
The significant condition of establishing civil control over force departments 
already has its legal basis. The Law “About democratic civil control over military 
organisation and law-enforcement agencies” of 19 July 2003, is the important act. 
According to this law validity and appropriateness of applying armed forces inside 
and outside the country, as well as issues of export and import of armaments, military 
technical cooperation, conversion and privatisation of defence enterprises, 
programmes for armed forces and law enforcement agencies development and others 
are subject to civil control.  
Such control can be exercised both through public organisation and elected 
representatives, and also by private application to the Human Rights Commissioner of 
the Supreme Council of Ukraine or other state bodies on the basis of other legislation. 
Thus, both state bodies and civil institutes participate in control over the defence and 
security sector.  
The Constitution of Ukraine forbids using the Armed Forces of Ukraine as 
well as other formations with the aim of restricting citizens’ rights and freedoms or 
with the aim of destroying constitutional order, removing power bodies or creating 
obstacles for their activity. According to the Constitution there is also not permitted 
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establishing and activity of organisational structures of political parties. 104  The 
principle of apolitical Armed Forces is stated also in the Law “About social and legal 
protection of militaries and members of their families.” 
 One more important element of the legislative base of security policy of 
Ukraine was the Law “Concerning basis of national security of Ukraine”, passed on 
19 June 2003.  
“According to this Law the Strategy of national security of Ukraine and 
Military doctrine of Ukraine are elaborated and approved by the President of Ukraine, 
and by them the guidance principles of military establishment, as well as activity 
directions of the state power bodies in particular circumstances are defined with the 
aim of timely finding, removing and neutralisation of real and potential threats to the 
national interests of Ukraine. The strategy of national security of Ukraine and Military 
doctrine of Ukraine are the documents that are obligatory for fulfilling and serve as 
the ground for elaborating definite programmes in correspondence with components 
of state policy of national security.” 
The Law contains a general description about basic definitions and grounds 
for establishing a Ukrainian national security system. Along with this there has been 
formed the list of definite national interests of Ukraine and threats to these interests. 
There are defined in the Law basic definitions, legal mechanisms of identification of 
national interests and threats of vital importance, and the system of national security 
and mechanisms of its guidance, democratic control over subjects of its providing and 
other important issues that require legalisation are strictly defined.  
The military doctrine must be consistent both with the basic Law and the 
Strategy of national security. In the process of elaborating conceptual documents in 
the sphere of national security and defence civilian people take an active part; they are 
domestic and foreign experts, representatives of scientific circles, deputes, leaders of 
political parties. Such wide representation of civil society allows consideration of 
topics that are included in the drafts fully, permits estimation, and links militaries and 
government from one side and society from the other.  
However, this legislative base is still not sufficiently provided with a system 
of normative documents that regulates the decisions on definite issues in this sphere. 
Imperfection of this normative base is one of the reasons for the low efficiency of 
civil structures’ activity as well as activity of civil officials in the force departments of 
Ukraine. Because frameworks of the civil personnel activity and its relationship with 
militaries are not regulated by such normative acts there are rather often tensions and 
disputes inside these force departments. Hence, the issues of the top-priority as to 
enhancing the role of civil officials over military structures are the following:  
• Elaborating and approving the structure of the civil bodies in the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine and the quantity of civil personnel there;  
• Defining the authority of the (civilian) Defence Minister and his deputes;  
• Working out the documents that regulate the procedure of appointment of 
civilian personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.  
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The reasons why these are important is explained in the following paragraphs. 
In Ukraine there is also the necessary institutional base for the national security 
system. It consists of both nongovernmental organisations and governmental bodies 
of different power branches: legislative, judicial and executive. All these bodies are 
civilian by nature and structure. The most developed part of this institutional base are 
the executive power bodies. The pivotal place among them belongs to the Council of 
National Security and Defence of Ukraine (CNSD). The CNSD has functions and 
authority which are definitely regulated by the Constitution and laws, as well as 
mechanisms for managing the national security system. In general this system cannot, 
however, work constantly and efficiently relying just on one body and without proper 
participation in the process of the components of civil control of other power 
structures of legislative and judicial power.  
Such limited nature can lead to the substitution of democratic principles with 
the authoritarian methods of control over force structures, when civil ministers and 
civil personnel of force structures can be appointed just according to the principal of 
personal devotion to the President or loyalty to the party, the leaders of which belong 
to the President’s entourage.  
Another problem of implementation of democratic control over the security 
sphere is control over intelligence service and special forces’ activity. This problem is 
of a big concern even for parliamentarians of the countries with developed European 
democracy. The secret character of intelligence departments’ activity does not allow 
parliaments and society to exert proper control over them. The problem of no less 
importance is the power structures freedom to act as they want inside a country. 
Under the conditions of transition such uncertainty can create a real threat to 
democracy.  
The implementation of civil control in the security and defence sphere is 
significantly complicated by lack of civil society structures in Ukraine. This impacts 
the process of political parties forming and assumption by them of the interests of 
different social sections of the country’s population.  
The point is that there is no full-fledged party system in Ukraine, which could 
present the interests of civil society in the state power bodies. Proceeding from this, 
political parties do not bear any political responsibility to society, as well as for its 
turn the government cannot be accountable to parties represented in the Parliament.  
The mechanism of effective civil control from the side of society can be 
exerted only when its interests in the Parliament will be represented by the ruling 
political party or ruling coalition, which would bear political responsibility for the 
Government’s activity, including activity of civil ministers of force departments. In 
Ukraine there is no such pivotal political precondition.  
Thus, at this moment we should work a lot at making the system of democratic 
control over security and defence sphere meet the criteria of civilized countries.  
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XIV. UKRAINE: THE ARMED FORCES AND BEYOND 
 
Oleksiy Melnyk and Leonid Polyakov  
 
 
Transparency and democratic accountability in the functioning of security structures 
are essential elements in the maintenance of a democratic society, such as the one that 
Ukraine is aspiring to build. When equipped with undistorted knowledge, individual 
citizens – who are naturally concerned with ensuring their own security and that of 
their society and their state – can effectively hold government authorities and security 
structures accountable for providing that security. A high level of transparency limits 
the chances for abuse of power, enhances the responsibility of security authorities, 
and therefore increases the effectiveness of the security structures they oversee. 
Therefore, it should be no surprise that progress in Ukraine's security sector 
reform (SSR) has been noticeably dependent on the achieved level of transparency 
and overall democratic development. The case of Ukrainian SSR also demonstrates 
that the progress of reform in each individual security structure depends 
predominantly on the level of democratisation in that institution – transparency, 
accountability, and introduction of effective civilian democratic control. The most 
successful examples of reform can be found in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which 
are more transparent and, consequently, more trusted by the population. The major 
non-military structures – principally the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security 
Service of Ukraine – remain basically unreformed from the time of their creation in 
the early 1990s. The result is a considerable gap in the development and reform of 
military and non-military security structures105. 
Fortunately for Ukraine, its SSR problems have received particular attention 
from democratic organisations like NATO and the European Union, whose 
enlargement to Ukrainian borders is providing a generally positive effect. Through 
practical assistance for reforms and regular feedback mechanisms, NATO has 
contributed to the establishment of international norms for military planning, force 
restructuring, and democratic control in the Armed Forces. EU efforts have been 
primarily limited to supporting the reform of Ukraine’s Border Service. However, 
overall the attention of NATO and the EU to the operation of Ukraine’s non-military 
security structures has been declarative rather than practical. 
When considering the prospects for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and 
associated SSR requirements, it is significant that the reform priorities declared by 
NATO and the EU coincide with those of Ukraine’s population. In setting 
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 For simplicity, this article uses the western concept of ‘military’ as meaning ‘national Armed 
Forces’ and ‘non-military’ as all other security services. However, the official Ukrainian classifications 
are more complicated. For example, Ukraine’s Security Service (inherited by the country from former 
Soviet KGB) simultaneously performs law-enforcement, political intelligence/counterintelligence and 
military counterintelligence missions. It also contains paramilitary contingents with employees having 
the legal status of military servicemen. The Ministry of Internal Affairs also includes paramilitary 
Interior Troops whose personnel wear military uniform and are legally considered as military, in 
addition to structures like criminal police, traffic police etc., whose employees have a rank structure 
and uniform similar to those of the military, but do not have legal military status.  
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requirements for candidates, both organisations focus on security primarily in terms of 
upholding the rule of law, human rights, social justice, and citizens’ well-being. As 
these are the same issues that concern Ukrainian citizens, efforts to expand SSR well 
beyond defence to include law-enforcement structures will likely receive considerable 
public support.  
Thus, there are good grounds to expect that the dual EU and NATO 
enlargements will have a positive impact on the speed and depth of Ukrainian SSR, 
on the condition that enlargement is accompanied by a further qualitative 
strengthening of both organisations’ security co-operation with Ukraine.  
 
 
Military dimension of SSR in Ukraine 
 
The first attempts at military reform in Ukraine – in the early to mid-1990s – were 
hampered by a lack of experience in state building, a poor legislative basis, vague 
political objectives, a lack of qualified experts at the state level, and continued Soviet-
style thinking. As a result, these first efforts at reform basically sought to rebuild 
Soviet-style forces and structures on a smaller scale. It took years for the political and 
military leadership to realise that the Soviet military heritage of some 800,000 
military personnel and thousands of tanks, personnel carriers, artillery pieces and 
aircraft was more of a liability than an asset.  
The early approach to military reform was also conditioned by the overall 
political and economic realities of the new Ukrainian state. During the early years of 
Ukraine’s independence, the principal focus of attention was on control of those non-
military security sector institutions that were capable of influencing internal political 
and economic competition. As the military sector was not a principal priority in this 
respect, Ukraine’s political elite concentrated its efforts on the subordination of 
military formations – removing them as a political factor – rather than reforms that 
would have addressed the real needs of the Armed Forces and defence policy. This 
neglect was assisted by the non-existent role of civil society in the early 1990s, which 
prevented the Armed Forces’ popularity in society from significantly influencing the 
political agenda. 
National priorities continued to shift as time passed: from control over military 
formations and the establishment of formal signs of national sovereignty in 1991-92 
to problems of the economic survival of the nation in the years that followed. 
Ukraine’s mighty internal potential rapidly disappeared due to the absence of 
effective economic reforms, and from 1991 to 1995 GDP dropped by almost 50 per 
cent. In the absence of a direct military threat, the authorities and public focused on 
other sectors, such as the political, economic, social and energy sectors.  
In the face of neglect and apathy, in the 1990s Ukrainian military was 
basically left to reform itself as it saw fit, within the framework of shrinking budgets. 
The failure to make sufficient reductions in force structure in the face of declining 
resources led to a situation where over 80 per cent of the MoD budget was (and still is) 
spent on the maintenance of personnel, leaving little left for either investment or 
maintaining the readiness of current forces. Faced with budget cuts, downsizing, and 
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operational fuel shortages under conditions of a deteriorating economy, combat 
training was reduced below minimum required levels, resulting in force readiness 
below minimum requirements. This not only affected national security, it also 
affected safety within the Armed Forces, as demonstrated by a number of fatal 
accidents involving the military.  
In recent years, however, these developments have elicited a growing concern 
on the part of Ukrainian society, particularly coming against the background of the 
deteriorating international security situation. This concern, combined with the 
traditionally high level of popular trust enjoyed by the military (see Diagram 1) and 
the increasing activity of civil society, has the real potential to facilitate meaningful 
actions in military reform. 
 
DIAGRAM 1 
Level of full support for the activities of state institutions by Ukrainian citizens 
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
Nov
2001
Jan
2002
Feb
2002
March
2002
May
2002
June
2002
Aug
2002
Sep
2002
Oct
2002
Nov
2002
Dec
2002
Feb
2003
March
2003
Apr
2003
June
2003
Aug
2003
Sept
2003
Armed Forces
Security Service
Police
President
Government
 
Thus, even given the weakness of Ukraine’s democratic institutions, the 
country’s media, NGOs and the population at large have begun to develop a rather 
vocal and critical public debate on issues of defence reform. These “public” factors 
are complemented by “government” factors: the interest of certain elements of the 
Ukrainian military establishment in reforming itself (in contrast to non-military 
security structures), declarative support on the part of authorities, and a low appetite 
for political interference. As a result of this convergence of factors, the growing 
public debate will very likely contribute to producing positive results.  
In the 2000-2002 period the critical mass of the above factors, plus the 
available experience of Ukraine’s more successful neighbours to the West, prompted 
the Ukrainian authorities to take a number of strategic decisions that could be 
considered steps in the right direction: setting the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force 
as a priority; promoting a change to professional (i.e. contract) service; and, most 
importantly, setting the ambitious strategic goal of joining NATO in the future. These 
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have been accompanied by practical achievements: the accumulation of experience 
through participation in international peacekeeping operations and international 
military co-operation; modest successes in developing capabilities in some “low-cost” 
areas (e.g. CBR protection, combat engineering and transport aviation); and the 
gradual accumulation of experience from the country’s own attempts to reform. 
The decision to seek NATO membership has provoked a more intensive 
reform process. The creation of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan/Target Plan, which 
includes specific SSR objectives, was a key first step. However, the Action 
Plan/Target Plan’s impact is limited by their generally declarative contents and by a 
Ukrainian approach that focuses on targets as specific, limited steps to be taken, rather 
than as a part of a systemic transformation.  
The need for systemic transformation can be readily seen in the area of 
developing military interoperability. Ukraine’s current approach is to train specific 
units to NATO standards in preparation for specific events. However, these standards 
conflict with the Soviet-era standards and procedures still used for regular combat 
training. While some initial steps have been made – for example, the Ukrainian 
National Defence Academy has well-established Multinational Staff Officer’s courses 
and is adding courses in Euro-Atlantic Integration – for the most part there has been 
no systemic review of curricula and training at military education institutions. The 
side-by-side existence of two standards – NATO and Soviet – causes systemic 
tensions that waste resources and reduce overall effectiveness. 
Unfortunately, lessons learned from defence reform efforts – as shown by the 
evolution of reform programmes such as the ‘State Programme of Reformation and 
Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through 2005’ (adopted in 2000) to the 
‘Concept for the Structure of the Armed Forces-2010’ (adopted in 2001); and the 
‘State Programme of Transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Manning with 
Contracted Servicemen’ (adopted in 2002) – have yet to address the need for systemic 
transformation, focusing instead on quantitative factors (and step-by-step reductions 
to ever-shrinking targets). As a result, current plans are still unrealistic. Technological 
advance means that the cost of military equipment for a given sized force doubles in 
price every 7-10 years, while the early stages of personnel reductions and all stages of 
professionalisation require considerable additional financial resources. Such factors 
have been ignored for many years in allocating funds to the national defence budget. 
As a result, even under the most optimistic scenario of economic development, 
Ukraine will not be able to afford 240,000 servicemen (as stipulated in the ‘Concept 
for the Armed Forces-2010’), or even 180,000-200,000 (according to the latest 
declarations of the Defence Ministry) if it also wishes to meet its goals for 
maintaining a high level of combat readiness and developing professional Armed 
Forces. The goal of creating a professional Rapid Reaction Force (with about 40,000 
servicemen) may be a realistic goal, but only if a more radical reduction of the 
remainder of the military – the Main Defence Forces – takes place in the very near 
term. 
Fundamentally, reform can only succeed if it can get in front of the current 
cycle of step-by-step reductions and ever-thinner distribution of scanty resources. The 
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Ukrainian authorities have recently made promising declarations, but the associated 
actions are still inconsistent or non-existent. What is needed is a concentration of 
resources and consistency of reform measures, founded on strong political will and 
clear definition of priorities.106 But in the absence of a direct and visible large military 
threat, the country’s leadership, which is concerned primarily about short-term 
political issues, is unlikely to become sincerely concerned about addressing long-term 
issues related to military reform. Two factors that could overcome this lack of interest 
are pressure either from the Ukrainian public and civil society and/or from Ukraine’s 
democratic partners in the West. However, the ability of Ukraine’s population to 
influence the top officials’ decisions is still limited by weak democratic institutions, 
and Western partners seem reluctant to publicly pressure Ukraine on defence reform 
issues – partly because co-operation in this area is deemed a success story, and partly 
because more attention is being paid to the need for democratic reforms. 
However, since even current defence reform plans have already gone beyond 
the list of problems that the military could resolve without the assistance of the 
civilian authorities and the support of a solid economic base, Western partners and 
civil society in Ukraine should consider that progress in defence reform will help 
highlight the urgency of democratising the entire system of state governance, 
including reforms in the political and economic spheres. 
 
 
Non-military dimension of SSR in Ukraine 
 
Only recently has the issue of SSR in Ukraine moved beyond issues of downsizing, 
restructuring, and establishing democratic civilian control over the Armed Forces. 
Thus, non-military (law-enforcement) security structures remain in the same essential 
form as the non-transparent (even to parliamentary control), non-reformed and non-
trusted replicas of their Soviet predecessors the KGB and militia (police) of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. This is largely due to the high level of involvement of 
these structures in the continuous struggle for political power in Ukraine and the 
parallel process of redistribution of property. Unfortunately, this involvement has 
been to the detriment of their primary mission – to fight criminal security threats – 
and to their reform to meet democratic standards.  
While in hard economic times the Ukrainian law-enforcement structures have 
usually been given the priority of scarce resources107 over the military, these same 
resources have not been used efficiently, due in part to the remaining cumbersome 
structures108 but also due to the absence of outside oversight – either by Parliament or 
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 See: “Transition to Professional Armed Forces in Ukraine: the Problems and Prospects”, Razumkov 
Centre analytical report. National Security & Defence, 2002, No.5, p.21. 
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 See, for instance, O.Havrylenko. “Does Ukraine Need a New Military Doctrine?” National Security 
& Defence, 2000, No.1, p.43. “The government financed the “National Defence” budget item at a level 
of 51.5 per cent of the quarterly plan [1999], the Border Troops – 43.6 per cent, the Internal Troops 
received 72.1 per cent of the planned amount, the National Guard – 72.2 per cent, and the Security 
Service – 82.3 per cent. Everyone may draw a conclusion without difficulty. What is difficult is 
proving that Ukraine is not building a police state.” 
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 See note 1. 
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public organisations – over the use of these resources. In addition, the common 
practice (until very recently) of appointing the heads of security structures solely on 
the basis of their loyalty to the President – rather than taking into account their 
professionalism – put additional limits on the reform of law-enforcement structures to 
improve democratisation and effectiveness.  
This approach certainly did not help in promoting public trust and support; 
rather, it resulted in a number of political scandals that affected the police and security 
services. These have included the murders of journalists Georgiy Gongadze and Igor 
Alexandrov and accusations against police and security in staging, or improperly 
handling, high-profile investigations into the assassinations of prominent opposition 
politicians (like Viacheslav Chornovil, the leader of the democratic party “Rukh”, 
who was killed in a traffic accident prior to the presidential elections of 1999) and 
“inconvenient” officials (like Valeriy Malev, head of the state arms-trading company 
“Ukrspetsexport”, who was killed in a traffic accident during the “Kolchuga” 
scandal109 in fall 2002). 
The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), is rather small in numbers, less visible, 
and has moderate support from the public. Although comparatively few, accusations 
against the SBU include involvement in coercive actions or eavesdropping against the 
political opposition. In contrast, respect for the police is far lower. Neglect by police 
of the actual needs of the population, as well as numerous cases of abuse of authority 
and criminal acts performed by police, suggest that the country’s leadership is not 
serious about democratising and improving the professionalism of police in order to 
provide real security to its citizens against the criminal world. Official concerns about 
law and order are rather declarative, and usually take the form of pressure from the 
highest police authorities on lower police structures to report a rosy statistical picture. 
The result is a disincentive to registering crimes, as well as cases of violence and even 
torture during investigation or detention. According to the 2003 Report by the Human 
Rights Commissioner of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) Nina 
Karpachova, “Tortures [during detention by police] are cruel, humiliating the honour 
and dignity of people, which has a systematic character for Ministry of Internal 
Affairs structures at the stage of investigation, and demonstrates about the brutal 
human rights violations and abuse of authority.”110 
Such a situation in the non-military security structures naturally had to come – 
sooner or later – in contradiction with the democratic aspirations of the majority of 
Ukrainian society. Thus, through the media, the Parliament, and political parties of 
democratic orientation, society has started to pay more attention to the activities of 
security structures. Significantly, even many representatives of the executive and pro-
presidential political parties appeared to be voicing concerns about the unreformed 
state of law-enforcement bodies. According to the former Head of the State 
                                                 
109
 “Kolchuga” is a Ukrainian-made anti-aircraft passive electronic detection system. The possibility of 
supplying Kolchuga systems to Iraq was – according to the former presidential bodyguard Major 
Mykola Melnychenko – discussed between President Kuchma and Malev. 
110
 See: Internet site of the Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada on Human Rights, Reports of the 
Commissioner [2], http://www.ombudsman.kiev.ua. 
Harmonie Papers No.17 
 
 151 
Commission for the Defence-Industrial Complex of Ukraine Volodymyr Horbulin:111 
“We never came close before to the issues of reforming other [non-military] security 
structures. Life itself poses the question of how to approach the reform of security 
structures, the SBU in particular.”112 
Former Ukrainian Defence Minister Olexandr Kuzmuck (currently a member 
of Ukraine's Parliament within the pro-presidential political bloc) on many occasions 
expressed his criticism of the fact that “after the dissolution of the USSR the number 
of [Ukrainian] Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel increased three fold, Internal 
Troops [of the Ministry of Internal Affairs] – four fold, and the SBU – six fold, while 
the Armed Forces were reduced to three times less.” 113 
To a certain extent, the almost total lack of progress in the reform of law-
enforcement structures, while rooted in local Ukrainian factors and legacies, was also 
the result of a lack of attention from Ukraine’s NATO and EU partners, who, during 
the 1990s, focused their security sector co-operation with Ukraine almost exclusively 
on defence issues. Only after the September 11 terrorist attacks did Ukraine’s Western 
partners start putting more emphasis on “new/soft security threats” (of a generally 
criminal nature), and, consequently, encouraging reforms of law-enforcement bodies 
and intelligence services. This dimension of common interests is already reflected in 
Ukraine-EU documents and in practice; for example, both the EU TACIS programme 
and the USA individually provide material and financial support to Ukraine’s Border 
Service. However, compared with the scale of defence co-operation, where Ukraine 
has some 600 co-operative events with NATO countries every year, co-operation with 
both NATO and EU in the area of law-enforcement is still in its embryonic state. 
A major shake-up in the leadership of Ukraine’s law-enforcement structures in 
the middle of 2003, which was accompanied by promising declarations, made some 
observers hopeful that SSR in the non-military area would accelerate. However, 
several months later the promised improvements have yet to materialise. In the case of 
Ukraine’s law-enforcement structures, the distance between public and official 
attitudes to the problem of reform continues to widen. The evident lack of political 
will of the country’s authorities to take real steps in democratising police and other 
law-enforcement bodies (Procurator Office, Tax Police, Customs) is one of the major 
factors contributing to the very low trust of the population in both the authorities and 
the law-enforcement structures. Progress in this dimension of Ukraine’s SSR will 
remain problematic until Ukrainian society is mature enough to put meaningful 
pressure on these structures to democratise.  
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 After this Commission was disbanded at the end of 2002, Mr. Horbulin was appointed to the post of 
the Head of the National Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine. He is also a former Secretary 
of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, 
112
 Intervention during the DCAF-sponsored conference “Parliamentary Control in the Sphere of 
Security and Defence”. Kyiv, September 26-27, 2002. 
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 See: “O. Kuzmuk points to the threat of turning Ukraine into military-police state.” Defense-
Express, November 12, 2002, http://www.defense-ua.com/rus. 
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Effect of NATO and EU enlargements on SSR in Ukraine 
 
Since early independence, Ukraine recognised the need for a multinational approach 
to security. This has included contribution to many UN peacekeeping operations, 
including NATO-led operations in the Balkans, as well as participation in NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace beginning in 1994. Ukraine also has reached a significant level 
of military co-operation with its Western neighbours through multinational efforts like 
the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion and most recently participation within the Polish sector 
of responsibility in Iraq; the Ukrainian-Romanian-Hungarian-Slovakian Tysa 
engineering battalion; NATO’s Transcarpathian flood control pilot project; and 
BLACKSEAFOR. These multilateral efforts require the development of 
interoperability, which, through the 1990s, increasingly meant matching NATO 
standards. Failure to meet these standards through peacetime training means that ad-
hoc arrangements must be made; this causes difficulties and may present a deadly 
threat for soldiers and for a mission.  
As Ukraine’s Western neighbours continue integration into NATO, their 
armed forces will increasingly operate according to NATO standards and procedures. 
In addition, other security sector structures – border control, intelligence services, law 
enforcement, judicial systems – will continue reforming to meet overall NATO 
standards for democracy and rule of law, as well as more specific EU standards in the 
area of Justice and Home affairs. As a result, even without its goals of NATO and EU 
membership, Ukraine would need to continue progress in SSR toward meeting EU 
and NATO standards – just to maintain effective co-operation with neighbours to the 
west. 
This challenge will be greatest for the non-military security sector institutions, 
which have the least experience in international co-operation. Border control issues 
will become crucial, particularly driven by Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and – after 
2007 – Romania’s implementation of the Schengen regime. This will firstly increase 
the need for Ukraine to co-operate effectively along its western frontier; secondly, it 
will also raise the need to strengthen Ukraine’s border regime along its eastern 
frontier, in order to prevent Ukraine’s becoming the westernmost outpost of a 
Eurasian zone of illegality and cross-border crime: trafficking in humans, drugs, arms, 
WMD, and so on. With regards to regional co-operation in the area of intelligence and 
law enforcement, Ukraine’s ability to meet NATO/EU standards will affect its 
inclusion into regional efforts at transnational policing and counter-terrorism.114  
Realising Ukraine’s declared intention to join NATO and the EU will require 
an even greater focus on SSR. Three key issues will need to be addressed by a 
comprehensive and systemic approach: 1) establishing democratic norms in the 
security sector, 2) ensuring a security system that meets modern needs at affordable 
cost, and last, but not least, 3) political factors. In the area of democratic standards for 
NATO and EU membership, Ukraine will need to meet overall requirements for 
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 For more details on the issue of fighting new security threats in the region, see, for instance 
L.Polyakov. “New Security Threats in Black Sea Region”, a chapter that will appear in The Black Sea 
Region: Cooperation and Security Building, edited by Oleksandr Pavliuk and Ivanna Klympush-
Tsintsadze, which will be published by M.E. Sharpe in cooperation with the East-West Institute.  
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democracy, supremacy of law, and human rights, as well as more specific 
requirements for the security sector; for example, democratic civil control, ensuring 
effective border regimes (that simultaneously form a barrier to criminal activity and 
allow the free movement of legitimate people and goods across the border), and 
standards of law enforcement behaviour. 
In order to maximise momentum towards reform, Ukrainian authorities should 
fully utilise today’s favourable political factors – the Euro-Atlantic course is 
overwhelmingly supported by parties and Government, and the population as a whole 
understands that the required reforms match their needs and the country’s 
shortcomings (see Diagram 2). While these are factors in favour of progress, other 
factors retard progress. This includes varying motivation and sincerity among various 
elements (i.e. the expert level, senior Security Sector officials, the political level, and 
society), which undermines political will and practical impact.  
 
DIAGRAM 2 
 
The importance of broad public support for NATO and EU membership bids 
cannot be overestimated as a factor in consolidating political will. For instance, the 
Czech leadership’s failure to mobilise citizens’ (and official) support for the NATO 
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air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 caused doubts among NATO members in the new 
partner’s loyalty and reliability. On the other hand, the Slovakian experience, where 
during 18 months 10 per cent of the citizens changed their mind in favour of NATO 
accession (see Diagram 3), is an example of the effectiveness of public informational 
policy if it is conducted properly and continuously. 
 
DIAGRAM 3 
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 But when Ukrainian authorities prefer trips to Brussels and meetings with NATO 
and EU officials over visits to Berdychiv and talks with Ukrainian people, it should be 
no wonder that the citizens’ attitude towards NATO is unstable and highly dependent 
on international developments. It is characterised by a high degree of ambivalence 
(see Diagram 4). Therefore, in Ukraine the factor of public attitudes toward NATO is 
so far a negative one. 
 
DIAGRAM 4 
 
 
Public opinion, however, will not change the reality of dual NATO/EU 
enlargement, which has become one of the great phenomena of modern history. This 
process will force Ukraine –regardless of the political leadership – to increase efforts 
to meet NATO/EU standards, in order to maintain regional co-operation and meet 
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common challenges. The process itself will also build its own dynamic; as the 
country’s Western neighbours are moving to EU/NATO standards, continued co-
operation will provide means for transferring knowledge and culture. In addition, 
NATO and EU enlargement to former “fraternal Socialist countries” can only increase 
Ukrainian citizens’ demands for change, particularly in area of democratisation. 
Linking democratisation and reform (which public supports) to NATO/EU accession 
(toward which the public is ambivalent or hostile) will be key to changing attitudes 
and strengthening political will. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The people are the ultimate holders of legal power in democracies. But when, as in 
Ukraine, they are gaining the necessary level of knowledge to evaluate the situation, 
but still lack the necessary power of influence it, they either watch passively, or try to 
struggle. Informed citizens usually attempt to make authorities accountable and 
security structures more democratic, open and effective. But when people know little, 
they will surely be passive, and will not stimulate the improvement of security 
structures, which in turn will lead the security structures to either stagnation and 
degradation, or possible descent into abuse.  
The most important effect of dual NATO/EU enlargement for Ukraine is 
evident – it is Ukraine's foreign policy strategic course of Euro-Atlantic integration. 
This Euro-Atlantic course requires commitment to democratic values of transparency 
and accountability. Although the criteria of NATO membership, by contrast to those 
of the EU, are formulated in a very general manner, even that brief list has its 
priorities – political and economic issues prevail over defence and security.  
Even without the Euro-Atlantic course, changes in the Ukrainian security 
neighbourhood would increase the importance of meeting NATO and EU standards, 
even if just to maintain the current level of regional co-operation. Participation in PfP 
and NATO-Ukraine mechanisms has been a driving force for deepening such co-
operation, which is now having a growing impact on the country’s development.  
However, we should admit that to date the influence of NATO procedures on 
internal processes in Ukraine is mostly limited to the Armed Forces. To effectively 
promote change, Ukraine’s co-operation with an enlarging NATO and EU will need 
to better match the priorities for SSR – especially in the non-military area – in terms 
of identifying “needs and options” for the country’s SSR, and then working to achieve 
higher security and save resources. But this process can only be effective if Ukraine 
gives priority to SSR and acts in systematic way. Action cannot be limited to agreeing 
an Action Plan with NATO and the EU (and perhaps eventually participation in 
MAP); it must be supported by national procedures that are aimed at supporting a 
process of systemic transformation. These national procedures must: clearly identify 
national security interests and link them to tools (structures) and resources (budget 
and personnel); bring together planning (via the President), budgeting (via the 
Government and parliament) and execution (responsibility); and develop political and 
societal consensus on security needs and the price to be paid. 
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Ukraine has now accumulated a certain amount of knowledge and experience 
in security sector reform, in particular through co-operation with NATO and the EU. 
However, this knowledge has yet to be effectively applied to the practice of SSR in 
Ukraine, especially with regard to the non-military security structures. Further 
progress will depend on the ability to expedite the democratic political and economic 
transformations in the country, which determine the success of SSR. This process will 
be supported by Ukraine’s NATO and EU bid, which will require Ukraine to meet 
high standards of democratisation. However, the challenge of generating public 
support remains. In this respect, linking democratisation and reform (which the public 
supports) to NATO/EU accession (which the public is ambivalent or hostile to) will 
be key to changing attitudes and to the success of SSR in Ukraine. 
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XV. AGENDA FOR MOLDOVA 
 
David Greenwood and Peter Volten 
 
 
In Moldova’s security politics the issue of Transdniestria is ever-present. That is 
inevitable. For so long as the former Soviet republic is divided ‘the construction of the 
nation and the state’ is unfinished and development of the country’s economy is 
thwarted. For so long as the Russian Federation helps sustain the secessionists, there 
is a risk that ‘proper’ Moldova will find fulfilment of its European vocation difficult if 
not impossible. For so long as the rulers in Tiraspol maintain – and evidently profit 
from – an environment in which illegal migration, smuggling, human- and drugs-
trafficking (and criminality generally) flourish, the powers-that-be in Chisinau – of 
whatever political stripe – face the danger that the territory they control may become 
infected too (as may, indeed, have happened already.) 
Renewed efforts to resolve the long ‘frozen conflict’ were a feature of 2003. 
Two developments were instrumental: President Voronin’s initiative in shifting the 
negotiating ground by proposing exploration of constitutionally-based federal options; 
and a shift from formal interest to concrete involvement on the part of the European 
Union (EU). In the event, however, nothing came of these endeavours. At the year’s 
end the constitutional talks were ‘on ice’ and the EU’s engagement had accomplished 
little. It was business as usual for the secessionists, and the Russians had in effect 
abrogated an undertaking to withdraw their troops from Transdniestra. 
Thus the immediate prospect is that the issue will continue to cast its shadow 
over the affairs of the Republic generally and security-sector policy-making in 
particular. Reform is frustrated by the authorities’ uncertainties about the fundamental 
question: ‘what do we want armed forces for in present circumstances?’ Little serious 
attention is paid to transparency-building because it is seen as a matter of secondary 
importance. Action to implement the 2002 Concept of Military Reform is therefore 
slow to materialise; and it is anybody’s guess when matching prospectuses for reform 
will appear covering interior troops and police forces (not to mention the judiciary). 
What can Moldova do to escape this impasse? One option is to wait and see 
how events unfold. This is what one of our Moldovan contributors appears to be 
advocating when he says that NATO and EU enlargement up to the country’s borders, 
the Union’s ‘wider Europe’ policy and Moldova’s strategic goal of EU integration 
‘might be those factors that could provide new solutions and give a new momentum to 
[Security-Sector Reform]’ (Emphasis added.) 
There is an alternative, however. It is to start at once on things that are going 
to have to be done whatever course the Transdniestria issue takes. There are several 
such things, all necessary steps en route to the integration goal, all responsive to the 
EU’s ‘wider Europe’ thinking and the imminence of its (and NATO’s) enlargement; 
and all practical propositions for Chisinau’s short-to-medium term policy agenda. 
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1. Measures to improve accountability and transparency in the conduct of 
defence and wider security-sector affairs, including legislative oversight. There 
are general ‘good governance’ arguments for action under this heading, of course. 
Early action should commend itself to Moldova, however, because the basic bargain 
offered by the ‘wider Europe’ initiative is that ‘in return for concrete measures 
demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and 
institutional reforms, all the neighbouring countries should be offered the prospect of 
a stake in the internal market … accompanied by further integration and liberalisation 
to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital’. This is quite 
apart from the domestic benefits likely to accrue for Moldova in countering 
incompetence and corruption in the public service. 
Whether the motivation is ‘demonstrating shared [democratic] values’ or 
introducing ‘institutional reforms’, there should be explicit acknowledgement by the 
authorities of their obligation to reveal, explain and justify what they do and what 
they spend, and by elected representatives of their responsibility to hold ministers, top 
officials and officers accountable. Appropriate procedures should be put in place on 
that basis: for provision of information to the legislature and for interrogation of the 
executive branch. Introduction of arrangements for day-to-day parliamentary liaison 
on the Romanian model should be considered. In the specific area of ex post financial 
accountability, the competence, independence and effectiveness of the national audit 
bureau should be assured. 
Moreover, ‘the right to know’ how the business of government is being 
conducted – in the security area as in any other – extends to the media, interest-groups 
and other civil society institutions. There should be no excessive resort to ‘need to 
know’ restrictions. The 2002 Concept of Military Reform says that Moldova plans 
dialogue with other countries on ‘democratic command and control’, but there is no 
need to await the outcome of more exchanges of views before taking action here. 
 
2. Overhaul of the central organisation of defence and of non-military security-
sector bodies. The 2002 Concept refers to this also. Specifically it promises ‘creation 
of a civilian and military command structure of the Armed Forces with a detailed 
delimitation of the attributions in the sphere of political, administrative and military 
command’ – but at an unspecified time in the period 2005-2008. In this area, however, 
there is little merit in putting-off to tomorrow what could be started today. The 
clarification of civil direction and ‘attributions’ of authority is something that should 
also be done for other ‘armed structures of the state’. Under this heading as under the 
last, what is proposed falls under the rubric of ‘demonstrating shared values’ or 
introducing ‘institutional reforms’ that is the essence of the ‘two-way street’ approach 
envisaged by the EU in its relations with neighbours and would-be members. 
This is not the place for elaboration on what such an undertaking might entail. 
Suffice it to say that among the features of a sound system one looks for, among many 
other things, safeguards against the abuse of presidential power (and the substitution 
of ‘regime security’ for ‘national security’ as the organisation’s rationale) and 
measures to ensure that the uniformed military cannot act as ‘a law unto themselves’. 
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3. Progressive steps towards an all-round strengthening of border controls (for 
persons and goods). Although this question has been considered hitherto mainly in 
the context of the Transdniestria issue, with particular reference to the effort to extract 
from Ukraine a commitment to joint posts on that part of the Moldovan state frontier 
that borders the breakaway entity, it is in fact a more fundamental matter. In fact, it is 
a precondition of any progress towards the implementation of ‘wider Europe’ notions 
in EU-Moldovan relations that Moldova should fully control all its external borders. 
(From mid-2004 there will be a NATO interest here as well.) 
Nor is this simply a matter of producing a watertight frontier. The border 
regime required is one that simultaneously forms a barrier to criminal activity of all 
kinds while allowing the free passage of legitimate traffic (persons and goods). 
Needless to say, this is a challenge with which many others are wrestling, especially 
in South-Eastern Europe. Accordingly, Moldova should exploit its regional 
connections in addressing the problem: for example, through the South-East European 
Co-operation Process (SEECP), the Southeast Europe Co-operation Initiative (SECI) 
and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. 
 
4. Conduct of thorough-going Defence Review (as advised by NATO), using the 
opportunity to prepare for introduction of a coherent system for resource 
allocation that would serve as a valuable tool for future military decision-making. 
The Constitution of Moldova proclaims the permanent neutrality of the country, 
ruling out membership of military blocs. However, a decade ago it was decided that 
this should be counterbalanced by extensive external co-operation, so Moldova has 
taken part in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme since its inception. 
(The Framework Document was signed on 4 March 1994.) This has involved 
participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in which the Republic’s 
defence dispositions are scrutinised by NATO Headquarters staff. 
The 2003 PARP ‘round’ resulted in a recommendation that – based on a 
revision of the 1995 National Security Strategy – Moldova should conduct a Defence 
Review, an exercise for which assistance might be available. The country should take 
this advice and begin relevant work during 2004/5. A focused approach similar to that 
adopted by the Slovak Republic in 2001/2 might commend itself. Moldova should 
explore trade-offs among capabilities, cost and risk, perhaps using the method 
employed by the Bulgarians in preparing their Plan 2004 (in the later 1990s) and 
subsequently used by them to develop a coherent planning, programming and 
budgeting system as a basic tool for resource allocation in defence. 
Moldova should aim to use as a vehicle for ensuring implementation of the 
Review’s outcome(s) – but not as a substitute for the exercise itself – the device of an 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), similar to Ukraine’s Action Plan with 
NATO. This is an idea floated by one of the Moldovan contributors to the present 
volume. 
 In our view these should be Moldova’s priorities in the months ahead, 
whether or not there is headway in resolving the Transdniestria question. 
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XVI. AGENDA FOR UKRAINE 
 
Peter Volten and David Greenwood 
 
 
Ukraine aspires to join both NATO and the European Union (EU). So far as NATO is 
concerned, the country is not preparing for early accession through participation in the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. However, it has a long history of working-
level co-operation with the military organisation, pursued since mid-1997 under a 
Charter on Distinctive Partnership and latterly on the basis of a NATO-Ukraine 
Action Plan. There is, for instance, a functioning Joint Working Group on Defence 
Reform. Since 2001 the country has also taken an active part in NATO’s full annual 
Planning and Review Process (PARP). To date, though, a key assumption underlying 
military provision has been that – notwithstanding the contingents Ukraine has sent 
over the years to serve on multinational peace-support operations – the armed forces 
must be capable of acting independently and, if necessary, alone. The question is: 
should this change if the country envisages a shift to MAP-status; and, if so, with 
what implications for force structures, force levels, equipment, deployment, training 
and so on – and at what cost? 
This complex question is currently being addressed in the major review which 
is provisionally scheduled for completion in June 2004. When it is completed Ukraine 
will have to decide on the tempo of implementation and priorities. If showing 
readiness for NATO membership is then a firm goal, the country will also have to pay 
attention to its capacity to sustain an appropriate, affordable and acceptable defence 
effort and to practise democratic-style civil-military relations in running it. 
The last requirement is also relevant to the quest for EU membership or, what 
is the immediate future prospect, for a good neighbourhood relationship with the 
Union in line with the latter’s ‘wider Europe’ initiative. The basic bargain that the EU 
offers here is – in the words of the Commission’s March 2003 Communication on the 
subject – ‘the prospect of a stake in the internal market … accompanied by further 
integration and liberalisation’ as a quid pro quo for ‘concrete measures demonstrating 
shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional 
reforms.’ 
A test of Ukraine’s seriousness of intent here – whether seen as an indicator of 
‘shared values’ or as a key ‘institutional reform’ – will be the successful 
subordination of all the country’s non-military security-sector organisations to 
legitimate direction and democratic control. Almost without exception these law-
enforcement structures and agencies remain unreformed, unaccountable and non-
transparent; and all who have contributed to this volume from or on Ukraine attach 
the highest priority to remedying this state of affairs. 
Like our contributors we also think reform here should top Ukraine’s policy 
agenda in the short-to-medium term. 
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1. Address the problem of the country’s unreformed, unaccountable and non-
transparent power structures by conducting a comprehensive Security and Law 
Enforcement Review – a counterpart to the current Defence Review (2003/4) – 
under high-level ministerial direction. There was a major shake-up in the leadership 
of Ukraine’s law-enforcement structures in the middle of 2003, accompanied by 
reform pledges. However, by the end of the year the promised improvements had yet 
to materialise. A high-profile ‘review’ format might be a suitable way to revive 
interest in the challenge. Giving visibility to the non-military organisations’ appetite 
for resources, coming on the heels of publicity for the armed forces’ finances, would 
be appropriate too. In addition the inquiry would cast light on who directs the police 
and security services, and thereby perhaps explain such episodes as the murders of 
journalists Gongadze and Alexandrov and of prominent opposition politicians (like 
Viacheslav Chornovil, the leader of the democratic party “Rukh”, who was killed in a 
traffic accident prior to the presidential elections of 1999) and “inconvenient” 
officials (like Valeriy Malev, head of the state arms-trading company 
“Ukrspetsexport”, who was killed in a traffic accident in fall 2002). 
What most stand in need of illumination, though, are the statistics that caused 
concern to former Defence Minister Olexandr Kuzmuck (currently a member of 
Ukraine's Parliament within the pro-presidential political bloc): that ‘after the 
dissolution of the USSR the number of [Ukrainian] Ministry of Internal Affairs 
personnel increased threefold, Internal Troops [of the Ministry of Internal Affairs] – 
four-fold, and the SBU [Ukrainian Security Service] – six-fold, while the Armed 
Forces were reduced to three times less.’ 
 
2. Evaluate critically the outcome(s) of the Marchuk Defence Review when 
known (mid-2004?), identify the highest priorities, and arrange their earliest 
possible implementation. The reason for inclusion of this item is straightforward. 
Ukraine has conducted reviews before – supposedly once-for-all exercises in 
identifying ‘needs’ and (preferred) ‘options’ – but has often failed to follow through. 
That should not be allowed to happen this time. The judgement of two of our 
Ukrainian contributors is apposite here: that the defence ministry needs to ‘get in front 
of the current cycle of step-by-step reductions and ever-thinner distribution of scanty 
resources’; and to end the habit of ‘promising declarations’ that lead to ‘associated 
actions’ which are ‘inconsistent or non-existent’.  
It will take time to digest the results of the Marchuk review, so 
implementation is unlikely to be contemplated before the final quarter of 2004. At that 
stage, though, there should be no delay. As it happens there should then be a ‘window 
of opportunity’ in the aftermath of the presidential ballot. 
If Ukraine has been encouraged at NATO’s Istanbul Summit in June 2004 to 
actively prepare for accession, it will at this point already be committed to the 
country’s first MAP-cycle (2004/5). This will be a powerful aid to self-discipline in 
preparations, if the experience of the last ‘neighbourhood states’ to earn membership 
invitations is anything to go by. Each of this trio – Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria – 
gained hugely from participation in the MAP procedure. 
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3. Take steps to strengthen civilian direction of the National Armed Forces and 
civilian input at all stages of defence decision-making, and to develop effective 
legislative oversight of security affairs. The end-2004 ‘window of opportunity’ for 
getting prompt implementation of the Defence Review’s recommendations should 
also be exploited to take steps in the direction of ‘democratic-style civil-military 
relations’ in Ukraine, a precondition for NATO entry laid down at the very start of the 
Organisation’s post-Cold War enlargement and a subject of MAP scrutiny. The 
necessary legal base exists in a 2003 Law; but one of our Ukrainian contributors says 
that there is a need for a complementary set of ‘normative documents’ to enhance all-
round civil control of the military. This is assured at the highest level, because of the 
pivotal place occupied by the Council of National Security and Defence (CNSD). 
However, this body’s dominant position raises problems of its own: ‘authoritarian 
methods of control over force structures’ based on appointments made ‘according to 
the principle of personal devotion to the President or loyalty to the party’. Lower 
down, Ukraine has neither balanced proportions between civilians and military staff 
nor definite differentiation of their functions and authorities. Nor are their adequate 
security education programmes for civilian personnel. The result, our author says, is a 
lack of competence of civil servants (and ‘experts’) and a profound distrust of the 
civilian leadership from the side of the professional military.           
Regarding legislative oversight, the word ‘develop’ is used in this heading 
advisedly – and not optimistically. There are no political parties in the Ukranian Rada, 
as that term is generally understood, but rather groups called parties which represent 
‘interests’. As a result, holding the executive to account – for its performance in the 
security domain or any other – is arbitrary and capricious, leading our local author to 
write, rather plaintively, that ‘we should work a lot at making the system of 
democratic control over the security and defence sphere meet the criteria of civilised 
countries’. 
 
4. Prioritise transparency-building in the conduct of defence affairs, wider 
security-sector affairs and generally; and make this the business of dedicated 
professionals. This item deserves its place on Ukraine’s policy agenda for the short-
to-medium term for several reasons. First, in the absence of effective legislative 
oversight the onus of holding governments to account falls on think-tank analysts and 
academics, the print and broadcast media. They require and should have access to the 
information they need to fulfil this function. Secondly, the role of free media in 
disseminating public information as well as providing critical feedback is of prime 
importance in times of change, when popular understanding can contribute to success 
and alienating citizens spells failure. (It is not for trivial reasons that NATO regards 
positive public attitudes to the Organisation as an indicator of a would-be member’s 
readiness for entry.) Thirdly, there is the wider issue of state-society relations in 
Ukraine on which subject one of our authors offers the encapsulation: ‘a shrewd 
information policy will aim not to suppress information but to create trust’. 
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